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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the progress of contemporary republican theory from its civic roots to its 
modern conception. Republicanism is a paradigm of liberty, and the transformation of this 
theory of liberty from concepts of self-government and civic virtue through to contemporary 
ideas of non-domination and political autonomy will be examined. Using Andrew Fletcher’s 
particular brand of civic-humanist republicanism as a critical model, this thesis will show that 
republicanism is vital for addressing the issues an increasingly interdependent and unjust 
global system brings about.  
 
This thesis considers Andrew Fletcher’s contribution to republican political theory and 
demonstrates that his unique approach to liberty, peace and the European political order is an 
important contribution to the canon of political thought used in contemporary scholarship to 
understand the political ordering of society. Furthermore, his contribution to the debate 
surrounding the Treaty of Union is a relevant starting point for consideration of the current 
Scottish Independence question. It shows that Fletcher’s civic-humanist republican theories 
are both relevant and necessary for the contemporary understanding of the republican theory 
of liberty, narrowing the gap between the dominant ideologies. Where communitarianism lays 
at one end of the spectrum, and libertarianism the other, Fletcher’s own brand of civic-
humanist republicanism narrows this broad spectrum. 
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An Introduction to Fletcher 
 
Contemporary republican theory comprises arguments for self-government, non-
domination, freedom, political autonomy and egalitarianism, it also lacks clarity. 
Different authors will place emphasis on different aspects, and ignore others 
completely. It is because of this versatility of form, and the different interpretations of 
its core doctrine, that republicanism as it is understood today lacks clarity as a 
normative theory. The theory of non-domination proposed by Pettit, and notions of 
self-government suggested by Arendt and Habermas, all have their roots in the early 
modern models of Cicero, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington. However, this is 
where the so-called ‘early modern’ canon of republicanism tends to end with most 
writers. Some may pay tribute to Montesquieu, and will refer to Locke as a liberal 
republican, but the republican writers of the early seventeenth-century to the 
enlightenment, when republican theories were at their most prevalent and most 
significant to contemporary political thought, are largely disregarded. In particular, 
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, writing at the turn of the eighteenth-century, proposed a 
modern political republican model much more relevant to contemporary politics than 
Machiavelli, incorporating a conception of commerce and a coherent European (if not 
global) political society. Fletcher recognises the corrupting yet necessary force of 
commerce for European peace and proposes a theory of federal perpetual peace 
based on a republic of republics which can be utilised when considering the ordering of 
global politics. Despite this, and his popularity in his native Scotland, his theories have 
gone largely unexamined. Fletcher receives no more than the occasional reference or 
discussion in contemporary economics, with regards to civic humanism and 
Machiavelli in political theory texts, or within historical investigation and the Treaty of 
Union of 1707. His contribution to politics, not least his contribution to republican 
political theory, has largely been overlooked.1      
                                                          
1 See for example, Hont, Istvan Jealousy of Trade. International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical 
Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Robbins, Caroline. The Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthman. Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund. 2004  and many of the great insights by Roger A. Mason 
including: in Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603.Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. Mason, Roger A (ed) Scotland and England 1286-1815. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd. 1987. 
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Scholars of republican theory have investigated the British heritage of 
republicanism through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it’s geographical 
scope is limited; as Andrew Hadfield reminds us, republicanism was not an 
autonomous political language but rather a ‘a literary phenomenon . . . because it 
consisted of a series of stories’.2 According to Honohan, the modern tradition of civic 
republicanism has roots with the early modern past of ancient Greece and Rome, and 
although Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington and Fletcher, through to the revolutionaries 
in America all wrote in very different worlds with very different intentions, all would 
have considered themselves as ‘building on *the+ ancient foundations’ of the early 
modern scholars.3 As Hadfield shows, republican thought was prevalent far beyond the 
debates in philosophy and politics. Shakespeare’s retelling of the Rape of Lucrece is 
indicative of his enthusiasm for political themes and debate. He portrays Lucrece as a 
republican heroine, whose fate birthed the history of the Roman republic. Buchanan’s 
retelling of the same story argues that tyrants often disguise their true natures 
because they are aware of the consequences of their actions, ‘For the hatred aroused 
by a single misdeed loses them all gratitude for their ostentatious generosity’. Their 
aim is to act ‘for the sake of their own absolute power rather than the advantage of 
the people’ and to ‘enjoy their own pleasures’ instead of governing in the interests of 
the people they are supposed to serve.4 This dishonest and closed form of government 
encourages the further vice of bad rule - flattery, the ‘nurse of tyranny and the most 
grievous plague of lawful kingship’. 5  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Pocock also looks to Fletcher in his examination of the influence of Machiavelli in Pocock. The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975. 
2 Hadfield, Andrew. “Republicanism in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Britain”. In David Armitage. British 
Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory 1500 – 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
3 Honohan, Iseult. Civic Republicanism. London. Routledge. 2002: 15. 
4 Buchanan. George. A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of 
George Buchanans’ De Iure Regni Apud Scotus Dialogus.  Roger A. Mason, and Martin S. Smith (ed. and trans.), 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004: 85-87. 
5 Buchanan, ibid. 3. 
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Hadfield reckons that the historical and theoretical debate about early-modern 
republicanism has ‘concentrated on the question of whether it was a language or a 
programme, a means of articulating an alternative to monarchical government, or a 
plan of action designed to replace hereditary monarchy’ leading to an over-inclusive 
understanding that risks seeing any reference to ‘virtue’ as republicanism in miniature, 
or a programme in opposition with purtianism and Royalism.6 Virtue and political 
participation are considered vital to sustaining civilised society; a community of like-
minded people who share common goals of a wider nature than merely familial or 
other small associations. English republicanism might be described as a faith in the 
power of institutions to circumscribe the authority of the monarch, allied to a belief 
that such institutions - Parliament, the law courts, local and national government - had 
the means to make individuals more virtuous and so better able to govern.7 It is 
therefore to the notions of self-government, as understood by enhanced civic 
participation and active public life, that republicanism holds most credence.  
 
Contemporary republican thought, associated with Pettit, Arendt and others, 
emphasises freedom as non-domination as the motivational factor at the heart of the 
tradition. This civic republican interpretation is often in conflict with the civic humanist 
interpretation that argues the goods of active political participation: civic virtue, the 
common good, etc., should be understood in the early modern republican tradition as 
intrinsically valuable components of the human experience. This positive conception of 
liberty holds that political freedom is a share in the good life: understood as active 
citizenship and civic virtue; the political arena is ‘a kind of theatre where freedom 
could appear’, ‘ a realm where freedom is a worldly reality’.8 Civic republicanism on the 
other hand, has a decidedly different conception of liberty; a negative theory of 
freedom as freedom from dependence or the domination of an arbitrary power.9 The 
                                                          
6 Hadfield. ibid:112 
7 Hadfield. passim. Hadfield‟s chapter illustrates many republican theories to be found in literature and poetry as well 
as political theory. 
8 Arendt, Hannah. What is Freedom? Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: 
Penguin books. 1993: 154. (emphasis added) 
9 See Skinner, Quentin The Idea of Negative Liberty, in Philosophy of History: Essays on the Historiography of 
Philosophy, Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Skinner (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 
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early modern values at the core of republican theory: mixed government; political 
participation; and avoidance of corruption, are instrumental in maintaining political 
freedom rather than intrinsic as the civic humanists maintain. However, both traditions 
agree that freedom can be achieved through government; self-government does not 
imply complete freedom from any form of governance; citizens are subject to the rule 
of law, ‘obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is freedom’. 10 
Furthermore, both traditions agree that anyone who is subject to the arbitrary rule of 
another is not self-governing.  
 
Frustratingly, there is little apparent clarity and conceptual coherence in the 
thought of contemporary republican authors who are concerned with republican 
themes. There is little doubt that there is a renewed interest in republicanism, but as 
Dagger comments, ‘it is not clear that the republican tradition truly speaks to 
contemporary concerns’.11 Michael Sandel argues that early modern republican ideas 
are a necessary prescription for the trials of today’s modern polity, ‘procedural 
liberalism’ has overwhelmed (American) politics, leaving politics deprived of debates 
concerning citizenship, self-government, civic virtue and the community. 12  As a 
consequence, there is widespread disenchantment with the contemporary political 
process; the liberal agenda lacking a moral discourse: the early modern republican civic 
virtue and citizenship, which offer empowerment and enfranchisement by narrowing 
the gap between the state and the community.13 
 
In his 2006 article, Dagger attempts to convince his readers that the revival of 
republicanism is a good thing; that it can address the political and economic concerns 
and contribute to the challenges of the twenty-first century. Republicanism is first and 
foremost a theory of freedom, and only secondly is it a theory of government. It 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Maynor, John W. Republicanism in the Modern World. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2003. Lovett, Frank. “Milton's Case 
for a Free Commonwealth,” American Journal of Political Science. 49, 2005: 466–478.  
10 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On the Social Contract.R.D. Masters. (ed and trans) New York: St Martin‟s Press. 1978: 
56. 
11 Dagger, Richard. “Neo-Republicanism and the Civic Economy”. Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 2006 5: 151. 
12 Sandel, Michael. Democracy’s Discontent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1996. 
13 Sandel, Michael, ibid: 323 
10 
 
benefits from a long tradition of ideals of freedom; from the Ciceronian independence 
of the Roman citizen, through Machiavellian equal citizens of republican Florence who 
distinguished themselves from the dominated subjects of Catholic Rome and the 
courts of Europe, and through the Commonwealth-men of Britain who argued against 
arbitrary rule, divine rights and absolutism. This commonwealth theme was picked up 
in the eighteenth-century by the colonists of the American Revolution who fought 
against the domination of a foreign arbitrary parliament. The current renewal of 
republican thought owes a great debt to these theories from ancient Rome, Italy, 
England and America. All recognise domination and arbitrary power as the rival to the 
civic community; freedom from domination means equality and dignity, freedom from 
fear and deference.  
 
Despite this, there is a lot of scepticism surrounding the efficacy of 
contemporary republican theory as a normative political theory. The scepticism stems 
from the claim that republicanism sacrifices individual autonomy in favour of 
communal identities, claiming that individual agency is a function of collective identity. 
Republicanism is often presented in a negative position in opposition to liberalism, 
finding fault with its excessive individualism and support for a morally wanting political 
culturism, as it advocates a political version of communitarianism which supports the 
individual freedom of citizens through their civic involvement in the community and in 
politics. Others claim that republicanism comes too close to liberalism,14 rendering it 
meaningless; ‘Either Republicanism is non-threatening because it is little more than a 
somewhat archaic rhetorical skin for a body of modern liberalism or, if substantively 
distancing itself from liberal precepts is overtly oppressive to a troubling degree’.15 But 
for any political theory to have relevance in the context of contemporary politics, it 
must adopt a basic liberal foundation which recognises individual rights; and every 
contemporary political theory which claims any degree of plausibility must be in some 
                                                          
14 Patten, Alan. “The Republican Critique of Liberalism”, British Journal of Political Science , 26, 1996:25–44. 
Haakonssen, K. “Republicanism”, in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds, Robert E. Goodin 
and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993. 
15 Brennan, Geoffrey and Lomasky, Loren. “Against Reviving Republicanism”. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
5, no 2, 2006: 222. 
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way committed to equality.16 For Fletcher and the neo-republicans, this commitment is 
both moral and political.17  Furthermore, the emergence of republicanism as an 
alternative to liberalism and communitarianism has been an important shift in 
contemporary political theory; freedom from domination being compared to the 
liberal theory of freedom from interference,18 or the communitarian proposal that the 
people as a collective body are the rightful possessors of sovereignty, and this 
sovereignty cannot be surrendered to any representative.19  
 
The enduring importance of freedom and how it is understood within the 
republican tradition is masterfully examined by Quentin Skinner and Phillip Pettit. Both 
present a republican theory of liberty that is invaluable to our understanding of 
politics. Pettit presents freedom as non-domination as the core ethical and political 
commitment of the republican tradition. He tells us that a society based on the 
republican tradition will protect its citizens from domination.20 Republicanism offers a 
practical solution to dependency; freedom as non-domination allows for a coercive 
state presence that does not interfere with freedom proper, but only restricts 
movement in collaboration with civil society and the common good. Republicanism 
emphasises familiar ideas: the importance of having a constitution, written or 
otherwise, within which government has to operate; the desirability of those in 
government being elected in such a way as to represent all the different elements of 
the populace; regular elections to limit the tenure of the executive to avoid arbitrary or 
accumulation of power; emphasis on the rule of law that the judicial, executive and 
legislative powers are divided and each authority subject to checks and balances; the 
existence of an active, concerned citizenry. Republicanism therefore offers a solution 
                                                          
16 See Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990, 
4-5 and Dworkin, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1977: 179-83. 
17 Of course, for Fletcher this equality was limited to male property owners, and he countenanced a form of domestic 
servitude as a means of taking men out of their miserable condition to the improvement of society as a whole – 
landowners and churches no longer required to provide for the poor, and thus dragging the whole system down.  
18 Goodin, Robert E. “Folie Republicaine”. Annual Review of Political Science 6, 2003: 71. 
19 Rousseau. Ibid. Book III Chapter XV. 
20 Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997: 161. 
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to the challenge of how the state can defend the populace from domination whilst 
ensuring it does not become the source of domination itself. 21 
 
Yet, the problem remains that republican political theory is still to be accepted 
as a viable source of political order in its own right. Given this, this thesis will examine 
the utility of republican political theory as can be found within the political pamphlets 
of Andrew Fletcher, and how his influence can make contemporary republican political 
thought acceptable within a new political order. It will address the question as to 
whether republicanism is an obsolete model that is at odds with a modern liberal 
society, or whether it comes too close to liberalism to lose its claim to any 
distinctiveness. Or, as this thesis concludes, contemporary republicanism based on the 
civic-humanist model of Andrew Fletcher, based on civic participation, non-
dependence and moral autonomy incorporates communitarian and liberal values, 
reinterprets the  principles and yields a republican end product.  
 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: how can contemporary political 
society apply Andrew Fletcher’s theory of republicanism to contemporary republican 
theory, making it more acceptable as a doctrine for justice and order.  Can we make a 
normative argument for political order based on enhanced civic participation in public 
life? By highlighting the theories of Andrew Fletcher that unite those of contemporary 
republican, cosmopolitan republican and communitarian approaches, as well as the 
liberal aspects that relate to modern politics, this thesis underlines the efficacy of his 
civic republican model. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that Andrew Fletcher 
has a modern understanding of politics; that his vision for a federal Britain and Europe 
based on the early modern republican model incorporating civic virtue and the more 
modern factor of commerce is relevant to today’s political order. I will compare 
Fletcher’s models for political order, non-dependence, liberty and virtue with those of 
contemporary republican and communitarian writers. Contemporary republicanism is 
                                                          
21 Richardson. Henry S. Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
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not a direct revival of the early modern model, and nor should it be, but both are 
committed to freedom, equality, liberty and justice - the attributes necessary for a 
political theory to have credence in modern liberal society. It is within the republican 
model that we find the normative features of self-governance and political action 
necessary for building just and egalitarian societies.  
 
There is still some controversy concerning the historiography of the republican 
tradition of thought; how we should interpret the tradition, its development and its 
role in contemporary political thought. From here the introduction will be divided into 
three parts: a discussion of methodology and historiography, and the method used to 
examine the theories of Andrew Fletcher. This is followed by an outline of the context 
of Fletcher; his history and the political ideas prevalent in his time; those theories 
directly related to his own political intentions involving the questions of authority and 
union in Britain, both historical and philosophical, and the deeper questions of 
sovereignty and natural rights which form the basis of his own philosophical 
knowledge. Finally, I provide a brief sketch of the arguments to be utilised in order to 
show the valuable contribution Fletcher can make to contemporary republican political 
theory. 
 
Methodology 
 There are copious studies of political ideas around the time of the Scottish-
Enlightenment yet Scottish political thought in the preceding years have been 
neglected. The aim of this thesis is to rectify the omission of these fundamental 
political ideas by approaching a profoundly influential political thinker in pre-
enlightenment Scotland. Andrew Fletcher (1653-1716) was politically active and 
influential in the years prior to the union of Scotland and England in 1707. His political 
theories are antecedent to those of the ideas popularized with the Enlightenment, 
considering ideas of social contract theory, consent/consensus, political obligations 
and authority, and the right to resist. In order to approach this neglected yet critical 
14 
 
period of political philosophy it is necessary to consider the methodological questions 
which arise in this area of historical enquiry.  
 
 ‘History I take to be a mode of thought in which events, human actions, beliefs, 
manners of thinking, are considered in relation to the conditions, or the circumstantial 
context, in which they appeared. This circumstantial context, however, is composed of 
other events, actions, and beliefs, just as the context of a word in a sentence is 
composed of other words from which we gather its meaning on that particular 
occasion. That is to say, history is not a mode of thought in which we understand 
events, actions, and beliefs as examples of the operation of general laws, but one in 
which we understand events, actions, and beliefs in relation to things of the same kind–
namely, other events, actions, and beliefs. The question the historian is out to answer 
is: What is the significance of this event, or action, or belief in the context of events and 
beliefs in which it appears.’22 
 
The history of political thought has inspired debate concerning the utility of the 
study of past ideas, whether history can only ever describe the past or if there are 
benefits to be gained that are applicable to future dilemmas. The history of thought in 
any discipline is cumulative, where theorists build upon the work of their predecessors 
in the given field and are subsequently used as a basis for the theories of their 
successors. Some accounts of history may be outside our realm of experience. We 
cannot experience life as a citizen in the developing democracy of Athens but does this 
mean that we must reject the assumptions and political contributions of Plato and 
Aristotle as fiction? Collingwood would disagree. It is his belief that history has the 
important task of uncovering how we structure our own experience of reality. The past 
does not live independent of the present, it lives on in the present, historical 
knowledge is self-knowledge.23 E.H Carr suggests we think of history less as a straight 
line, and more as a winding procession that loops as our circumstances bringing us 
                                                          
22 Oakeshott, Michael. On History and Other Essays. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983: 1. 
23Collingwood, R.G. The Idea of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.  
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closer to some parts of the past than to others. Thus giving us good reason to consider 
the ideas of the past; allowing us to avoid making the same mistakes, or reinventing 
the wheel. This is not to say that studying the ideas of the past will solve current 
issues, but it does ‘raise the level of debate’.24 
 
David Armitage draws our attention to the growing popularity of British 
political thought over the last half-century; providing readers with prescriptions for 
method as well as models of practice. This history of political thought encompasses 
over four hundred years of political ideas and claims not only British citizens, migrants 
and descendants. ‘The history of British political thought is therefore becoming an 
enterprise almost as expansive in its subject-matter as it has been in its international 
impact’.25 Pocock and Shochet founded the Center for the History of British Political 
Thought in Washington DC in 1985, it’s methodology was simple: ‘The ‘‘great texts’’ of 
English, Scottish, and American political thought are secure in their places within our 
program, but at the same time the ‘’history of political thought’’ we seek is a history of 
language, literature, publication and audience. It embraces the ephemeral tracts and 
pamphlets as well as the great texts.’26 The Cambridge method, associated with the 
Center and its founders as well as Skinner and Laslett, amongst others, refers to the 
method of assigning texts to their contexts: the context of historical and political 
circumstances and language, as well as intention. The choice of language had great 
significance in the early modern period – political commentators had a choice of 
languages to use; Latin, English, Greek and of course, the vernacular.  
 
Andrew Fletcher’s choice of Italian in discussion of the political ramifications of 
the Spanish Crisis of Succession and the balance of power in Europe in his Discorso 
Della Cosa di Spagna was suggestive of the profound influence of Machiavelli on 
Fletcher’s thought. The pretence of place of publication, noted as Naples but most 
                                                          
24 Honohan, Iseult. Civic Republicanism. London: Routledge, 2002: 3. 
25 Armitage, David, “Introduction”. In Armitage, ibid: 1. 
26 Pocock “The History of British Political Thought: The Creation of a Center”, Journal of British Studies, 24, 
1985:284. 
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certainly in Edinburgh, is indicative of the rhetorical nod to the Spanish Rebel, 
Tommaso Campanella, whose De Monarchia Hispanica was in Fletcher’s library.27 
Robertson suggests Fletcher’s use of irony when discussing the Spanish universal 
monarchy was indirectly aimed at the British kingdom, meanwhile it’s publication at 
the time of the Darien ships setting sail for Panama may suggest that Fletcher is 
warning the small European nations of Scotland and Naples that they should use the 
crisis to their advantage; avoiding being swallowed up by the large and powerful 
European nations.28 It is for this kind of reason that Skinner et al present the thought 
of a given author ‘as a series of speech acts performed in linguistic and circumstantial 
contexts, which revealed his intentions and set limits to his ability to perform them, 
but which may also be used by a historian to recover what they were.’29 
 
Pocock et al suggest that the gap between the historian of political thought and 
political theorist may be widening due to this contextualisation of political language. 
While the historian is interested in what the author meant (and was understood) to 
say, his intention and his success in saying it within a succession of historical contexts, 
the political theorist wishes to use the author’s text for his own purpose of enquiry 
‘which has no guaranteed identity with the enterprise the author was pursuing’.30 And 
as the historian and the political theorists purpose and method differ, so does the 
canon of texts from which they obtain their understanding. The canon of texts from 
which republican theorists, and historians of republican theory have, in the main, been 
similar as far as the main contributors appear: Cicero, Aristotle, through Machiavelli 
and the Florentines, Harrington and the commonwealth-men. But for the historian of 
(British) political ideas, interested in the validity of a theory to contemporary society, 
key players are vital in their absence. John Mair, George Buchanan and Samuel 
                                                          
27 Willems, P.J.M. Bibliotheca Fletcheriana, or the Extraordinary Library of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun. Privately 
published, 1999. 
28 See Robertson, John. The Conceptual Framework of Anglo-Scottish Union. Rev. Int. Estud. Vascos. Cuad, 5, 2009: 
125-137. 
29 Pocock, J.G.A. Schochet, Gordon and Schwoerer Lois G. “The History of British Political Thought: A Field and its 
Futures”. In David Armitage, ibid: 11. 
30 Pocock, J.G.A. Schochet, Gordon and Schwoerer Lois G. “The History of British Political Thought: A Field and its 
Futures”. In David Armitage. ibid: 11 
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Rutherford to name but a few crucial Scottish players, address the central republican 
questions of authority, liberty and the political duties of the citizen but have largely 
gone unexplored within the republican tradition.  
 
There are concerns with this method. According to MacLure, meaning cannot 
be divorced from the material form in which it is distributed. Through hermeneutic 
study, every reader selects significant meanings and affects the meaning by means of 
editing the text. Therefore the solid canon of texts that scholars of political theory aim 
to comprehend have acquired different meaning through attempts to understand 
them better; ‘to the extent that political theorizing consists in offering not simply a 
perspective on the political world but also an orientation to action within it, its 
containment within conventional genre distinctions looks more like a matter of 
academic convenience than a characteristic of historical expressions’.31 This relates 
well with John Morril’s theory that history is irrelevant in the writing of political 
thought due to the varied form of ‘past utterances’, the concerns for present theorists 
differ between each other and those of the past, as well as coming from conflicting 
contextual bases. He argues that British history is not at all British. The three kingdoms 
of Britain have very distinct histories, and ‘the different parts of Britain draw 
differentially on parts of Europe’, British historiography, therefore, ‘gains from a 
comparative European approach’.32  
 
For the purposes of this study, I turn to Quentin Skinner and his contextual 
approach towards the study of historical ideas. Skinner highlights the inherent 
problems with the study of the history of ideas. He argues that historical analysis is 
fundamentally value-laden, exegetes of this discipline approach historical texts with a 
preconceived starting point that creates bias in their readings. ‘We must classify in 
                                                          
31 MacLure, Kirstie. “Reflections on Political Literature: History, Theory and the Printed Book” In David Armitage. 
Ibid: 253 
32 Morril. John. “Thinking about the New British History”. In David Armitage. ibid: 46 
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order to understand’ and, he argues, ‘we can only classify the unfamiliar in terms of 
the familiar’.33  
 
The methodological mythologies of doctrine: prolepsis and coherence, outlined 
by Skinner are the results of the contemporary student being ‘set’ by the needs, 
ideologies and structure of the contemporary discipline to which the historical thinker 
is held to contribute. Each arises, Skinner argues, when we treat the text of the thinker 
as the limit to our analysis, our only source for consideration. But Skinner also points 
out that it is equally common for historians to assume that the text is best understood 
as a reflection and result of the time in which it was written; as a product of its own 
time, the historical context is thus assumed to explain the text. The problem this 
engenders is no less significant than that of the mythologies. In particular, the 
‘independent life of ideas in history must be correspondingly in danger’.34 The way to 
avoid this problem of context versus canon is, for Skinner, to locate the intention in the 
context of his or her thought. This can only be achieved by looking at the relationship 
between the author, the historical context and the audience. As he puts it: ‘There 
seems no question that for every statement there must be some explanatory context, 
for every action some set of antecedent causal conditions’.35 Therefore, the key to 
good historical analysis is to disengage from contemporary ways of thinking. The 
author’s intentions must be taken seriously, contextualised historically and then we 
can make our own normative assumptions clear, and determine whether the author’s 
ideas are confused, incomplete or enlightened. To determine a thinkers intention 
based on our own paradigmatically held beliefs and with the luxury of historical 
knowledge, is insufficient. Analysis based on this methodology will be flawed, and 
empirically questionable.  
 
                                                          
33 Skinner.See in particular Skinner. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, History and Theory 8, 
1969: 3-53. Visions of Politics: Volume I: Regarding Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002: 31. The 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978, Visions of Politics: Volume II: Renaissance Virtues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
34 Skinner,2002 ibid:  58. 
35 Skinner,2002 ibid : 59. 
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Fletcher’s own philosophical evolution is owed to his humanist education and 
the political and economic circumstances of Scotland that he witnessed. The works of 
Cicero and Aristotle, Machiavelli, Pufendorf, Grotius, Hobbes and Locke all lay heavily 
in his philosophical and historical thought. For the most part, Fletcher’s political 
theories are at odds with the prevalent social contract theories of the time. Both 
Grotius and Hobbes propose obedience to the state, and the importance of 
sovereignty resting with one power.  
 
 Fletcher draws heavily from the continental influences he was exposed to on 
his ‘grand tour’ (and exile) in Europe – including the Hague, Paris and Denmark.36 Not 
least his association with the political agitators such as Monmouth and the Council of 
Six with whom he was due to raise a rebellion with in 1698 until an unfortunate 
incident over a horse resulted in him shooting a man dead and being asked to leave. 
He was later to be an active member of whiggish ‘Club’, a group of politically minded 
gentlemen who had been excluded from the Convention of the Three Estates called by 
Prince William of Orange, their raison d’etre was to force the government to listen to 
their political views, but whose main contribution was to become the ‘highly efficient 
watchdog against court manoeuvres’.37 
 
It is for the reasons outlined above that this thesis will begin by examining the 
author: his history and intentions, from the contextualist approach as outlined by 
Skinner. In this way we may better understand the republican tradition of thought, 
Fletcher’s contribution to this tradition, and what it can offer contemporary politics. 
However, it would be an onerous task to attempt to adopt all that Skinner offers us 
with regards to his methodological criticism; as Collingwood acknowledges, an 
historian cannot completely understand the context of an historical thinker’s thought 
completely, and it is with this in mind that this thesis proceeds with caution with 
regards to making claims vis-à-vis Fletcher’s political development. This thesis does not 
                                                          
36 MacKenzie, W.C. Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun. Edinburgh: The Porpoise Press, 1932: 27. 
37 MacKenzie, W.C. Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun. Ibid: 52-53. 
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attempt to understand Fletcher, ‘exactly as he understood himself’, recognising this 
historicist method as implausible.38 However, it does attempt to properly identify the 
context of the author as it bears significance on his intention and political 
development. This thesis does not attempt to credit Fletcher with anticipating 
contemporary republican political thought, but does show him to be a significant 
figure within the tradition. Nor does it attempt to ‘read between the lines’, or decode 
any viewpoint, thus avoiding crediting Fletcher with ideas that he did not himself 
present, but it does present a partial account of his political thought. Recognizing the 
limitations of the method in this theses attempts to understand Fletcher in a modern 
context, this thesis balances the contextualist approach with an engagement with the 
‘perennial questions’ approach found in alternative methods of understanding the 
history of political thought.  This thesis does not attempt to give a full account of 
republican theory, or the development of any republican tradition, it is a thesis on 
Andrew Fletcher and how his thought can be utilised in the modern political arena. 
 
The Philosophical Connection. Fletcher’s political development via Scottish and 
European political history.  
 Andrew Fletcher (1653-1716), the ‘Patriot’, is best known for his inexorable 
commitment to his native country and his incorruptible opposition to the Treaty of 
Union in 1707. However, he is also unfairly remembered, when remembered at all, as 
a failure. He ‘failed’ to secure independence for Scotland, and ‘failed’ to thwart the 
union.39 It is true that the incorporating Treaty of Union went through and Scotland 
was unsuccessful in retaining its own parliament, but it was Fletcher’s contribution 
that prevented it going through on entirely English terms. Fletcher’s proposed twelve 
conditions on government; on the authority of the parliament and especially royalty, 
included annual parliaments; elected members; voting restricted to members of 
                                                          
38 Strauss, Leo. “Political Philosophy and History,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol 10, No. 1 (Jan 1949): 41. 
39 See contributions from a number of authors tasked with paying tribute to Fletcher including: Donaldson, Gordon. 
“Fletcher of Saltoun”. Scott. P.H. Andrew Fletcher, “A Pioneer of the European idea”. Barrow, Geoffrey. “Andrew 
Fletcher – A Sturdy Example”, in The Saltoun Papers. Reflections on Andrew Fletcher. Scott. P.H. (ed). Edinburgh: 
The Saltire Society, 2003. 
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parliament only; no royal presence or veto on legislation; war and peace to be with 
parliamentary consent only; and offices, grants and pardons to be warranted only by 
parliament; and automatic forfeiture of the throne by any monarch who transgressed 
any of the limitations.40 All of which helped to ensure that the power of the monarch 
was unable to wield his power arbitrarily, and without accountability, but did not have 
his desired outcome – the continued independence of the Scottish parliament from 
English interference. Fletcher’s greatest contribution, therefore,  is best understood as 
intellectual rather than political. 
  
 Fletcher’s writings, of which there are only a few, offer insight into the distinct 
Scottish political identity and conspicuous historical European approach within Scottish 
political thought utilised in answering the questions of authority and peace in Britain 
and Europe. It is in Scotland, with Fletcher, that we first see the concept of a European 
peace emerging. Due perhaps in part to Fletcher’s continued travels around the 
European continent, but more importantly, Fletcher was attempting to understand the 
political composition of Europe; it’s prospects for peace and trade, and Scotland’s 
place within it – how Scotland was to be able to survive amongst the great imperial 
monarchies.  
 
  Despite being absent from Scotland for most of his life, Fletcher’s allegiance to 
his country and the welfare of his countrymen is evident throughout his political 
pamphlets and discourse’. Each of his political pamphlets and political actions are a 
product of a particular difficulty Scotland confronted; each is intended to influence 
decision makers and consequently benefit his country. His dedication saw him being 
tried for treason twice, sentenced to death in his absence and his lands being forfeited 
to the crown. His fierce temper and reputation for aggression kept him from serious 
political office, however, he continued to petition parliament and those of influence to 
ameliorate his countrymen’s troubles.  
 
                                                          
40 Fletcher. Speeches Made by a Member of Parliament. Robertson, 1997,  ibid:  
22 
 
 Although Fletcher was born almost in the century before the Enlightenment, his 
political theory preludes that of Voltaire and Rousseau, and Scottish enlightenment 
thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith. His concern for religion was not a 
concern for religious matters per se, but a concern for the serious consequences 
organized religion had on the state and policy; especially the threat that a Catholic king 
on the throne, in Fletcher’s view, would result in arbitrary rule. Fletcher also blamed 
the church for the appalling conditions many of his fellow Scotsmen were facing. By 
banishing slavery on moral and religious grounds, the church had freed men whose 
only estate was their liberty; and by providing for the poor, the church encouraged 
vagabonds and beggars. ‘At length I found the original of that multitude of beggars 
which now oppress the world, to have proceeded from churchmen, who (never failing 
to confound things spiritual with temporal, and consequently all good order and good 
government, either through mistake or design) upon the first public establishment of 
the Christian religion, recommended nothing more to masters, in order to the 
salvation of their souls, than the setting such of their slaves at liberty as would 
embrace the Christian faith, though our Saviour and his apostles had been so far from 
making use of any temporal advantages to persuade eternal truths, and so far from 
invading any man’s property, by promising him heaven for it, that the apostle Paul says 
expressly, ‘In whatever condition of life every one is called to the Christian faith, in that 
let him remain . . This disorder of giving liberty to great numbers of slaves upon their 
profession of Christianity, grew to such a height, even in the time of Constantine the 
great, that the cities of the empire found themselves burdened with an infinite 
number of men, who had no other estate but their liberty, of whom the greatest part 
would not work, and the rest had been bred to no profession’.41This of course led to 
the conclusion that Fletcher was pro-slavery, but careful reading of his work clearly 
shows that Fletcher was for liberty of the individual being free to pursue the common 
good, and this may require him to be an  indentured servant so ‘that no man might 
                                                          
41 Fletcher. Two Discourses Concerning the Affairs of Scotland. The Second Discourse.  
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want the necessities of life, nor any person able to work be burdensome to the 
commonwealth’.42  
  
 Fletcher was born in 1653 in Saltoun, East Lothian.43 Eldest son and heir of 
Robert Fletcher, (1625-1665) and Katharine Bruce (d. 1713), the daughter of Sir Henry 
Bruce who had claim to the lineage of King Robert Bruce. He was born into a well 
established family: his grandfather was Lord Innerpeffer, a senator of the college of 
Justice in Scotland. On his mother’s side he was also connected to the Campbell’s of 
Glenorchy and the Haldanes of Gleneagles. Fletcher’s early education and influence 
has often been attributed to Gilbert Burnett, minister of Saltoun and the future Bishop 
of Salisbury, however, as Burnett only took up the position in 1665 another important 
influence on Fletcher’s early life is probably Patrick Scougal who was minister between 
1658 and 1664, before he took up a position as Bishop at Aberdeen. David Steuart 
Erskine, 11th Earl of Buchan, wrote in his biography of Fletcher which is based on family 
papers that were discovered in 1792: ‘From Burnet he received, as might have been 
expected, a very pious and learned education, and was strongly imbued with erudition 
and the principles of free government, which were congenial to the family of Fletcher, 
and espoused by his mother and those who had, with her, the charge of his nurture’.44  
 
During Fletcher’s early childhood Scotland was already a conquered country. 
Charles II had fled to France after his defeat by Cromwell at Worcester. In 1651, 
Cromwell declared Scotland and England to be one Commonwealth, leaving Scotland 
without a legally constituted government. During this ‘protectorate’, Cromwell 
introduced several structural changes to the political system of Scotland. A uniform 
system of government was introduced, a united parliament was set up for Scotland, 
England and Ireland, Scotland allowed to send 30 members. The government was, for 
the first time, independent of a king, and loyalty to a monarch was no longer an 
                                                          
42 Fletcher. Passim.  
43 A Gap in parish records between 1647-1660 leaves the precise date unknown but 1653 is supported by family 
records. See http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9720?docPos=2/andrewfletcher  
44 D.S Erskine, Earl of Buchan. Essays on the Lives and Writings of Fletcher of Saltoun and the poet Thomson: 
Biographical, Critical, and Political. London. 1792, p5. in Daiches, Fletcher of Saltoun, vii. 
24 
 
essential element of national integrity. Cromwell was determined to subdue Scotland, 
and General Monck and other commissioners were sent to ensure that this was 
achieved. He garrisoned soldiers in all of Scotland’s chief towns and strong forts were 
built in Leith, Perth, Inverness, Inverlochy and Ayr. Although these commissioners 
were hated by the Scot's, the laws were for the most part and for the first time, 
generally obeyed. All but the Episcopalians and the Roman Catholics were allowed to 
worship as they wished. Despite Scotland’s history of rebellion and revolution, there 
was no concerted effort at opposition to Cromwell. Why was there no revolt? 
Opposition to the government no longer meant violent revolution and challenges to 
the crown; instead the people were able to find representation through the 
constitutional system. Furthermore, Scotland was divided religiously, socially and 
politically and therefore there was little possibility of a united force against Cromwell. 
The Earl of Glencairn and other highland chiefs attempted to rise in support of the 
exiled Charles, however, there was much infighting and they achieved very little. 
General Middleton was sent by Charles to lead the royalist highland forces 
nevertheless General Monck’s force easily defeated them at Dalnaspidal, 1654. After 
this, Cromwell’s protectorate ran relatively peacefully. 
 
After the death of Cromwell in 1658  and the disastrous administrate of his son 
Richard, Charles II was restored to the throne with the help of Monck, his former 
adversary, who marched to London with an army to demand his restoration. On the 
25th May 1660, Charles landed in Dover and the Scot’s were again freed from English 
enforced rule. However, Charles II governed despotically and in absence by means of a 
privy council that was chosen entirely by him, despite an earlier act of parliament 
prohibiting him from doing so. As a result, his Privy Council was made up of those who 
would do entirely his bidding and whose intentions seemed to be motivated by greed; 
extortion being the gain and cruelty the method. 45  The Restoration of Charles 
instigated a rush of the Scot’s nobility attempting to gain office and spoils that they 
                                                          
45 Letters within the Lauderdale papers show the commissioners of Scotland: Rothes, Dalyell. Hamilton and 
Drummond  to be greedy and abusive men. See Lauderdale papers, vol. 1. Osmund Airy, (ed).Camden Society, 1883-
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hoped would be available as a result.46 Fletcher’s Discourse of Government with 
Relation to the Militias, is a direct criticism of this greed and the practice of buying 
loyalty and office. 
 
‘There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the 
indignity and cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to 
be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves 
that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their 
ambition, avarice, and luxury, set themselves with the utmost art and violence to 
procure their establishment: and by such men almost the whole world has been 
trampled underfoot, and subjected to tyranny, for want of understanding by what 
means and methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care and 
pains to instruct themselves in other arts and sciences, yet very few apply themselves 
to consider the nature of government, an enquiry so useful and necessary both to 
magistrate and people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether 
directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become 
almost everywhere a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would 
bestow a small part of the time and application which they throw away upon curious 
but useless studies, or endless gaming, in perusing those excellent rules and examples 
of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to 
discover all such abuses and corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is 
therefore very strange that they should think study and knowledge necessary in 
everything they go about, except in the noblest and most useful of all applications, the 
art of government’47 
 
                                                          
46 In a draft letter from Charles II to the Earl of Middleton, Charles discloses his disappointment to learn that „privat 
barganes‟ are taking place to „make sale of my grace and mercie‟ [sic]. Lauderdale papers, pp92-92 mss 23115, f.118 
47 Fletcher. A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias. Robertson, 1997, ibid: 2 
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In 1660, Charles authorized commissioners to encourage plantations.48 The 
Scot’s wished for their own Scottish colony, but the result was mostly Scottish 
settlements within English colonies. Despite this, trade developed and grew, especially 
between Scotland and the America’s, the colonies and England. However, the 
‘Navigation Acts’ 1661, prohibited goods being brought into England from ships that 
were not of English origin. No goods were to be carried to or from colonies except on 
English ships, besides sugar, tobacco and other commodities that were to be shipped 
only to England and English colonies.49  This mercantilist economic policy badly 
damaged Scotland’s trade, especially with the Americas and was a force behind the 
first Dutch Wars, Holland at the time a close trading partner with Scotland. Scotland 
reacted with a similar act declaring that as long as they were excluded from England 
and Ireland’s trade, imports to Scotland would be charged double import duties if they 
were not from Scottish ships or ship from the country of origin. Despite the attempts 
by each country to harm each other economically, and improve their own, Scotland did 
continue to trade with England, however, always at a less agreeable position. A ledger 
of accounts dated 1st January 1704 shows the disproportion of imports and exports. 
Exports, including: linen, cloth, salt and fish amounted to 2212,000 merks. However, 
imports, including: tobacco, sugar, silk and leather, arguably ‘luxury’ goods, amounted 
to 4272,000.50 It is these luxuries that Fletcher was to argue as the cause of many of 
Scotland’s problems, that the choice of goods and leisure was inseparable from 
corruption. 
 
In 1661, parliament was called to pass the ‘Rescissory Act’, which rescinded all 
acts passed since 1633, fundamentally to proclaim that all acts passed by the 
covenanters were no longer law.51 Parliament declared that the king should be head of 
                                                          
48 Lauderdale papers p39. Earl or Middleton‟s Instructions, by his majesty‟s command, signed Lauderdale. 
(mss23114, f.88) dated 17th December 1660. 
49 This was later advised by the duke of Lauderdale, Charles‟ secretary to Scotland, in an attempt to undermine the 
position of his opposition: Hamilton, Tweedale, Morton, Roxburgh, Queensbury and Drummond by gaining 
monopolies on salt, tobacco and brandy. In a letter dating 29th nov 1673. Lauderdale papers. 23136 f.26.  
50National Library Scotland.  (NLS) ms16503 ff 117, 127, 139, 141. 
51 Bishop James Sharp refers to this act in his letters to Patrick Drummond. Lauderdale papers pp62-74. mss23115 
ff.25, 47, 69.  
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the church as well as the state, thus destroying everything that the covenanters had 
fought for, and placing Charles in the position to dictate laws and religion. Placing him 
in what Fletcher later perceived as a position of tyranny, able to exert arbitrary 
authority over both the church and state, with no limitations of his government 
sufficient to secure against his arbitrary power.52 The Privy Council later declared 
episcopacy as the form of church government in Scotland. Laws were passed forcing 
ministers to request permission to preach at their parish. Many refused and were 
forced out of their parishes. The congregation was forced to attend church, if they 
refused they could be heavily fined or soldiers would be placed in their homes until 
fines or debts were paid or they acquiesced and attended church. The soldiers placed 
in the homes of the people were rough, nasty and oppressive.  In November 1666, the 
‘Pentland Rising’ signified the peak of frustration and the culmination of ‘the troubles’ 
with a revolt against the oppressive regime.   
 
 In 1667, aged fourteen, Fletcher was enrolled at the University of St. Andrews, 
his signature can be seen on the matriculation roll of Saint Leonard’s college of the 
University. It is unknown exactly what he would have studied, but it can be assumed by 
the curriculum of that time that Fletcher would have been taught in the humanist 
tradition: consolidating his knowledge of Latin, Greek, logic, rhetoric and dialectic. He 
is known to have left Scotland for London with his tutor, James Graham, in 1668 and so 
would not have completed his bachelor’s degree. Fletcher’s movements after his 
leaving St. Andrews are not well documented and can only be traced through 
correspondence, receipts and bills. It is believed that he was in the Netherlands by the 
end of the year of 1668, bills and receipts place him in Paris in 1670, The Hague and 
Rotterdam in 1671 and back in Paris by the October. Paris again in 1672, 1673 and 
1675 and in December 1675 he was in London, returning to Paris by the May of 1676 
where he is reported to have remained until the latter half of 1677. Going with the 
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evidence of these bills and receipts it is likely that Fletcher was out of his native 
country continuously 1668-1678.53  
 
Fletcher’s political pamphlets are evidence of his inexorable allegiance to his 
native country despite his many years of absence, and his personal library of almost 
6000 books shows he was a committed and knowledgeable bibliophile. P.J.M Willems 
has carefully produced the Bibliographica Fletcheriana, reconstructing Fletcher’s 
catalogue of books from family records and Fletcher’s own bibliography.54 Fletcher’s 
own catalogue is dated as being compiled between 1690-1716, but Willems suggests 
that there is evidence that Fletcher’s book collecting started much earlier.55 The 
catalogue classification reflects familiarity with the books and subjects, suggesting that 
Fletcher did read the books and did not merely collect them. Fletcher classifies his 
library under several headings, each with further sub-headings: Literae humaniores; 
Historici: Miscellaneous, Greek, Roman, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Scottish, 
English, and the Low Countries; Poetea: Miscellaneous, Greek, et cetera, however 
these are not consistently maintained throughout; Oratores: language, dictionaries, 
grammars and works from rhetoricians and epistolographers; Theologi: philosophy of 
law, education, diplomacy, history of law, and law;  Legislatores: science, natural 
philosophy, medicine, husbandry and economics; Mathematici: music, geography, 
astronomy, art, architecture, military; Iuridici, law.56  
 
Fletcher’s book collecting continued right until his death. Letters to his nephew, 
Andrew, in Paris 1715/16 have instructions and lists for Andrew to buy books at 
auction for Fletcher. Some of these letters list over 50 books, and Fletcher’s urgency 
and determination to get the latest editions newly printed is apparent.57  Further 
                                                          
53 National Library Scotland. (NLS). Mss16831 ff 9-81, mss17263 ff 27-112, mss16803, mss16804. Fletcher was in 
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evidence to suggest Fletcher did not merely collect his books is his extensive 
knowledge on each book that he referenced in his catalogue, and from his political 
pamphlets, letters and other writings. In a letter to his nephew dated: 10th March 
1716, Fletcher claims to be reading, with ‘extraordinary application and delight’, 
Daniel’s History of France which was published in 1713.58 Whether or not he was able 
to read all of the books in his library cannot be known, and how he managed to buy 
such a number with his meager means is also unknown. 
  
Scotland, at this time, was far removed from the luxuries of coffee and 
chocolate houses that Fletcher loved to frequent while on the continent. According to 
letters from Rothes to Lauderdale,59 Scotland was in a deplorable state during the 
years of Fletcher’s absence, and Fletcher could have only looked on in dismay at the 
troubles his country faced. It is worth surmising that the troubles in Scotland were part 
reason for Fletcher’s continued absence. Rothes reports to Lauderdale, in a letter 
dated May 13th 1665, that the lack of trade and commerce in Scotland had a heavy 
effect on the wealth of it’s people and money had become scarce. He also discusses 
the ‘troubles’ facing the church and its’ restructuring from Presbyterian to 
Episcopalian. He reports on the ‘ffanatiek(s) and boayies [sic] that disrupt church 
sermons.60  
 
On his return to Scotland, Fletcher was appointed as a member of the 
Convention of Estates, representing East Lothian in the June 1678 meeting. He 
immediately opposed the Duke of Lauderdale who had been virtually ruling Scotland 
on behalf of Charles II as High Commissioner, and sided with the Duke of Hamilton. It is 
here that Fletcher first presented himself as an outspoken defender of rights. 
Responding to the imprisonment of his brother Henry who had smuggled himself into 
the convention, Fletcher identified one of the High Commissioner’s servants as also 
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30 
 
being unlawfully at the meeting. Lauderdale was thus forced to plead privilege to 
justify his servant’s presence.  
 
Lauderdale had been appointed secretary for Scotland by Charles II in 1661, 
and succeeded the Earl of Rothes as High Commissioner in 1667. As such, until 1680, 
Lauderdale effectively ran the country. He had worked hard in 1669-1670 to achieve a 
union of the parliaments of Scotland and England, but this created a lot of opposition 
to Lauderdale and the Scots had successfully blocked the scheme. In 1678, Lauderdale 
outraged the Covenanters of the south-west by garrisoning 9,000 troops, the ‘highland 
host’, there. According to the Lauderdale papers, the king had received reports of 
abuses by the troops, including rapes, murders and robberies. Expecting a major 
rebellion Lauderdale introduced repressive legislation to suppress it. He was in need of 
money to raise an army to put down any insurrection and it was for this reason that he 
summoned the Convention of Estates in 1678.  
 
The timing of Lauderdale’s calling of the convention was crucial. Hamilton, the 
main opposition to Lauderdale, had gone to London with ‘ten or twelve of the nobility’ 
and approximately ‘fifty gentlemen of quality’ to lodge complaints with the King.61 
Lauderdale was thus able to manipulate the votes of the convention in the absence of 
his main opposition. By the time the nobility were to return from London, Lauderdale 
was in charge of four parts in five of the assembly, and a land tax of 30,000 annually 
for five years was granted, thus enabling Lauderdale to maintain a larger standing 
army. Fletcher would have witnessed these proceedings with growing resentment and 
indignation. Following the convention, Fletcher had 200 foot soldiers and 46 horsemen 
quartered on him. Fletcher immediately responded by opposing the Privy Council’s 
plan to implement the ‘Council Act’ and raise a militia. It is reported by Lord 
Fountainhall that on july 29th, 1680, ‘at privy Council, Fletcher of Saltoun, Sinclair of 
Stevenston, and Murray of Blackbarronie are paneled for seditiously and factiously 
opposing, at least obstructing, his Majesty’s service, in putting the Act of Privy Council 
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to executions for levying the 5500 men out of the militia’.62 Fletcher also joined a 
petition in 1681 challenging the legality of the council’s actions, claiming the 
quartering of soldiers contrary to law.63 Fletcher was in trouble with the Convention 
again in 1682 for obstructing the provisioning of troops garrisoned in east Lothian by 
failing to set prices on corn and other supplies. Given Fletcher’s opposition to the 
quartering of soldiers it seems probable that he would try anything to thwart the 
progress of the Council’s attempts to raise a standing army.  
 
In 1681, Fletcher was returned to office as commissioner for East Lothian after 
a contentious election. He immediately opposed the new High Commissioner, the 
Duke of York: Charles II brother and future James VII and II. James had proposed two 
acts, the ‘Test act’ and the ‘Succession’, that would ensure his succession to Charles II 
throne despite being catholic. Fletcher proposed that the security of the protestant 
religion should be made one if the Test act’s main objectives, a motion that could 
hardly be ignored by the government. This proposal resulted in a confused and 
contradictory legislation that could only embarrass the government and make the act, 
and James’ reign if he was to succeed, be fraught with hypocrisy as he would have to 
swear, as a catholic, to uphold the preceding Succession Act, as ‘the only supreme 
governor of this realm over all persons and in all causes as well ecclesiastical and 
civil’.64 The intention behind Fletcher proposing this is unclear, he was not particularly 
interested in religion and it is unlikely that he wanted to secure the protestant religion. 
He was, however, concerned with the possibility of arbitrary power, whether this was 
wielded by the church or state. Daiches suggests that Fletcher had intended to 
embarrass the government, and in this he certainly succeeded. According to Daiches, 
the Test Act professed to renounce Roman Catholic faith and Covenanting 
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Protestantism, however the Succession Act would confirm a Catholic heir to the 
throne.65 
 
The later brush with authority concerning the provisions for troops in 1682 
confirmed to Fletcher that his life may be in danger, having unquestionably assured 
the Duke of York’s enmity. In May 1683 he left Scotland for London with Robert Baillie. 
He was admitted privilege to the secrets of Lord Russell’s Council of Six that was 
concerned with the constitution and liberties of Scotland and England. This Council 
included the Duke of Monmouth, Charles II illegitimate son and future leader of the 
revolution against James VII and II. In November of that year Ballie was arrested and 
executed for treason for his part in the ‘Rye House Plot’ to assassinate Charles II. In 
1681 the Exclusion Bill was introduced in the House of Commons, an attempt to pass 
an Act of Parliament excluding James from the succession. Charles outmaneuvered his 
opponents and dissolved Parliament for the final time. This left his opponents with no 
legal method of preventing James's succession. The ‘Rye House Plot’ had been an 
attempt on both Charles II and James’ lives. Baillie was offered pardon in return for 
implicating Fletcher, but he refused. Monmouth was also implicated and forced to 
leave the country. Neither Scotland nor England were safe for Fletcher and he fled to 
Paris and moved on to The Hague, a refuge for those opposed to the monarchy. Here 
Fletcher joined Monmouth and the ill-fated rebellion against James VII and II. 
 
 Between 1683 and 1685 Fletcher continued with his passion for collecting 
books and stayed in contact with other political exiles, including Viscount Stair and the 
Duke of Argyle. In November 1684, Fletcher was cited, in his absence, to answer to the 
charge of ‘conversing with Argyle and other rebels abroad’. Argyle denied the charges 
on behalf of Fletcher, claiming that he had written to Fletcher however, his letters had 
gone unanswered. Again, in January 1685, Fletcher was cited, along with other ‘rebels’, 
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to appear before parliament in the March to answer to charges of treason. Fletcher did 
not attend either of these citations. In 1685, Charles II died and was succeeded by his 
brother, James VII and II. Scotland and England were now under the rule of a Catholic 
royal absolutist. As previously mentioned, Fletcher’s concern was not necessarily with 
the religion of the monarch, but with his opinion that a Catholic King would result in 
arbitrary rule. Monmouth had been living in Holland still hoping for a peaceful 
succession to the throne, however, after Charles II death and James VII and II accession 
he was compelled to claim his right forcibly.  
 
In April 1685, the Duke of Argyle set sail for Scotland to raise a rebellion there 
against the advice of Fletcher. Argyle was assured that Monmouth would follow him 
within 6 days to raise a similar rebellion in England. Despite disapproving of both 
expeditions Fletcher ‘resolved to run fortunes’ with Monmouth,66 to support him due 
to personal loyalties. However, subsequent events were to ensure that Fletcher would 
not be present at the battle of Sedgemoor that cost Monmouth and many of his 
supporters their lives. Monmouth was forced to dismiss Fletcher from his service after 
an ‘unfortunate incident’ that resulted in Fletcher shooting dead another supporter. 67   
 
Burnett explains: ‘he sent him out on another party: And he, not yet being 
furnished with a horse, took the horse of one {Heywood Dare, Mayor of Taunton] who 
had brought in a great body of men from Tuanton. He was not in the way: So Fletcher, 
not seeing him to ask his leave, thought that all things were to be in common among 
them, that he could advance the service. After Fletcher had rid about, as he was 
ordered, as he returned, the owner of the horse rode on, who was a rough and ill bred 
man, reproached him in very injurious terms, for taking out his horse without his leave. 
Fletcher bore this longer than could have been expected from one of his impetuous 
temper. But the other persisted in giving him foul language, and offered a switch or a 
cane: Upon which he discharged his pistol at him and fatally shot him dead. He went 
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and gave the duke an account of this, who saw it impossible to keep him longer about 
him, without disgusting and losing the country people, who were already coming in a 
body to demand justice’.68 
 
Monmouth asked Fletcher to leave, and he did so, on the 13th June on the 
Helderenberg, set for Spain. The ship was impounded at Santander and Fletcher 
imprisoned. However, by the next morning it is reported that he mysteriously escaped. 
Accounts of Fletcher’s movements in Spain have been committed to paper by the Earl 
Marischal. The Earl was born in 1693, Fletcher died in 1716 when Marischal was only 
23, therefore the accounts he has written must have been recalled from memories of 
conversations taking place when still a young man.69 The accounts place Fletcher 
traveling through Spain in disguise, indulging in his passion for buying books. He is later 
said to have enlisted in the Hungarian army, however there is very little evidence to 
sustain either of these claims. Bills and receipts place Fletcher in the Netherlands, 
under the name of Ebron, by 1687, if not as early as 1686.70 
 
Monmouth had fled from the field of battle at Sedgemoor but was later 
captured on 8th July. He was condemned to execution for committing treason against 
the king, and beheaded in the Tower of London on 15 July. It is said that it took eight 
blows of the axe from Jack Ketch to sever his head. The subsequent ‘Bloody Assizes’ of 
Judge Jeffreys were a series of trials of Monmouth's supporters in which 320 people 
were condemned to death and around 800 sentenced to be transported to the West 
Indies.71 In his absence Fletcher was tried for treason on 21st December 1685, charged 
with participating in Monmouth’s rebellion. In January 1686 he was found guilty, 
condemned as a traitor and sentenced to lose both his life and his lands as was the 
established punishment at that time. James II took advantage of the suppression of the 
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rebellion to consolidate his power. He asked Parliament to repeal the Test Act. He used 
his power to appoint Catholics to senior posts, and raised the strength of the standing 
army. Parliament was dismissed on 20th November after attempting to oppose many of 
James’ moves.  
 
Fletcher was safe in the Netherlands at the time of his trial, a life of exile 
essential for his well-being. Between 1686-1688, very little is known of his life. He is 
known to have joined William of Orange at The Hague in 1688 however he was not in a 
privileged position. He sailed for Scotland with William of Torbay after the main force 
of William’s invasion had already left. In 1688, when the birth of James Francis Edward 
Stuart heralded a Catholic succession, James II was overthrown in a coup d'état by 
William of Orange in the Glorious Revolution at the invitation of the disaffected 
Protestant Establishment. James fled, and William and his wife were offered the 
throne, England proclaiming them as joint sovereigns in February 1689. Scotland did 
not follow this until the Convention of Estates claimed James had forfeited his crown 
and declared William King in the April.  
 
Fletcher had been in London and to his indignation was not a member of the 
Convention. Outside political favour and developments, he was party to the meeting of 
Scots nobility and gentlemen, ‘The Club’, an unofficial group led by Sir James 
Montgomery and Sir Patrick Hume, whom he encouraged to press for radical 
limitations on the power of the crown. Fletcher believed that there was a need for a 
union of the parliaments of the two countries, writing to Andrew Russel in January 
1689: ‘I thinck we can never come to any trew settlement but by uniting with England 
in parliament, and Traid. For as for our worship and, particular laws we certainly can 
never be united to them in thes’.72 He was also deeply concerned with the Claim of 
Rights and its clause against a ‘popish king’ as he wrote to Patrick Hume in September 
1689, fearing an absolutist reign reminiscent of James VII may result. The letter to 
Russell was written at a time when Fletcher was optimistic about the possibility of 
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England’s parliament being able to impose limitations on the new royal power. 
However, subsequent events proved otherwise and Fletcher changed his mind.  
 
Fletcher’s patriotism and political idea’s were always a result of his concern for 
his country, his actions always intended to bring certain results for the people of 
Scotland: political freedom and economic prosperity. England’s part in the disastrous 
‘Darien Scheme’, and the hostility England displayed towards Scotland’s trading 
efforts, especially the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies’ proved to 
Fletcher that any union was likely to frustrate Scotland’s development and, as a result, 
he became passionately and outspokenly against any such union. It is from this that he 
responded with his first treatise, A Discourse of Government with Relation to the 
Militias in which he vehemently opposes the maintaining of a standing army and the 
granting of taxation powers without the guarantee of sufficient government, and it is 
here that we start to follow Fletcher’s pamphlets, all published between the Glorious 
Revolution of 1689 and ending with the Treaty of Union in 1707.  
 
The Scotland of the 17th century resembles little of the confident, flourishing 
country of the previous century. The accession of King James VI of Scotland to the 
English throne in 1603 was a disaster for his first country, two independent kingdoms 
now uneasily united under one King. At first sight this would seem a great benefit for 
the people of Scotland, a Scottish king on the English throne. However, James VI and I 
was to soon forget about his homeland in favour of the interests of the larger, more 
powerful and prosperous country. The foreign and domestic policies of the two 
countries were now linked together, and England’s priority was to itself. Economically, 
Scotland was in a poor position vis a vis England. Scotland’s mountainous terrain and 
harsh climate along with centuries of war between England and Scotland resulting in 
the laying waste of the fertile south of the country, left Scotland in a poor condition 
agriculturally and economically. It depended on trade with the continent, France and 
Holland. However, once united under James VI and I, England’s wars with Scotland’s 
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trading partners had a negative impact on Scotland's already weakened economy. 
Duties were increased and trade became much less than it had formerly been.73  
 
Throughout the 17th century, Scotland’s economic conditions gradually 
worsened. Despotic, absent rule by monarch’s far removed from the reality of 
Scotland's situation under the reigns of James’s VI and I, and his successor, Charles I, 
was characterized by intimidation, bribery and repression. During the chapter of the 
‘wars of the three kingdoms’ between 1639-1651, Scotland found itself fighting both 
against and with the English. Scotland played a large role in the deposition of Charles I. 
Scotland subsequently appointed Charles II to the Scottish throne, only for him to be 
quickly deposed by Cromwell taking Scotland by force. All these factors combined to 
worsen the already deplorable situation. The last years of the 17th century were 
characterized by the appalling circumstances of the poor. 1696 saw the beginning of 7 
years of blight and famine caused by poor harvests, heavy rains, and the perishing of 
livestock. 74  The cost of essentials soared beyond the means of the poor, and 
workhouses and churches struggled to cope with the demand made on their meager 
resources. The already depleted population was too large to sustain itself, children 
were sold into slavery, thousands died of starvation, the situation was so bad that, in 
Mackenzie’s words, ‘even the dead were left to bury themselves’.75 
 
Andrew Fletcher, born in 1653, was brought up and was politically active during 
the worst of these times. His pamphlet, the ‘Two Discourses Concerning the Affairs of 
Scotland’, written in 1698, was a direct response to the misery that many of his fellow 
Scotsmen were facing. Fletcher recognized the immediate need for social and 
economic change to alleviate the suffering of the poor and turn around Scotland’s 
problem of mass poverty. In order to respond adequately to this need, Fletcher turned 
to the early modern writings of Aristotle and the ‘ideal’ Roman republic, for answers to 
the wretched condition of Scotland. Fletcher, a steadfast defender of liberty, despaired 
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at the situation to the extent that he was willing to sacrifice the individual’s autonomy 
over himself in order to solve the problem. It is from this first pamphlet that we 
recognise Fletcher as a staunch advocate of civic-republican values, placing the good of 
the community over the rights of the individual. Fletcher’s primary concern is always 
for his country as a whole; its place in the emerging international economy. 
 
It is Fletcher’s belief that the liberty of Europe is ensured through the reliance 
on a system of political accountability maintained by keeping the ‘sword in the hands 
of the landholding subjects’76. The power of the monarchy would remain limited and 
political power would remain with the people as long as a system of political 
reciprocation - a domestic balance of power based on mutual reliance, existed.  
Fletcher maintains that as long as the government relies on the cooperation of the 
lairds, who have the cooperation of the soldiers, in times of war, then a balance would 
exist.  This balance would keep the government steady; it is a provision against the 
encroachments of the crown. However, as soon as military power no longer rests in 
the hands of the people the government has a superior position with regards to 
control and running of society.  Oppression comes under the guise of liberty, and 
Fletcher is appalled that man would allow himself to be ruled by a corrupt and self-
interested government rather than fight for good governance.   ‘There is not perhaps 
in humane affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity and cruelty which the far 
greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under the pretence of 
government’.77  Man is deceived by an outward appearance of good governance and 
liberty by a tyrannous government until it is too late.78  Here, Fletcher is referring to 
the reign of James VI and I, who, after his accession to the English throne ruled 
Scotland as an absent monarch using intimidation and bribery to retain control over his 
first country.  ‘A Discourse on Government’ is Fletcher’s discourse on the history of 
liberty.   It is not an appeal to return to the ‘barbaric’ way of living of the warlike 
nations, but it is an appeal to the civic morality that existed at that time.  Virtue is to 
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be found in history, the Gothic simplicity and militaristic life.  The present is 
characterized by decadence, corruption and debt as man is seduced by extravagance.  
Virtue is the moral and material foundation of civil social and political life and Fletcher 
recognizes a need to return to pre-commercial morality.   
 
This idea that freeholders should be given militaristic training in order to be 
educated in civic virtue is resonant of the Ancient Athenian and Roman attitude. 
Aristotle asserts that man has civic duties, not rights, and must always place the state 
before himself. Xenephon shows concern for the loss of Greek values within a 
democracy; a concern for the political collapse of the polis caused by moral collapse of 
the democratic rule of the lower class, the undisciplined, self-indulgent masses. ‘The 
practice of physical exercises and the pursuit of culture has been brought into 
disrepute by the common people as undesirable…’79 The decline of Athens in the 
fourth century has been attributed to moral decline. It is not merely that Athens had 
been exhausted by the long Peloponnesian War; Athens was active and enterprising 
enough to fully recover.  What happens in the fourth century is a permanent change in 
the temper of the people: it is the emergence of a different attitude to life. In the 
fourth century there is the emergence of an awareness of individualism.  In Rome, Livy, 
Tacitus and Plutarch were concerned for the loss of civic virtue during the transition to 
the Roman Empire.80  Fletcher appeals to history to highlight the dangers to society the 
loss of virtue poses, and this loss of virtue is, for Fletcher, a direct result of the loss of 
militaristic training and mans natural inclination towards pleasure. The influence of the 
classics on Fletcher is quite clear. Fletcher asserts that politics requires a civic virtue; a 
political structure that allows for the pursuit of the common good – the defense of and 
development of the community as a whole pursued through political interests 
supported by institutional order.  
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Late seventeenth-century Scotland was, in Fletcher’s words, in a deplorable 
condition. There was very little external trade or commerce, and the health of the 
country was at an all-time low, the nation having endured several plagues and 
famines. Scotland could no longer live up to its motto: ‘Neme me impune lacessit’. The 
move of the Scottish king to England had disastrous consequences, unforeseen by 
many Scots who were convinced of the partiality of the king. However, Scotland’s 
affairs were now being ministered in England and English interests inevitably came 
before those of the Scots. It is because of this deplorable state that Fletcher assumes a 
great number of Scottish people and businessmen were willing to risk life and money 
to embark on the Darien Scheme – an attempt by the newly formed African Trading 
Company to create a colony and port in Darien. Fletcher donated £1000 himself to the 
scheme, seeing it as an opportunity to make Scotland a great trading nation. The 
scheme was at first supported by William III despite the English and Dutch being 
against it, however pressure from English and Dutch industry, the ill health of the 
Spanish monarch and Williams’ desire to secure the Spanish crisis meant he soon 
withdrew his support and subverted the efforts of the African Trading Company. Many 
Scotsmen perished through hunger and disease as ports visited on the voyage were 
warned not to sell provisions or aid in any way. The Darien Scheme ended in death and 
disaster.  
 
Beyond the domestic front, European politics at the turn of the seventeenth-
century was very much in transition with commerce becoming a reason of state. In 
order for Scotland to be able to survive as an independent nation it needed to be able 
to defend itself. In order for defence, Scotland required the militia as proposed by 
Fletcher, and rapid economic growth and stability; growth that Darien was supposed 
to be the catalyst for. As Fletcher had noted, war had become a trade to live by and 
Scotland simply could not keep up.81 Summarised by Istvan Hont; the need of modern 
warfare created an ever increasing demand for finance on a scale that could not be 
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met by the expedients of the past.82 Trade was necessary for income and defence, as 
the wars of France and the Spanish succession crisis clearly demonstrated, the new 
international system was founded on warring nations vying for advantage in the 
marketplace; a zero-sum competition. Commerce as a reason of state highlighted the 
need to protect Scotland from aggressive neighbours. Fletcher recognised Scotland’s 
potential – with an abundance of natural resources, harbours and access to the seas of 
Europe, which only through neglect had not been developed to its full potential; with 
this potential and its proximity to its longest standing enemy, Scotland was a prime 
target. It was both a social and economic disaster when the Darien Scheme failed. 
 
Fletcher sees the purposeful interference in Scotland’s attempts to make the 
nation considerable as a direct contravention of the Scottish people’s rights and 
liberties, and the potential destruction of the nation. ‘Should it be that his majesty 
ought not to protect us in our just rights and privileges? That he should break laws and 
violate his oath by our destruction’?83 By turning his back on the Darien scheme, 
William not only put English and Dutch interests before Scotland’s, but ruined its 
chances of economic and commercial growth. Fletcher is leading up to his point that 
Scottish and English interests cannot be fairly managed by the same ministers, that 
those ministers appointed envoys for foreign affairs cannot even be considered 
ministers for Scotland; appointed by England, they cannot be sufficiently relied upon 
to further Scottish interests either at home or abroad. Fletcher is aware that without 
independent political authority to protect and further its own interests, Scotland 
would be at the mercy of a market economy that it could not participate fully in. As the 
examples of the Darien Scheme and the Welsh and the Irish nations before them 
show, the English state would not hesitate to destroy Scotland’s interests were they to 
impede their own. This reason alone is enough for Fletcher to believe that having the 
interests of both countries represented by the same government would be disastrous 
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for Scotland. Therefore it is vital that Scotland is able to extricate itself from its 
dependence on England within the federal British system. 
  
Despite his acceptance of the monarchy being situated in England and the two 
countries being united by the crown, Fletcher fully believes in a federal system of 
governance; advocating a system where two nations are united under one king and the 
banner of Great Britain with separate parliaments that represent both national and 
international affairs. This is not to be limited to foreign and economic affairs but in all 
cases where ‘honour of the nation is concerned’. 84  Clearly a campaigner for 
representative government, Fletcher is against any removal of Scottish parliamentary 
influence. It is his belief that members of parliament who represent the public, must 
be ‘truly informed’ of the opinions of those they represent, and this is one more 
reason why Fletcher feels it is only possible within a representative parliament.85 
Anything less would be to subject Scotland to the mastery of England, rendering it 
dependent on England for its trade as well as its laws, and subjecting the people to 
slavery.86  
 
As Robertson tells us, what makes Fletcher’s intellectual identity unique, and 
unifies his political work, is his attempt to identify politics of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries in terms of Europe, the terms in which could do the complexity of 
the system justice, and the distinctive terms which he chose to give it conceptual 
coherence’.87  The terms Fletcher chose were derived from Machiavelli and the 
ancients who recognise politics as a distinct sphere of human action with particular 
goals and values which should be both pursued and remain distinct from any goals or 
values related to any concern for the next world.   
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 Bruce Lenman claims that Fletcher’s contributions are often – but not always, 
how could they be – as relevant to today as when first articulated.88 Fletcher’s political 
ideas are not entirely located within a particular time; they address eternal questions 
regarding political authority, right governance and freedom. Furthermore, his 
contribution to the debates surrounding the union in 1707 seems more pertinent with 
the success of Scottish devolution and the Scottish National Party’s plan for 
independence or ‘Devolution Max’. Initially a consequence perhaps, of the abuse of 
sovereignty by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party, and the policies imposed on 
the Scottish nation. Lenman suggests that the Tory dominance over Scottish politics in 
the 1980s was akin to the political absolutism of Louis XIV. Fletcher, he claims, was 
concerned for ‘an over-mighty executive scheming and plotting to subvert the political 
structures of a free society. . . [B]ut the effective power of Louis XIV to coerce and bully 
the other twenty million Frenchmen in his day was in practice far more limited than 
the capacity of any post 1945 British Prime Minister to coerce and rally the 50,000,000 
or so inhabitants of the United Kingdom. . . Thatcher disposes of absolute centralised 
power (or sovereignty to use the polite and misleading term often used to mask the 
reality) but she disposes of a vast and subservient bureaucracy in every corner of her 
realm’.89 It is, according to Lenman, this reason that makes Andrew Fletcher relevant 
to contemporary politics; his concern for the subversion of political structures and the 
domination of a free people by an arbitrary and absolute political leader who claims 
legitimacy. And although Lenman is referring to a past time in British politics, his 
concern is not Margaret Thatcher per se, but what he sees as the centralised 
absolutism of the British political system; without the rule of law or a written 
constitution to secure the rights and liberties of the British people.  
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 P.H Scott commemorates Fletcher as the Patriot, the man David Hume 
remarked as ‘a man of signal probity and fine genius’.90 Scott remarks that Fletcher’s 
‘lucidity and originality’ have contributed to his appeal, and recognises him as not only 
anticipating, but initiating the Scottish Enlightenment; his understanding of the 
importance of economic factors anticipating the works of Hume, Smith and, he even 
suggests, Marx, a grandiose claim to say the least, but one not without at least some 
conjectural foundation. 91  The most accurate introduction to Fletcher comes from 
Edward J Cowan, in his discussion of the ’radical Scottish political tradition’. ‘He was a 
man who recognised the economic interdependence of states, a patriot who dreamed 
of a World Empire, a Scot who looked to the best in his country’s past as inspiration for 
the European and World future’.92  
 
 Despite being absent from Scotland for most of his life, Fletcher’s allegiance to 
his country and the welfare of his countrymen is evident throughout his political 
pamphlets and discourse’. Each of his political pamphlets and actions, are a product of 
a particular difficulty Scotland confronted; each is intended to influence decision 
makers and consequently benefit his country. His dedication saw him being tried for 
treason twice, sentenced to death in his absence and his lands being forfeited to the 
crown. His fierce temper and reputation for aggression kept him from serious political 
office, however he continued to petition parliament and those of influence to 
ameliorate his countrymen’s troubles. Fletcher was born almost in the century before 
the Enlightenment, and his political theory preludes that of Voltaire and Rousseau, and 
Scottish enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith. His concern for 
religion was not a concern for religious matters per se, but a concern for the serious 
consequences organized religion had on the state and policy; especially the threat that 
a Catholic king on the throne, in Fletcher’s view, would result in arbitrary rule. At the 
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heart of Fletcher’s politics, was a desire for the non-dependence of Scotland on 
external control and influence, and the socio-economic improvement of the country. 
 
  Non-dependence rather than independence was the platform from which his 
analysis of Scottish and European politics was fashioned, and this meant constitutional 
reform in the shape of limitations on the monarch and free political institutions. Non-
dependence also required socio-economic advancement within the state; without it, 
the deplorable condition that the Scots were in would worsen. Seven years of famine 
had devastated the nation, and overseas trade had all but collapsed – not helped by 
the incessant interference of the English parliament in Scottish affairs, including wars 
with Scottish trading partners.93 Fletcher recognised that overseas trade was necessary 
to stop mass emigration of the Scots people, emigration that would result in further 
dependence on the English. It was, for Fletcher, this dependence on the English court 
that was the cause of Scotland’s troubles in the first place and he showed that a free 
society depended on a working system of trade and commerce. It is because of this 
socio-economic necessity that Phillipson claims the Scottish parliament had to choose 
between free trade and a free parliament – the English court only willing to offer free 
trade in return for an incorporating Union in 1707. 94  Fletcher understood the 
advantages of a closer union with England, especially with regards to trade and 
commerce, but was willing to place his bets on the survival of his country as a fully 
independent nation than the full dependence on the English.  
 
 At the heart of any of Fletcher’s pamphlets is the concern for liberty, whether 
this is set within the civic humanist tradition placing emphasis on virtue, as most 
notable in his pamphlet concerning the militias, or in his ardent desire to maintain 
Scotland’s own parliament and dependence from England. Fletcher was not entirely 
                                                          
93 Fletcher, Andrew. “Two Discourses Concerning the Affairs of Scotland”. Robertson.Andrew Fletcher, Political 
Works. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  Fletcher also blamed the church for the appalling conditions 
many of his fellow Scotsmen were facing. By banishing slavery on moral and religious grounds, the church had freed 
men whose only estate was their liberty; and by providing for the poor, the church encouraged vagabonds and 
beggars. It is Robertson‟s version of Fletcher‟s works that will be used throughout this thesis, unless otherwise stated. 
94 Phillipson, Nicholas. “The Scottish Enlightenment”. In Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich. The Enlightenment in the 
National Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981: 24. 
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anti-union, recognising the great benefits a closer trading and political union with 
England could bring Scotland, but he was against the incorporating union that finally 
passed in 1707. Fletcher saw this as Scotland becoming fully dependent on England.  
 
 Post union, Fletcher removed himself from public life, he became isolated 
politically. His attempt to keep the issue of the succession open by suggesting (with 
irony) that the crown be offered to the Prussion Hohenzollerns was exposed as a bluff 
when it was discovered they had no connection with the Scottish royal line. Support for 
him further deteriorated to the point that Fletcher challenged a once committed 
supporter, the Early of Roxburgh, to a duel. At this Fletcher withdrew from active 
politics. He maintained correspondence with political allies and was arrested (wrongly) 
on suspicion of involvement in a Jacobite plot in 1708, but never did succumb to 
Jacobitism himself. Fletcher was out of the country during the Rebellion of 1715, and 
remarked of the Pretenders inadequacies ‘convinces everbody who formerly did not 
believe it that he is of the family’.95 A patriot to the last, fletcher’s dying words were an 
appeal to the Lord to ‘have mercy on my poor country that is so barbarously 
oppressed’.96 
 
Fletcher’s civic humanism is most apparent in the European historical approach 
he uses to highlight the loss and corruption of virtue. It is the fundamental problem of 
the loss of virtue - participation in politics and public life, and a concern for the 
common good - which is the cause of society and the main concern for civic humanists 
(republicans, broadly speaking) rather than the right to resist or proper authority. 
Pocock recognises the strong influence of Harrington in Fletcher’s work; accepting the 
‘Gothic’ roots of modern liberty: where arms and therefore, authority and sovereignty, 
were in the hands of the land owners; all the while being aware of the post-feudal, 
                                                          
95 See Robertson, Political Works, 1997 ibid: xvii and also Scottish History Society, Miscellany X. Letters of Andrew 
Fletcher. Edinburgh. T & A Constable. Edinburgh University Press. 1904: 155-6 
96 Again, see Robertson, passim. And the Letters of Andrew Fletcher, passim: 170-2 
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commercial society which offered liberty new opportunities and also hazards.97 
Commerce brought specialisation, and the land owners gave up their arms and allowed 
themselves to ‘be defended and governed by others’.98 By choosing ‘an expensive way 
of living’ man has given up his freedom; selling the means of his liberty so he may 
afford the trappings of culture.99 Pocock sees this Fletcherian response to Britain and 
the corruption and loss of virtue as the first phase in the critique of modern society, 
and again, very much based on a neo-Harringtonian version of civic humanism.100 
Fletcher is assumed to have ‘elaborated the neo-Harringtonian perspective to the 
point where it exposed the most difficult of the many problems to perplex eighteenth-
century social thought: the apparent incompatibility of liberty and virtue with culture’. 
‘It is the concern for virtue as the moral as well as material foundation of social and 
personal life’, as well as the use of Machiavelli and Harrington, that places Fletcher in 
the civic humanist succession, according to Pocock.101 
 
As previously noted, Robertson asserts that Machiavelli was the pre-eminent 
influence, and ‘source of insight into modern politics’ for Fletcher. ‘From Machiavelli, 
Fletcher learnt that the wisdom of the ancients, which he revered, lay in recognising 
politics as a distinct sphere of human activity, with its own values and goals.’102 It is 
Machiavelli that gives Fletcher the terms which gives his approach to European politics 
conceptual coherence. Fletcher draws on the Machiavellian theme of virtù and, 
applying the necessary matter of commerce, adapts it to a neo-Machiavellian political 
thought which is more compatible to the increasingly commercial political arena.  
  
Unionism in Scotland 
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Despite the renewed energy for republicanism as an alternative to the normative 
political theories of liberalism and communitarianism, which have enjoyed being the 
centre of philosophical debate in the English speaking world, the so-called canon of 
texts has remained fairly static. No-one questions the use of Cicero and Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Harrington, or Sidney but the works of the sixteenth and seventeenth-
century British commentators on the state of Britain are conspicuously absent. The 
question of authority in Britain had been at the forefront of political imagination since 
before the union of the kingdoms of Scotland and England in 1603. From George 
Buchanan’s History of Scotland in which he demonstrates history of popular 
sovereignty and the need for the consent of the people for monarchical authority, to 
his former pupil, James VI and I attempts to authorise a divine right of absolute 
monarchy. Not forgetting the covenantors, commonwealth-men and whigs who 
dedicated their political arguments to the subject of authority and sovereignty in 
Britain. What follows is a summary of the main theories that dominated the political 
debates of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in Scotland centred on the 
most controversial political events concerning the rights and duties of both the 
monarch and the people. Fletcher was familiar with each of the tracts mentioned in 
this section, having heavily annotated versions in his personal library.103  
 
It is established that the pro-union arguments prevalent in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were presented in order to preserve the protestant faith in 
Scotland from the threat of the restoration of Catholic dominance.104 In his Blast of the 
Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women, John Knox argued that what was 
of importance was the establishment of Protestantism in Scotland and its safeguarding 
in England; whether this Union involved confederacy, federacy, perpetual friendship, 
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amity or league did not matter.105 With the accession of James VI & I to the thrones of 
Scotland and England, several Scotsmen were appointed to negotiate a closer union 
between the two countries. This resulted in several tracts which postulated a federal 
system of unification linking the English and Scottish nations. John Russell (1550 – 
1612), again concerned with the religious rule, suggested a strengthening of the union. 
Robert Ponte (1524-1606) proposed a union based on friendship and religion. While 
both were concerned with the possibility of Scotland’s absorption into the English 
Empire, Russell was particularly insistent that any union implied partnership and not 
dominion.  
 
John Mair’s Historia Maioris Britanniae (1521) assumes that only a Union 
between Scotland and England would bring about a proper alignment of their (often 
competing) interests. This union was not based on a capitulation of the Scottish nation 
as was later achieved in 1707, but was to be grounded on a genuine acknowledgement 
of partnership and shared interests. Like many of the Scottish philosophers, Mair uses 
an historical approach as a means of supporting what can only be described as a very 
Scottish form of philosophy – a practical response to a political problem. Mair 
produces a history which is intended to be impartial, although he struggles to conceal 
his favour for his own country and emotional involvement with its struggle to maintain 
independence. Unlike other histories of Britain at the time, Mair does not try to 
combine the two separate histories but moves between two narratives. In order to 
ensure any union is fair and equal, he attempts to show Britain as one geopolitical 
entity with two very independent and equal nations within that are both entitled to 
rule in their own right. 
 
                                                          
105 The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women was aimed at the newly crowned Queen 
of England, Mary, who was attempting to re-Catholicise England - not Mary Queen of Scots. See Mason, Roger A. 
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The History of Great Britain shows Scotland as an autonomous Kingdom, able 
to unite with England on equal terms.106 Right reason and common sense will prevail 
over any nationalistic desires, and the resulting union would bring an alignment of 
interests and peace. John Mair intended his history as more than a mere chronicle of 
facts. It was dedicated to the King not for flattery or patronage, but to ensure that he 
was to read it and hopefully learn from the lesson that Mair hoped to teach – that 
peace in Britain could only be achieved through a Union on equal terms. ‘*M+y aim that 
you may learn from the reading of this history that you may learn not only that thing 
that was done, but also how it ought to have been done.’107 Mair contradicts the 
histories of Boece and the English historians, attributing the cause of British discord to 
an overemphasis on patriotism and an overweening desire to demonstrate superiority 
across nations. Only by shaking off the pretensions to historical superiority and 
imperialism, and unifying the crowns through equal marriage terms, he argued, could 
Britain become peaceful. 
 
A former pupil of Mair, George Buchanan (1506-1582) went against his old 
master and wrote a history based on the fantastic account of Hector Boece which was 
itself inspired by the political events of the time, Mary Queen of Scots’ alleged 
complicity in the murder of her husband Lord Darnley and her consequent marriage to 
the accused, Lord Bothwell. Buchanan wrote the De Iure Regni Apud Scotus Dialogus 
intending to justify the deposition of Queen Mary as a right of the people of Scotland 
that dated back to the first kings of Scotland. Sovereignty, on his account, is a privilege 
extended on the crown by the people, and this can be withdrawn if the monarch 
becomes unworthy.  
 
This was not the only intention of the De Iure. Mason suggests that Buchanan 
deliberately manipulated the history of Scotland to demonstrate how the laws of 
                                                          
106 See also Mason, Scotland and England 1286-1815 ibid, and Colin Kidd, Union and Unionisms: Political Thought 
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107 Mair, John. A History of Greater Britain, as well England as Scotland; translated from the original Latin and 
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nature had been adopted by the early Scots as the basis of their constitution.108 The 
dedication to James VI unmistakably sets out Buchanan’s purpose - to advise James VI 
of his duty towards his subjects, and to counsel him against flattery and corruption. It 
follows the “mirror for princes” form which was popular at that time, and might seem 
as if it were intended to rebuke and drag James back from tyranny were he to choose 
that path. However, twelve years elapsed between the composition of the De Iure and 
its eventual publication, so the underlying intention behind the work cannot have been 
to counsel James VI – although this may have been a factor in its publication. It is, in 
any case, clear from the date of writing that the defence of the people from a tyrant, 
Mary, and the provision of evidence for the people’s right to depose the monarch, 
were his foremost goals at the time of writing. 
 
Although Buchanan is considered one of the most influential political 
commentators of the time, his political interests were more concerned with the 
character of the sovereign and the people’s right to resist, than the characteristics of 
the nation-state. Nevertheless, his political philosophy remains deeply relevant to the 
discussion at hand. Buchanan is essentially concerned with the nature of governance 
with respect to the sovereign and his subjects; the limitations on the authority of the 
king, and his duties concerning the common good and liberties of his subjects. 
Buchanan relies on Scotland’s independent past to justify the argument that the 
sovereign requires the people’s consent to justify his reign, rather than to argue for an 
independent Scottish nation or country. Kings, he maintains, are subject to laws and to 
their people. 
 
 This ‘fact’ that Scottish kings were elected and granted limited authority by the 
people was based on ‘usage-beliefs’, ‘a body of unwritten traditions which were 
neither feudal in origin nor in any sense the law of the land’.109 These describe the 
                                                          
108 Mason, Roger A. “George Buchanan, James VI and the Presbyterians”. In Roger A Mason (ed) Scots and Britons. 
Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603, ibid: 112-138 
109 Williamson. A.H. Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI: the apocalypse, the union and the 
shaping of Scotland’s public culture. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers. 1979.  
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reciprocal responsibilities of the people and the monarch.110 Thus, Buchanan is able to 
draw on the informal interaction, or oral traditions that form the Scottish historical 
consciousness and hold it as consonant with natural law, using this as the basis of his 
political thought.111 This appeal to Scottish custom, identified with natural law, gives 
further support to the punishment of Queen Mary and strengthened his argument for 
accountability. By depicting Scotland as being governed by an ancient, natural law that 
never changed, Buchanan is able to reinforce his theory of resistance. He 
acknowledges the necessity of recognizing the king’s authority as limited. For 
Buchanan, the king’s right to rule and the extent to which he can rule is given to him by 
the people. Both the king and his subjects must recognize this given authority in all 
aspects of government and incorporate it into the system.112 The social arrangement 
of king over people is legitimate only by agreement, and this agreement is dependent 
on both parties having reason to honour the terms of the social contract. In return for 
security and justice, the people agree to be subject to certain laws and obligations. The 
king must also have laws and duties to which he is accountable to avoid any corruption 
of his position; he is subject to the limitations of the rule of law. It is for the people to 
dictate the extent of the king’s authority over them to ensure that he himself is subject 
to laws and performs his duties in gaining the common good for all.113 If the king is to 
fail in his duties as protector and provider of justice, or indeed, he himself is to become 
a threat, the people would have the right to rule themselves and resist his authority.  
 
 In his discussion of resistance to tyranny, Buchanan turned to some 
fundamental questions concerning the problem of political obligation based on 
consent: when is resistance acceptable? For Buchanan, the obligation of obedience is 
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conditional, based on reciprocal consent. The obligation depends not on any tangible 
consent but on implicit consent contingent on the character of the government. One 
has an obligation to obey the edicts of a good government engaged in just action. 
However, if it is a tyrannical government doing what no government should do, then 
there is no such obligation to obey. A king who acts contrary to the good of the people 
should not, according to Buchanan, be considered a king.114 Therefore, the man who 
was once regarded as king can be punished in accordance with the laws. Any union 
between Scotland and England that was not based on equality, or promoted the 
interests of one to the detriment of the other could not be considered a union that 
was based on consent because, as Buchanan claimed, no man would gladly accept the 
withdrawal of his rights or powers.  
  
 Buchanan proposed a system of vertical dimensions of political accountability 
regarding the power relations between the state and its citizens. In order for the law 
and the king to be legitimate, society must be able to adopt political values such as 
good representation, deliberation and accountability - values critical to justice and 
legitimacy. Accountability, for Buchanan, allows critics of the government to target the 
individual tyrant without posing a direct challenge to the political institution. Virtue in 
public life - political participation - is a necessary attribute for holding the king to 
account. A lack of accountability paves the way for corruption, greed and self-
interested gains.115 A tyrant, then, is one who has come to power without consent or 
has exercised his power contrary to justice. Any unilateral assumption of power, in the 
absence of the legitimising framework of deliberation and accountability, is an 
exemplar of tyranny. Buchanan justifies his theory of resistance in terms of constraints 
on legitimate authority – the conditions required for any exercise of power to be 
warranted, and hence generate a duty of obedience. The duty of obedience to higher 
authority is only due as long as the exercise of this duty does not conflict with 
obedience to God: human obligations are subsumed by the divine. The tyrant who 
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demands ‘ungodly’ deeds must be resisted.116 And, similarly, the king who disregards 
law and assumes powers that are not granted to him may be regarded, and treated, as 
an enemy of the people and God.  
 
 James VI and I accession to the English throne in 1603 should have been a 
profitable union for Scotland and a popular choice. The Scottish king would rule 
England, bringing peace between the warring nations, accord of religion, and greater 
security from external threats. Sadly, infighting amongst the nobility and lack of 
concord left Scotland wide open for conflict, civil war and invasion – as became 
evidenced in the following hundred years, a period marked by periodic regicide, the 
Covenanters’ rebellion, and widespread turmoil. Scotland invaded England in several 
‘Bishop Wars’, and anti-monarchy and absolutist theories of governance prevailed. 
This was an intense period for witch-hunting and persecution; Scotland and England 
came under the protectorship of Oliver Cromwell, only for the Restoration period to 
restore the Stuart monarchy in 1660 and for it to collapse again with the exile of James 
VII and II in 1688. These events ultimately led to the so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’, 
and thence to the Treaty of Unions in 1707. 
 
Returning to the theme of union with equality, John Russell wrote A treatise of 
the Happie and Blissed Unioun in 1604, after James VI and I seceded to the throne of 
England, and before he had adopted the role as King of Great Britain. Again, it is 
dedicated to the King and is intended to advise him on the form the union should take 
to ensure its success. This objective is stated in the opening paragraphs to the treatise: 
the form in which the union should take in order for it to succeed; and the good reason 
to why it should proceed. This objective is reiterated in the final chapter with a list of 
no less than fifteen recommendations for the mould of the union.117  
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Russell is in favour of the Union of the Crowns; like Mair, he believes that it 
would benefit his home country - more, perhaps, than it would England. It is clear from 
the dedication to James VI however, that Russell is concerned for the future of 
Scotland if the union is not equal. He reminds James that his Scottish subjects are his 
first concern, and that they should always be favourable towards him: he needed their 
consent, as well as that of the people of England, for his peaceable accession to the 
English throne. Both nations are to be treated as equal and sovereign entities within 
the British Empire, regardless of the inheritance of a greater kingdom.118 Russell 
suggests ‘ane personall unioun…the concord and harmonie of hairtis and myndis’, 
maintaining a union with full sovereignty and self-government enjoyed by both 
kingdoms. His is a union which would strengthen commercial ties and alleviate the 
hostility between the two by retracting the hostile laws between them. The names of 
Scotland and England would be erased, and replaced with Great Britain; a reciprocal 
adoption of the term, with both parties living under the same sovereign monarchy.119 
This, however, is where the union is to end. There is to be no alteration made to either 
of the kingdoms in their public estate without the full consent of the parliament 
concerned.120  
 
It was a popular principle held in Scotland at the time that Sovereignty rested 
with the people. In contrast, Russell assumes that the King is the sole holder of 
sovereign power - as the only legitimate law-maker - having no superior. Despite this 
monarchical absolutism there are fundamental laws that even the king is subject to, 
the ‘Trew Law of Free Monarchies’ which the king is unable to alter or dispense 
with. 121  This includes the sovereignty of the country. Any violation of these 
fundamental laws will result in the ruin of Scotland and its position as an independent 
nation. The Union shall not be allowed to subvert the fundamental laws of the nation: 
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 ‘Sal lane frie kingdome possessing sua ancienne liberties become ane slave, 
furth of libertie in bondage and servitude – and that of thair auin proper uill, 
uncompellit or coactit, to the heich honour of Ingland, perpetuall desolatioun of 
Scotland? Sall Scotland now eftir sua mony ages ressave schame, and amit hir ancienne 
beautie? The Lord forbid.122  
 
The union was to be mutual and reciprocal, and not the translation of one estate onto 
the other, or the subjugation of Scotland. If England commands and Scotland obeys, 
then Scotland would lose its beauty for ever - its beauty, in this context, being its 
constitution and independence. The union Russell had in mind was a meeting of the 
hearts and minds to end the troubles and calamities of the past, and the formation of a 
true union.123 
 
Like Mair before him, Russell clearly favours union but this is limited to a 
nominal federation,  
‘Bot houseoevir I inclyne to the affirmative, it is with this speciall limitatioun 
that it sall not import ony alteratioun of the kingdoms in haill or in pairt, in religion, 
policie, lauis, liberteis and ancienne priviledgis, bot to tend to the gude of baith, 
prejudice of nane.124 
 
 Scotland and England both have laws, liberties and policies as good as each other, and 
no change was required for either.125 His desire for the sovereignty of both countries 
to be maintained is apparent throughout, but Levack suggests the clearest indication 
of this is his use of the term Empire (Impire) when referring to the two kingdoms. 
Although not an unfamiliar term at the time, it had been abandoned by many unionists 
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in favour of British terminology, referring to Britain as one imperial crown rather than 
two separate imperial kingdoms.126 
 
Using the language of empire, Russell indicates his desire for an almost federal 
unification between the two nations. He argues that union is perhaps not necessary – 
what is required is a mutual league or contract in which the religion and policies of 
both nations are maintained in whole, as good reason dictates they should, for the 
maintenance of amity and friendship between the two empires.127 In order to ensure 
peace between the two nations, the confederacy must be shown to be for the benefit 
of both with no prejudice of one over the other and no interference in internal matters 
of state. The union is to be limited to ensure peace between the two, the continued 
economic growth of both, and their defence against foreign injury. These are all 
offered as basic principles of a federal arrangement between two equal nations. He 
gives strength to his argument by referring to several other kingdoms including the 
Roman Empire, Holland, Germany, Sicily, Hungary, and Austria among others that ‘... 
have united with other Impyirs yet have not altered their estates, laws or liberties as a 
consequence and have maintained their integrity as nations’128 - including the Duchy of 
Milan, the kingdom of Portugal and the republic of Genua who, under the rule of the 
king of Spain, have preserved their fundamental laws and policies.129 The use of these 
federal examples as preferred models to reinforce his argument for limited and equal 
union, demonstrate unequivocally Russell’s desire for a similar arrangement between 
Scotland and England.  
 
At the same time, Thomas Craig is arguing for union along the similar lines.130 A 
permanent union consisting of two nations governed in accordance with their own 
laws and customs. The parliaments are to retain their own status and authority, and no 
new laws promulgated, or existing laws repealed without the full consent of the 
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parliament concerned.131 Influenced by Bodin, Craig maintains that the king is the 
sovereign entity with no superior, and this condition means that the king is not able to 
surrender his sovereignty to another. Nor can a king who governs a free people render 
them slaves.132 The sovereign power in Craig’s premise is the protector of the 
sovereign right on behalf of the nation; he holds no lands or offices. Any king - who is 
subject to no other - who willingly gives away any part of his sovereignty and becomes 
beholden to them loses his title and rights to majesty. Of course, James VI & James I 
would not be giving away Scotland’s sovereignty to another, merely holding on to the 
sovereign rights to both Scotland and England simultaneously, but Craig, like Russell, is 
concerned for the integrity of Scotland’s ancient constitution once James inherits the 
more tempting England. And, as Russell had suggested, by inheriting England James 
had inherited an increase in his duties and care towards Scotland in order to ensure 
their interests were protected and met. 
 
During the height of the Stuart reign’s unpopularity, the covenanting 
movement in the early 1640’s was again concerned with the form of governance of 
Scotland or Britain. Samuel Rutherford and his fellow hard-line Presbyterians had been 
actively opposing any amendments to the Presbyterian church from the decade 
following from 1610, and especially the Articles of Perth that were passed at the 
General Assembly in 1618 which required the congregation to kneel at communion. 
And there is no doubt that Rutherford had Presbyterian radicals amongst his many 
friends and correspondents throughout the 1620s. However, it was after Charles I 
renewed his fervour for religious uniformity throughout Britain in the 1630s that 
Rutherford and his compatriots became most active in their rebellion. The introduction 
of a new prayer book in 1637 sparked a riot in opposition, and the covenanting 
movement formed themselves into a formidable group in 1638, producing and signing 
the National Covenant – obliging the signatories to maintain the Scottish kirk and its 
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laws, and instigating a five year revolution.133 The Solemn League and Covenant was 
signed in August, 1643. Samuel Rutherford published his justification for resistance, 
Lex Rex in 1644.134  
 
Lex, Rex, (or ‘Law before King’) is a political text intended to justify resistance to 
Charles I. It outlines the Presbyterian disaffection from Charles I and their outrage at 
what they saw as his betrayal of the Reformed church. Coffey suggests that 
Rutherford’s intentions may be found in the fact that it was published at a time when 
Charles was in negotiations with the Scots and Parliament, and lays out his proposals 
for limitations on the monarch.135 Set out in the Scholastic method, Rutherford 
structures his arguments in the form of forty-four questions dealing with the origins of 
government, the relation between king and subjects, and the connection between King 
and Law - in which Rutherford places the king firmly beneath the law. Rutherford relies 
on Buchanan’s ancient constitution to support his own natural law theories, and his 
theories concerning popular sovereignty are comparable. He maintains that the people 
create the king and that true sovereignty belongs primarily to God, not to the people. 
Upon the election of rulers, the people do not so much surrender their liberties and 
rights as delegate the authority to govern to the monarch. If the king has become 
tyrannical, the people may resume their rightful power from him. Rather than being 
above the law, the prince is under the law and subservient to the ends of the state; he 
is merely the executor of the state and its interests. And as will become clear, it is 
these pro-union treatises heavily influence Fletcher’s desire for a non-incoporation 
union between Scotland and England and his wider political thought. 
 
                                                          
133 For more on the Covenanting movements see MacInnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement 
1625-1641. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991. Mason, Roger A. “Covenant and Commonweal: the 
language of politics in Reformation Scotland”. In N MacDougall (ed) Church, Politics and Society: Scotland, 1408 – 
1929. Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 1994. And Coffey, John. Politics, Religion and the British 
Revolutions: the Mind of Samuel Rutherford. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1997,  
134 It is considered that a great part of the text was written at least 10 years before publication.  
135 Coffey, J. Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions. the Mind of Samuel Rutherford. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 1997: 149.  
60 
 
It is clear to see that Mair and his contemporaries were not concerned for an 
independent Scotland or a complete division of political authority between Scotland 
and England, but rather the question was what form that political authority should 
take. The union had been a long accepted political reality that was not being 
contested. The problems lay in the perceived threat to the laws and culture of 
Scotland, and the inevitable religious divisions. Again, this was not about who had the 
authority of religion, rather the form that it would take. According to Burgess, the civil 
wars between Scotland and England were not because of differences over the origins 
of government, but because of deeper concerns for its purpose.136 Arguments over the 
authority of the sovereign came from concern for final causes, religious and national 
covenants. These arguments were born out of concern for the potential of the 
religious covenant inspiring the use of force against a king whenever his policy was 
deemed unsatisfactory, destabilising the commonwealth and leaving it under threat 
from religious wars and civil rebellions. In the national covenant, every man was 
responsible for the religious integrity of the country.  
 
Calvinist political theory does not rely on the natural law theories that 
abounded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In fact, Calvinists seem reluctant 
to use the theory to explain their resistance theories, preferring to use social contract 
models. Civil society is a construct of consenting individuals given to them by the grace 
of God. For Buchanan and Rutherford, mankind had lived in huts and caves but came 
together, not through reason as Aristotle had suggested, but because God asked them 
to. ‘God and nature intendeth the policie and peace of mankinde, then must God and 
nature have given to mankinde, a power to encompasse this end; this must be a power 
of government.137 But whether using natural law, or scriptural evidence, all agreed that 
the sovereign’s political authority comes from the consent of the people. Any attempt 
to take power by violent means was illegitimate and could justly be repelled by force. 
                                                          
136  Burgess, Glenn. “Revisionism, Politics and Political Ideas in Early Stuart England”. Historical Journal, 34, 1992: 
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137 Rutherford, Samuel. Lex Rex.  The Law and the Prince; A Dispute for the Just Preorgative of King and People. 
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Therefore, for peace to endure between the two neighbouring countries, a union of 
equals with the full consent of the people was required.   
 
This debate grew ever more fierce in the run up to the Treaty of Unions in 
1707. Although the Union of Crowns had been accepted and as shown, considered the 
best model for peace; the Glorious Revolution, the secession crisis and the consequent 
Act of Settlement in 1701 heralded a new predicament for political relations between 
the two countries. The political ideas that were coming from Scotland were based 
almost entirely on attempts to find answers to the particular troubles faced by the 
country at the time. Furthermore, like the two centuries of political thought preceding 
it, the political commentaries were not concerned for a wholly independent Scotland, 
rather the model of governance that was to lead Britain. 
 
 The Glorious Revolution (1688) saw Stuart rule replaced by William of Orange, 
producing a completely new form of constitution in Britain based on contract. The 
debate concerning the proper authority was part of a broader question in the history 
of political thought in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries – that of how a common 
life, society and morality is possible when members of society are engaged in an open-
ended bargaining for their individual rights. Whether it is set in a Grotian ideal natural 
order or a Hobbesian natural disorder, answers to this question range from 
contractual, natural law, and natural rights theories. 138 
 
 As Colin Kidd suggests, the history of political thought in Scotland was not a 
concern for natural rights, or the meaning of life etc., but a concern for authority; the 
nature of governance and the relationship between monarch and subject. As has been 
shown, the Scottish desire for self-governance has never been a singular desire for 
independence from England. In fact, for a large part of Scottish history up until the 
Treaty of Unions in 1707, Scotland was – and the people very much considered 
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themselves to be – an independent nation that would benefit from a greater union 
with England.  
 
 The period between the sixteenth and eighteenth-centuries was a crucial time 
for Scotland, both politically and intellectually. The monarchy was in turmoil and 
Scotland had endured several long periods of minority rule.  Political turmoil and 
struggles for power were the cause of many of the wars between England and 
Scotland, and the internal struggles that erupted in violence. However, the story of 
Scotland is not wholly one of a struggle for independence and freedom from English 
domination. It was during this period that European confederal theory was developed, 
a constellation of positions in defence of the people, in which they had the right to 
resist absolute or tyrannical power. The need for a rethink of the political issues was 
exacerbated by increased international trade, the expansion of the colonies, 
overlapping political boundaries and aggressive wars of expansion. This, combined 
with the religious wars and the constant interfering in religious affairs by political 
bodies and Kings, signified, for many political thinkers of the time a need for reform of 
constitutional and political theory. The theory of popular sovereignty was a device 
created by Parliament leaders to legitimate opposition to royal authority.  
 
 The right to resist government was one of the most controversial and debated 
topics in political philosophy in Scotland and Europe. The accountability of 
governments to the people and the right of rebellion were the issues that marked the 
progress of liberty and anticipated the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers of the 
eighteenth century. During the seventeenth century royal absolutism was making 
progress throughout Europe. Britain had already experienced religious reformation 
that was to change the political and spiritual make up of the country forever. Calvinist 
theories dominated throughout Europe, and battle lines were drawn between the 
religions. The rise of centralised nation-states in the sixteenth century had given 
popularity to the doctrine of sovereignty. The modern state was characterised by 
centralised power, the decline of papal and ecclesiastic authority over the state and 
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the increased power of monarchs. Germany, France, England, Sweden, Denmark and 
Spain were all involved in the protracted Thirty Years War (1618-48). The Peace of 
Westphalia marked the end of the Wars of Religion and of active religious persecution, 
and also indicated the beginning of religious toleration. It meant that men of all creeds 
had to devise a way in which they could live together peacefully within one state. The 
Wars of Religion and concomitant theological controversies had a profound effect on 
social and political life. Alongside the increased secular powers of monarchs, the 
discovery of the New World and Europe’s expansion, the powers of the Princes of 
Europe increased, as did their pretensions and greed. In France, absolutism was most 
effective: Louis XIII subdued the Huguenots and harnessed Catholic militarism to serve 
the monarchy; following a temporary setback caused by the Fronde, the latter half of 
the century saw a ‘golden age’ of royal absolutism under Louis XIV, who promoted 
raison d’état as the highest law when dealing with subjects and other states.139 In 1673 
the French Parliament was deprived of its right to oppose royal edicts, and in 1682 the 
Declaration of the Clergy of France asserted the independence of Kings from papal 
control. Elsewhere, absolutism continued to flourish: in Denmark the Danish Estates 
was closed down in 1660; in Sweden in 1680 constitutional reform effectively 
established absolutism. Meanwhile, in Britain, attempts to establish royal absolutism 
were attempted several times and only averted by the execution of one king and the 
deposition of another.  
 
 The political theories of the modern world are largely indebted to natural law 
theories; in the field of international relations the law of nature is still repeatedly 
appealed to. During the Reformation and Restoration, controversies concerning ius 
naturale occupied a prominent place. Political philosophy in Scotland was a practical 
endeavour – intended to address the problems facing the country at that particular 
time, and what Scotland was facing was the subjugation of the country, laws, culture 
and people by its dominant and aggressive neighbour, England. Calvinist ideas 
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concerning the right to resist were popular throughout the sixteenth-century Europe, 
and found favour with George Buchanan and John Knox in Scotland. As Skinner attests, 
in order to better understand the evolution of radical politics in early modern Europe, 
the thought of the schoolmen in the years preceding the Reformation need to be 
brought centre stage.140 
 
 Republican ideals have long had a tangible effect on the political ideas in 
Scotland, influencing the pro and anti-unionist authors alike. And, as has been shown, 
unionism in Scotland is not solely a post-seventeenth-century phenomenon. Equality, 
virtue and self-governance - even within a Union - have a long conceptual history. 
Limitations on the authority and influence of the monarch have always been at the 
heart of Scottish political thought, whether these limitations come from the 
constitution, the sovereignty of the people or the ‘Three Estates’. From Mair, through 
Buchanan, the pro-unionists and the covenanters, the concern for the liberty of the 
Scottish people and the nation’s independence, English domination have been a 
central concern. It would be a mistake to apply the term republican to the thought of 
the aforementioned authors, however their interests are republican in their subject 
matter.  
 
Structure 
 In order to establish Andrew Fletcher’s distinct civic-humanist republicanism as 
a valuable model on which to examine contemporary republican theory, this thesis has 
been divided into four parts. Chapter one introduces republican theory, and highlights 
the similarities between the neo-republican theories of Pettit and Pocock amongst 
others, and the civic-humanist republican theory of Andrew Fletcher. These similarities 
demonstrate the significance of Fletcher to contemporary republican theory. 
Republicanism has always been concerned with liberty, and the contemporary models 
for liberty proposed by Pettit et al are attempts to address the challenges of poverty 
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and injustice on a global scale. However, in an effort to disassociate contemporary 
republican theory with the failures of the liberal doctrine - making it distinct from the 
liberal model - neo-republicanism has lost some of its efficacy; fragmenting its 
usefulness between the different conceptions and confusing the core concepts along 
the way. A return to the early modern model proposed by Fletcher which combines 
the most attractive parts of both liberalism and civic humanism; emphasising the need 
for civic virtue to achieve the common good, would offer a model more in tune with 
contemporary needs.  
 
This chapter introduces the contemporary republican theories in their many 
forms and includes the discussion of Pettit, Pocock, Sunstein and Etzioni; examining 
their value with regards to contemporary issues. This chapter shows that a complete 
revision of early modern republicanism has neither occurred nor is necessary to 
answer contemporary political issues, but rather the many forms of modern 
republicanism have internalised the early modern lessons promoting the common 
good and political virtue - understood here as political liberty - as the central 
components at the heart of the ideology. The focus of freedom as non-dependence or 
non-domination, as opposed to non-interference, is vital for a contemporary global 
order which is both inter-dependent and interventionist.  
 
Chapter two sets Fletcher up as an example of the republican ideal; his 
distinctive civic-humanist and somewhat communitarian model of republicanism. By 
focusing on the fundamental republican theories found within Fletcher’s thought and 
how he utilised these to answer questions regarding the best form of government. 
Fletcher’s use of freedom as non-dependence is a vital component of any canon of 
republican political thought. It will show that Fletcher’s emphasis on freedom as non-
dependence; freedom from arbitrary rule and coercion as the fundamental basis for a 
model republic holds the same normative judgements as contemporary liberalism, 
considered necessary for a political theory to be considered as having value in 
contemporary global civil society. Fletcher emphasises freedom of the state as the 
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foundation for the common good, and the ultimate freedom of the individual within 
that state.  
 
Chapter three examines Fletcher’s international political ideas in order to show 
that he has a modern understanding of international politics, and that his theories can 
be utilised as a foundation when considering contemporary issues of order and peace 
within an increasingly interdependent European, if not global, political context. Using 
Fletcher as a critical lens, this chapter evaluates the liberal and republican discursive 
attempts to make sense of the global political order. Fletcher’s modernisation of the 
republican paradigm, and his models for the proper conduct between states, provides 
a basic model for understanding global justice, and promoting international equality 
and cooperation.  
 
Finally, while the previous chapters look to how Fletcher’s political position was 
shared by contemporary political authors with regards to the global political system, 
chapter four outlines what Fletcher has to offer contemporary political theory with 
regards to his ideas which have yet to be shared amongst the modern republican 
tradition. Fletcher, unlike his republican predecessors, believes in morality within 
international relations and it is from this position that he can make his greatest 
intellectual contribution to contemporary politics - by helping us to understand the 
nature of power politics, past and present. Republican ideals of liberty and justice, 
combined with an awareness of the corrupting influence of commerce as well as its 
contribution to peace, together with a commitment to virtue in politics that he 
recognizes as being corrupted by the emerging modern state system. Each of these 
themes can be used to illuminate the operation of contemporary power politics and 
the theories presented to limit the damage and tender justice. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to show that Fletcher is a significant figure in the 
republican tradition, that his intellectual, if not political, contribution is fundamental to 
a proper understanding of the republican paradigm. Using the civic-humanist and 
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cosmopolitan representations of the republican model of Andrew Fletcher to critique 
contemporary republican theories, this thesis offers Fletcher as a vital contributor to 
the contemporary debates concerned with global order and justice.  
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Chapter 1. Contemporary Republicanism 
 
The history of republicanism in contemporary political theory is neither linear nor 
coherent. There are those who appeal to republican values but deny their 
republicanism, others may include many of the principles of civic humanism and/or 
early modern republicanism but perhaps not enough to be considered republican. 
Dworkin finds himself identified as a republican, but would not recognise this 
distinction himself. One will also find republican values in modern communitarianism, 
and a conciliation of liberal and republican paradigms in Pettit, Sandel and Onuf.141 
What all the aforementioned authors have in common is their appeal to history as an 
approach to explain the order of things (res publica) and to illustrate current political 
arguments.  
 
In Aristotelian times, res publica came to mean the political framework, or even 
constitution, that would best ensure the common good: a mixed government joining 
democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. This was reconsidered in Renaissance Italy, 
most famously by Machiavelli and again in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
England by the likes of Harrington and Sydney, as well as minor figures such as this 
thesis’ focus, Fletcher. Contemporary republicanism, as with early modern 
republicanism, disregards the liberal preoccupation with natural rights and unilateral 
behaviour of individuals in the development of society, and instead focuses on the 
republican values of civic virtue, public life and community, the achievement of the 
common good and the eschewal of corruption.142 
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It is recognised in modern republican theory that a strong distinction between 
liberalism and republicanism may be ineffective. Both approaches contain 
instrumental accounts of certain ideals and virtues that have the effect of enhancing 
the overall system of freedom for individuals.143 There are still arguments as to the 
shape neo-republicanism should take: Guiner attempts to reconcile human rights and 
popular sovereignty with a procedural democracy, offering a third way between 
liberalism and republicanism, whereas Pettit goes further in his attempt to integrate 
both paradigms more fully with his proposal of a theory of freedom as non-
domination.144 Etzioni insists that society relies on a symbiotic relationship between 
libertarianism (his all-encompassing phrase for liberalism) and republicanism, his 
version of a communitarian model.145 Yet there are those who still insist that the 
distinction is necessary, critiquing the liberal view that there is no strong divergence 
between the two approaches: seeing the strong republicanism of Aristotle as 
incompatible with the liberal ideas of justice.146 
 
In the western, or ‘early modern’ republican tradition associated with 
Machiavelli, Harington, Sidney et al, the emphasis remains on the importance of civic 
virtue and political participation for the common good, the dangers of corruption and 
the need for a mixed constitution providing the rule of law.  The early modern 
republican tradition promotes a conception of the good life achieved through this 
active political participation and civic virtue, providing the foundation for political 
liberty. 
 
By contrast, contemporary, or ‘civic’ republicanism emphasises political liberty 
understood as non-domination (Pettit). Wheras the early modern republican model is 
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based on a positive conception of liberty, where political participation leads to self-
government, contemporary civic republicans have misinterpreted the early modern 
model and argue in favour of a negative conception of political liberty that no longer 
sees civic virtue as an intrinsically valuable component of the human experience, but 
as an instrumental component for achivieing political liberty.  
 
For both the early modern and the contemporary civic republican, the central 
tenet of contemporary republicanism is the notion of freedom from an arbitrary 
master, it can therefore be argued that there is little difference between the two 
canons, the only difference perhaps being the means to the end. For the early modern 
republicans, political participation ensures freedom from arbitrary rule, restricting the 
opportunity for one to gain arbitrary powers – while for contemporary republicans, the 
only way to ensure no-one gains arbitrary mastery is to limit his subjects dependency 
on him. The clearest difference, therefore, is the emphasis on the type of freedom; 
freedom of non-domination, or a liberal freedom of non-interference. Whereas today 
political liberty conjures for many the idea of protection of private interests against 
arbitrary acts of the government, early modern republicanism offers a different ideal 
of liberty, not the protection from government, but the opportunity to govern oneself: 
freedom as action, social and political.147 It is here that the civic-humanist version of 
republicanism of Andrew Fletcher comes into its own, bridging the gap between the 
early modern emphasis on political participation providing freedom as self-
governance, and the contemporary civic republican emphasis on political liberty 
understood as non-domination – independence – from an arbitrary or interfering 
power.  
 
In contemporary international political theory there is no single republican 
argument but a series of connected strategies that aim to make normative arguments 
proposing greater individual participation in public life, without interfering with the 
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freedoms of individuals. However, the division of the republican ‘tradition’ into 
restricted and partial arguments based on a limited treatment of the doctrine limits its 
usefulness as a conceptual framework for contemporary international thought. This 
chapter identifies contemporary republican international thought and the treatment of 
the republican tradition in history. It shows that the division of the doctrine into 
several themes: civic, cosmopolitan, and liberal – has undermined the value of 
republicanism for international relations theory. It demonstrates that the most 
auspicious way to treat republican theory is to reconstruct the republican tradition of 
the eighteenth-century; it is only by seeing the republican tradition as a whole, 
considering concepts of freedom as non-domination, the common good as the 
motivation for political action, and civic virtue as a moral and political incentive for 
action that we can begin to utilize republican international theory to its full potential.  
 
This chapter outlines the early modern western republicanism as found in 
Machiavelli and Harrington amongst others: the history of the concept and an analysis 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century uses of the paradigm. It will summarize 
and critique some of the major positions on republicanism in contemporary political 
theory, including J.G.A Pocock’s republicanism as a paradigm, Pettit’s idea of 
republican theory of freedom as non-domination, and Etzioni’s communitarian model 
as an alternative to republicanism, as well as a looking at the value of republicanism in 
modern political thought – its applicability to the contemporary struggles with 
concepts of global justice and liberty. The chapter concludes that contemporary 
republicanism is not as contemporary as publicised, and that the early modern 
republican theories are sufficient to answer these contemporary problems without any 
systematic dismantling and restructuring of the paradigm.  
 
The Foundations  and Revival of the Republican Paradigm. 
‘By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a Democracy, 
or any Form of Government, but an independent Community which the Latines signified 
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by the word Civitas, to which the word which best answers in our Language, is 
Commonwealth, and most properly expressed such a Society of Men, which Community 
or Citty in English does not, for there may be subordinate communities in a 
Government; and City amongst us has a different notion from Commonwealth.’148  
 
First and foremost, the republican tradition is a discourse on liberty. From 
Greece and Rome to the quattrocento Florentines, political participation is seen as 
conducive to social harmony, political stability, and the ‘freedom’ of self-governance. 
Freedom is dependent on freedom from arbitrary and absolutist rule, and the freedom 
to participate in public life. It is not a theory of liberty from interference, but the 
coexistence between the absence from certain forms of constraint, and political 
participation. This is a theme later picked up by Rousseau in his theories on the social 
contract. Going against the popular versions of Hobbes, Goritus and Puffendorf, 
Rousseau proposes a positive conception of liberty that emphasises moral freedom - 
obedience to laws one has prescribed to oneself -  as the key to freedom as non-
dependence; the fact that one obeys only himself. Rousseau asserts that ‘Man is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains. Those who think themselves the masters of 
others are indeed greater slaves than they’ 149  Self-governance and political 
participation are the source of liberty, by abandoning claims to individual or natural 
rights and joining in civil society, individuals will have the means of both preserving 
themselves and their liberty. This process enables them to discover the general will 
that obligates them to obey the laws and it is these laws that protect the individual 
from being subject to the will of any other.150 Rousseau is attempting to reconcile the 
freedom of the individual with the necessary authority of that state. It is worth noting 
that Rousseau is writing this some 50 years after Fletcher wrote in his Discourse of 
Goverenmnet that ‘the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the 
people, or to keep them under slaveyr; it is become alost every where a crime to 
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reason about matters of government. . . And not only that government is tyrannical, 
which is tyrannically excercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in 
their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince’.151 
 
Pocock proposes that authentic traditions have a conscious timeline; adherents 
are aware of the beginnings and the continuous descent until their own participation 
in the tradition. As he puts it,  
[t]he tradition in question may be referred back to Aristotle in nearly every 
respect, but ... so many subsequent authors restated parts of it and were influential in 
their own ways that, especially under Renaissance conditions, it is hard to define with 
certainty the particular writer exerting authority at a particular point. We are, in short, 
confronted by the problems of interpreting a tradition of thought’.152 
 
Therefore, the political thinker has to be understood in terms of his linguistic time:  a 
social being whose thoughts and actions are linguistic events; his words and concepts 
are inherited from shared traditions and discourses as well as languages of legitimation 
and discourse; and as a consequence, his ability to fully theorise is constrained by the 
context in which he functions as a social being.153 Man is nothing without society, or, 
as Pocock stipulates, the paradigm which gives his existence meaning.  
 
Pocock defines republicanism in this way, as a language or a mode of discourse, 
implying a conversation or vocabulary in which political debates are conducted, 
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including ‘virtue’, ‘corruption’ and the ‘common good’.154 Within this ‘paradigm of 
early modern republicanism’ the conversation can only take place when certain 
underlying assumptions are recognised – assumptions regarding human nature – and 
what is good for the individual in society, how this can be achieved etc. These 
assumptions constitute a paradigm which must be shared by the community in which 
the conversation or discourse on republicanism takes place in order for it to be 
meaningful. Therefore, the central tenet of the ‘early modern’ republican paradigm is 
the assumption that human nature has a purpose that can only be fulfilled by 
participating in public life – there exists an objective public good that can be 
discovered through virtuous political debate and activity.  Furthermore, these ideals 
must struggle to maintain themselves within a conceptual framework within the 
historically defined community.155  
 
This is denied by Mark Tushnet, who in Red White and Blue: A Critical Analysis 
of Constitutional Law, claims that the meaning of words would be readily understood 
without resorting to complicated theory: ‘In the eyes of those of the republican 
tradition, the limits the constitution places on the government ... [would be] readily 
understood by all’.156 In his version of republicanism people draw their ‘understanding 
of themselves and the meaning of their lives from their participation with others in a 
social world they actively and jointly create’, reiterating Pocock’s idea that human 
nature can only be fulfilled by active participation in self-government. According to 
Daniel Rogers, despite the concept of republicanism being one of the success stories if 
the 1980’s, the rise of the paradigmatic event met formidable obstacles, not least 
because ‘the root texts of the republican synthesis were difficult to the verge of 
unreadability, highly intellectualistic, and in many respects as consensual as the 
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consensus history they were designed to supplant’.157 But, because of the ‘vague and 
supple’ nature of the paradigm, republicanism was both difficult for historians to 
define and therefore easy to manipulate for the ends its formulators and its 
antagonists alike.158 By the time republicanism gained its full strength in the 1980’s, it 
had become a massively complicated mixture of renaissance civic-republicanism, 
eighteenth-century liberal idealism, and twentieth-century theories of freedom. It 
would seem to the casual observer, that neo-republicanism is searching to recover the 
forgotten meaning of the term, having been lost in contemporary contributions. 
 
Civic humanism is a theory of citizenship rather than liberty, but the citizenship 
provides the foundation for political liberty: the moral and rational faculties of 
individuals can only be fully developed if they act as citizens. It is by actively taking part 
in political life – performing ones civic duties – that one becomes virtuous. Pocock 
summarises this Aristotelian conception of the civic ideal: civic humanism denotes a 
style of thought in which it is argued that the development of the individual toward 
self-fulfillment is possible only when the individual acts as a citizen, that is, as a 
conscious and autonomous participant in an autonomous decision-making political 
community, the polis or republic. 159  The civic humanist ideal originated in the 
reassertion of the vita active: the ultimate goal of the citizen was to assert his virtue in 
(political) action (for the common good) of which the republic was the frame. 
Machiavelli claimed that an armed people would be a politically active people, like 
Republican Rome – who had armed the people. But a people who bore arms only in 
subjection to a powerful few were not exercising their virtu, while the powerful few 
had lost their virtu through the corruption of their powers. Virtu could only be 
maintained through equality. None were to be subject to anything other than the 
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public power.160 In this civic humanist tradition the republic appears as a mixture of a 
balance of three independent powers (or virtues), the one the few and the many. 
These were modes of political action and intelligence. In most versions, the virtues 
pertained to: in the one - leadership, in the few, reflective wisdom and prudence, and 
in the many, military.161 In the tradition of Aristotle, it was important to be able to 
assign to each group the political function appropriate to its virtue and cause it to 
serve the common good and maintain the balance of powers (virtues). Whereas 
contemporary republicanism rejects monarchy, civic humanism and early modern 
republicans did not reject monarchy outright. Instead, they reject tyranny in whatever 
form that appeared: monarchy, aristocracy, or the tyranny of the majority (democracy). 
The ideal form of governance for the civic humanist and early modern republicans 
would be a mixed government based on virtu and the pursuit of the common good 
through civil society.    
 
Humanism motivated the translation and study of early modern texts and was 
a major influence on the development of political thought in Scotland and pre-civil war 
England, encouraging the ideas of virtue and honour on public life, and gravitas, 
emulating the Roman ideals found in the newly translated texts.162 The humanist 
scholarly experience emphasised secular historical analysis and political interpretation 
which influenced political analysis and ideas of public life. Blair Worden insists that 
humanism encouraged alertness to the contrasting characteristics of the various forms 
of government – monarchical, aristocratic, democratic and mixed – as identified by the 
early modern writers.163 Despite this genuine republicanism was not embraced as a 
concept in England until the 1640s despite the works by Italian republicans and about 
Italian republics being translated into English at the end of the sixteenth-century and 
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finding readership amongst parliamentarians and the landed gentry. 164  English 
republicanism grew out of the desire to protect the constitution from the increasing 
threat of overly ambitious and absolutist princes in Europe, especially the Stuarts in 
Britain. Monarchical prerogative was eroding the institutional safeguards against 
tyranny; Charles I had been beheaded at the end of the civil war and Charles II had fled 
to France after his defeat by Cromwell at Worcester. In 1651, Cromwell declared 
Scotland and England to be one Commonwealth, leaving Scotland without a legally 
constituted government.  
 
It is as a response to this that Harrington’s Oceania (1656) calls for a return to 
the republican principles of early modern antiquity: wisdom, virtue and martial 
discipline. Unlike the de facto writers before him, he does not attempt to make sense 
of the English Civil War through theories of ability as legitimacy, but through patterns 
of social change. He wants to locate political order and institutions immune from the 
corruptibility of all the previous existing governments. Harrington calls for a return to 
the republican principles of early modern antiquity: wisdom, virtue and martial 
discipline. Unlike the de facto writers before him, he doesn’t seek to make sense of the 
English Civil War through theories of ability as legitimacy, but through patterns of 
social change. He wants to locate political order and institutions immune from the 
corruptibility of all the previous existing governments. Harrington believes that laws 
shape history – that there are universal rules or an underlying force within the social 
order that is a guide to all political life – and that these laws can be discovered through 
a rigorous study of the European past. 165 
 
A great admirer of Machiavelli, Harrington’s Oceania is a model state whose 
stability is based upon governmental rule which represents the economic structure of 
society. According to Harrington, a stable government can only be secured so long as 
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the political structure reflects the distribution of economic power in the nation. When 
the political structure fails to reflect the balance of power, the result is an unstable and 
weak foundation. Monarchy is only appropriate when the monarch controls the 
military class through ownership of the bulk of property. Power sharing is required 
when a bulk of the power – i.e. land and military capabilities – is owned by a broad 
section of landholding aristocracy or freeholding landowners. 
 
 For Harrington, the proper form of government is always dictated by a power 
arrangement founded in the balance of property ownership – the means of power. The 
consent of and consultation within these institutions was decreasing despite the 
general belief that the good will and cooperation of the nobility and landed freeman 
was necessary for effective rule. Only by adopting the principle of popular sovereignty, 
with an emphasis on moral dimensions of self-government and its practical outcomes, 
could an organised society hope to achieve its highest goals. When individual citizens 
are both empowered and obliged to take an active role in public affairs – and only 
when equality and personal liberty are secured – can the state realise its potential for 
greatness and the common good. Courage and public spirit (and the willingness to take 
a role in common business, the res publica), a rejection of luxury and corruption, and 
sense of liberty that does not require the sacrifice of private interest for public good, 
are necessary for civil society to flourish. It is not the well-being of individuals that 
makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond question that 
it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly.166 While the wisdom 
of the commonwealth may be held in the aristocracy (the few), the interest is in the 
entire body of the people. ‘The wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind, but 
the interest of the few is not the profit of mankind, nor of a commonwealth’.167 
Therefore, mandatory rotation of the elected members of the legislature would 
guarantee equal access and frustrate the formulation of faction.  
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Pocock suggests that Harrington wrote the Oceana ‘less to justify the fall of the 
English monarchy than to explain it, and this is why the work is so important’.168  It was 
for historical necessity and not for any abstract theory of natural rights that made all 
alternatives to republicanism unworkable and unjust.169 Corruption is a result of 
political instability and not the cause of political malaise, the fault lay principally with a 
political structure out of sync with the economic realities of the day. For Harrington 
and his successors such as Fletcher, corruption is the lack of public spirit. Neo-
Harringtonian’s have since attempted to assimilate the anti-monarchical ideas of 
Harrington with the Whig notion of balanced constitution and limited monarchy.  
 
Isaiah Berlin has claimed that surrendering individual liberties in return for 
political freedom is the basis for totalitarianism and gave birth to the two most 
destructive totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-century; fascism and bolshevism. He 
seeks to find why the idea that sacrificing individual liberties ‘on the altar of the 
community’ is considered not an absolute loss, but acceptable and necessary, and as 
the theoretical legacy of humanist individualism, the Enlightenment and liberalism.170 
Berlin claims that the sacrifice of personal liberty for political freedom has only 
resulted in the annihilation of the self-government of the political community; political 
liberty is replaced by the need for security and resignation from both personal liberty 
and political freedom. As a consequence, the absolutists and elitists arose to 
totalitarianism.171 The fundamental core of Berlin’s stance is that personal and political 
freedoms cannot be sacrificed one for the other, nor can one replace the other. By 
contrast liberty means there is no restraint upon those conditions which, in modern 
civilisation, are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness. There is no liberty if 
a dominant opinion can control the social habits of the rest without persuading the 
latter that there are reasonable grounds for the control. The paradox of self-
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government is that certain restraints on freedom are necessary to add to individual 
happiness; no man stands alone, his liberty is never absolute; ‘imposition, broadly 
speaking, is essential to liberty since it makes for peace; and peace is the condition of 
continued liberty’. ‘A man’s citizenship is the contribution of his instructed judgement 
to the public good, and right action is action upon the basis of that judgement’.172 
 
Berlin contends that the early modern liberal (negative) notion of freedom: 
‘ ( ... ) Is not, at any rate, logically, connected with democracy or self-
government. Self-government may, on the whole, provide a better guarantee of the 
preservation of civil liberties than other regimes, and has been defended as such by 
libertarians. But there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and 
democratic rule. The answer to the question ‘Who governs me?’ is logically distinct 
from the question ‘How far does the government interfere with me?’ it is in this 
difference that the great contrast between the two concepts of negative and positive 
liberty, in the end, consists. For the ‘positive’ sense of liberty comes to light if we try to 
answer the question, not ‘What am I free to do or be?’, but ‘By whom am I ruled?’ or 
‘Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?’ The connection between 
democracy and individual liberty is a good deal more tenuous than it seems to many 
advocates of both. The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in 
the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep as a wish that for a free 
area for action, and perhaps historically older.  But it is not a desire for the same thing. 
So different is it, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies that 
dominate our world. For it is this, the ‘positive’ conception of liberty, not freedom from, 
but freedom to – to lead one prescribed form of life – which the adherents of the 
‘negative’’ notion represent as being, at times, no better that a specious disguise for 
brutal tyranny’.173 
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Berlin understands self-government as a democratic regime. The republican 
also adopts a democratic position which it attempts to incorporate into representative 
and participatory frameworks of government. It is a concept of liberty based on both 
the negative structure of freedom from domination, and a positive perception of 
freedom to participate, which gives a rich notion of self-government that is attractive 
and important to the civic republican ideal. It is the positive conception of political 
liberty that is carried through to the seventeenth-century republicans. This is in 
contrast to the liberal theory of the later seventeenth-century English and American 
observers who recognise the individual’s natural freedom as freedom from the 
interference of government; the protection of one’s private life and property from any 
external threat. The discourse of freedom based on individual rights is carried to the 
limitation of government to the extent of attempts to draw a juridical barrier between 
a free citizen and their government. Robert Nozick puts it most succinctly: ‘individuals 
have rights, and there are things no person may do to them (without violating their 
rights). So strong and far reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, 
if anything, the state and its officials may do’.174 
 
It is Richard Fallon Jnr’s belief that the revival of interest in republican theory 
had nothing to do with an ‘historical fascination’ or an interest in the American 
constitution-framers’ intent, but rather a ‘straightforwardly normative or political’ 
source originating from intellectual dissatisfaction with liberalism.175 Fallon, borrowing 
from Rawls, defines liberalism here as insisting that the individual is the subject of 
moral value. In order for society to be just, the individual’s rights must be enforced 
even-handedly.176 The republicanism being revived encompasses a few core tenets: 
that human beings are political, that they can only fulfill their natures by participating 
in self-government, promoting virtue in the community and advancing the common 
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good.177 He regards Pocock’s ‘paradigm of early modern republicanism’ as a ‘poor 
candidate for contemporary adoption’, because the central tenets of virtue and the 
public good are ‘highly uncongenial to modern ontology and epistemology’.178 He 
rejects the Pocockian version of republicanism for its inapplicability to modern life, 
assuming that most people no longer believe in a public good that can be anything 
other than a version of individual good. His question, therefore, is whether the revived 
republicanism is the same republicanism studied by historians like Pocock, or some 
reformulated and modern version.179 It is with this argument that we can highlight the 
fundamental weakness in any contemporary republican theory that relies on liberal 
understanding; that is its emphasis on the liberty of the individual and its neglect of 
the common good as a moral and political motivator.  
 
Fallon is just one of several neo-republican approaches identifiable in 
contemporary international relations theory, and there are concurrent themes 
discernible throughout: the civic virtue; the search for the common good and the 
proper conduct in public affairs - and what this means to concepts of freedom and 
private interest - equal and independent political participation; and participation with 
an emphasis on duty and responsibility. Worden identifies only two types of 
republicanism: constitutional republicanism which he associates with Quentin Skinner 
and civic republicanism, adopted by Pocock in his influential Machiavellian Moment.180 
He discusses the work of Beard and Morgan amongst others, but there is no doubt the 
most difficult text to come to terms with is Pocock’s Machiavllian Moment; according 
to Pocock, deliberately so.181 For Pocock, the importance of republicanism lies in the 
contingency of history: he attempts to overturn the individualist paradigm that 
assumes any developments in the history of political thought from the time of 
                                                          
177 Fallon, ibid: 1697, see also Pocock, the Machiavellian Moment, ibid.  and Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New 
York:  Penguin Books, 1963:115.  
178 Fallon, ibid:1698, see also Michelman, Frank I. Foreward: “Traces of Self-Government”. Harvard Law Review 4, 
1986: 4-75. 
179 Fallon,ibid :1969. 
180 Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and Republic: The English Experience”, ibid.See also Tully, James. (ed), 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988 and Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, ibid. 
181 Pocock, “The Machiavellian Moment Revisited”, ibid: (53) 1. 
83 
 
Machiavelli are contributions to the liberal vocabulary. This is in contrast to Skinner’s 
neo-Roman republicanism in which he emphasises the association of citizens for 
juridical order and common interest – in this deontological approach, civic 
participation is not an end in itself but an instrument to attain liberty. 
 
This is to overlook the contribution Pettit and Viroli have made to the 
republican tradition. Viroli regrets the decline in civic consciousness, and hopes to 
revive civic concerns. Viroli claims that republican patriotism is vital for preserving self-
government, and can only be achieved through participation in the life of the republic, 
but this patriotism has been denied as a sound basis for contemporary politics. 182 
Pettit recognises a completely republican idea of freedom which he traces back to the 
Roman Republic. In his proposal for freedom as non-domination, the citizen would be 
immune from any and all arbitrary control. This is different from the idea of freedom 
as non-interference because this freedom, in the liberal paradigm, does not guarantee 
non-domination. As can be seen in the master/slave relationship; a master who does 
not interfere in his slave’s decisions is no less a master and does not free the slave 
from non-freedom.183 Pettit opposes the liberal conception of freedom as an absence 
of interference towards a republican conception of freedom as an absence of 
domination. In this sense, he defends the traditional distinction between positive 
freedom and negative freedom, and does not answer to a modern republican 
conception. In order to guarantee a republican freedom, the states themselves must 
be that freedom, and not the guarantors of it. Put simply, the institutions constitute 
the freedoms of the state. This republican freedom should respect the rule of law, the 
separation of powers within a two chamber system of decentralisation, and the 
defence of the civic reality – the defence of non-domination as the organisation 
element can only be guaranteed if everyone recognises and respects it.  
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Early modern republicanism denies any separation between public and private 
rights or goods; rights cannot be defined independently, and because of its assumption 
that the good is only identified through political participation and deliberation 
amongst equal citizens, it is right that the government take steps to mould the 
character of its citizens. This paternalistic system of government is not, and cannot be 
made to be, acceptable in a modern world – most of us would likely apprehend such as 
a form of tyranny. It is easy to see why then, republicanism’s assumed counterpart, 
liberalism, is the predominant theory in the western world and the one that gained 
most approval in the eighteenth-century, especially following the American 
Revolution. It regards the human being as the ultimate subject for moral and political 
action, and aims to protect the individual from oppression or injustice (in this view 
injustice refers to a disregard for rights). It therefore requires limitations to be placed 
on the legislators, ensuring the individual’s rights are met. Contemporary civic 
republicans are bound by the limitations the predominance of liberal theory; its 
concepts and language of the individual, have placed on contemporary politics and as 
such have struggled to present civic republicanism, with it’s language of ‘the common 
good’, or Rousseuan ‘common under the supreme direction of the general will’,  as a 
viable option.184  
 
Yet no contemporary republican theory is advocating a government’s 
entitlement to dictate the moral actions of its citizens. Public action is indeed 
legislated, but political participation cannot be made a moral norm. It might just be the 
case therefore, that republicanism is a counter-ideology advanced to criticise 
liberalism, and not one to be adopted as an ideal-type. This is certainly how Tushnet 
approaches the subject, determining the central assumptions of liberalism and using 
republican ideals to critique either its usefulness, or to suggest that liberalism itself is 
more republican in scope than it cares to be. Tushnet argues that liberal theory 
requires public criteria for the critical judgment of legislation and political rulings, 
subjecting the legislators to significant restraints – however, liberal practice is not 
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constrained in the way that liberal theory requires. According to Tushnet, ‘the 
techniques of legal reasoning…are so flexible that they allow us to assemble diverse 
precedents into whatever pattern we choose,’ and therefore judges can ‘do whatever 
they want’.185 
 
The revival of republicanism has not been a rehash of the early modern 
republican values and norms. The paradigm of early modern republicanism fails to 
address contemporary concerns for individual liberties in a way that is considered 
acceptable to modern liberal theorists. But rather than abandon early modern 
republicanism entirely, contemporary republican theorists attempt to suggest non-
threatening political action designed to transform society only to a point to which 
republicanism again becomes credible, while the paradigm of early modern 
republicanism is limited to the subset of traditional ideals that coincide with 
contemporary belief structures. Alisdair McIntyre for instance, believes that some form 
of Aristotelian republicanism, despite perhaps being incompatible in a society morally 
fragmented along individualistic lines, may have coherence in contemporary politics as 
the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of republicanism can be credible in 
a genuine form of moral community, namely, local forms of community within which 
civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained, (if the traditions of virtue 
can survive), through ‘the new dark ages which are already upon us’. 186 
 
Fallon suggests two alluring reasons for the popularity of republicanism. First is 
Michael Sandel’s claim that ‘when politics goes well, we can know a good in common 
that we cannot know alone’,187 and second, Michelman’s claim that republicanism 
promises a more encompassing positive freedom, as opposed to the negative 
freedoms offered by liberalism – the freedom of prescribing to one’s self, across a 
more encompassing domain, the laws to which one will be subject.188 Sandel’s is a 
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morally restrictive republicanism which is problematic in contemporary politics, 
ascribing a moral guardianship to the state. Sandel suggests two governmental 
initiatives at the local level that are in accord with early modern republican ideals. The 
first is economic in character, including legislating against ‘the unrestrained mobility of 
capital, with its disruptive effects on neighbourhoods’, and the protection of jobs. The 
second involves moral legislation including the prohibition of pornography and other 
vices, as well as local control of education.189 Again, the problem with this model is in 
the assumption that the government can and should be responsible for and legislate 
the private moral choices of the individual.190  
 
Both these approaches fit the republican model of freedom through self-
government, and the resistance to individual rights as a limit on political action, 
however, they are beset with problems, not least the threat to the local economy as 
businesses move to where there is no such restrictive protection, and the liberal 
response to intolerance and individual rights. Few modern republicans would shun 
judicially protected individual rights totally in favour of the community, threatening 
the basic assumptions of the republican tradition and the republican claim to a clear 
distinction from liberalism. As Fallon suggests, republican revivalists can abandon the 
tradition’s characteristic stance, if they so wish, but to do so is to embark in a 
‘substantial revision of historical republicanism’.191 Fallon claims that the problem with 
efforts at a contemporary model of republicanism is twofold: if it falls to close to early 
modern republicanism it risks ‘foundering on modern philosophical sensibilities’; 
however, if it departs to far from the early modern example, it hazards losing all of its 
republican distinctiveness. It is here that Fallon misses a very fundamental truth about 
early modern republicanism: the early modern paradigm never did have such 
distinctiveness as he makes out, nor did it ever depart from what were then the 
philosophical sensibilities, nor does it need to now to be considered republican.  
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The central point of early modern republicanism is the commitment to freedom 
and equality which is achieved through self-government, or the people giving 
themselves their laws and liberties through political action and law formation.192 This 
model certainly does not seem to depart from modern philosophical tendencies nor 
the model of republicanism as can be found in the ideas of Machiavelli, seventeenth-
century England, or the eighteenth-century commonwealth-man. It can be conceded 
that if the allure of republicanism is in its promise of individual autonomy, then law-
making would be impossible, but the autonomy which the republican paradigm defines 
is not a fully liberal conception of absolute non-interference, but as Pettit suggests, 
non-domination.   
 
Michelman offers an alternative form of republicanism than Sandel, based on 
‘practical reason’. Although today we may hold that it is perhaps impossible for 
individuals acting equally and without coercion to agree to the appropriate resolutions 
to moral and political issues, we may imagine a possible world in which individuals can 
hold a conversation in which they agree to appropriate resolutions to moral and 
political issues.193 If we can imagine this civically motivated republican conversation 
taking place, then we can be enriched by the ideal of positive freedom it exemplifies. 
 
Building on the moderate republican proposals of Sandel and Michelman, 
Amatai Etzioni postulates a ‘moderate communitarian proposal’; avoiding the extreme 
ends of communitarianism, regarded by some critics as ascribing supreme value to the 
community itself to the detriment of the individual, and the libertarian ignorance of 
the community in favour of the dominant value of the individual. 194 He rejects the 
libertarian view that there are only individuals with individual lives, arguing that ‘if one 
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views the community as merely an aggregation of individuals joined for their 
convenience, one leaves out the sociological need for affective (nonrational) bonds as 
counterweight to centrifugal forces that seek to disperse communities. One also does 
not take into account the pivotal role of these bonds in sustaining common values that 
in turn provide criteria for community-wide shared decisions and policies. He also 
rejects an altogether communitarian proposal as the community as the sole source of 
social order and authority as it leaves an ‘insufficient basis for individual freedom and 
individual rights’.195  
 
Instead, Etzioni sees a third way, namely, recognising the necessity of fusing the 
two conceptual frameworks together. Using the I and We notation he outlines the 
assumption that individuals act within a social context and this context is not reducible 
to an individual act. Instead of the social act being a ‘conscious transaction among 
individuals’, it is a ‘legitimate and integral part of one’s existence’. Both the individual 
and society rely on one another for survival. In this symbiotic relationship, the 
individual provides the creativity for change and fulfilment, and the community is the 
source of service for shared needs and stability.196 What is necessary is not a focus on 
individualism (libertarian) or community (communitarianism) but a balance between 
the two, between the I and the We. Both have the same sociological and moral 
standing, it is the historical context which dictates which element needs to be 
‘nourished’ at any given time.197 
 
This is not an altogether radical idea and is certainly not new or contemporary 
in style or focus. This communitarian proposal fits well within the republican model, 
before it lost its way amongst the predominant liberal theories. Harrington, Fletcher 
and Machiavelli recognise the mutual needs of society and the individual – an 
interdependence that could provide the stability and development required in an age 
of growth and the coming empire. It is a recognised underlying principle of the 
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eighteenth-century commonwealth-man and liberals alike. The early modern 
republicans recognise the need for balance, it just so happens that at the turn of the 
eighteenth-century, it was the community that needed nourishing, the excessive 
individualism recognised as the source of corruption to the detriment of society, and 
as a direct consequence, the individual. There is, in the early modern republican realm, 
an opportunity for such pluralism as suggested by Etzioni to make a meaningful 
contribution to both debates about and the practice of politics – but it is one that is 
largely ignored.198  
 
Republican Liberty – Freedom by the sword 
 The republican term of liberty is not a theory based on the individual, but on 
the commonwealth. Liberty comes from political participation creating laws on behalf 
of oneself, and the public good, avoiding arbitrary rule – it is a theory based on the 
concept of non-dominance.199 When the likes of Machiavelli and Harrington, and the 
early modern republicans that follow, consider the freedom of states, they are 
employing the same method of freedom of the state as they do the freedom of the 
freeman. In order for civil society to be free, it must be capable of acting according to 
its free will, viz. the public interest of its citizens. Republicanism is a phenomenon 
closely associated with antiquity whereas liberalism is associated with modernism.  
 
Vicki Sullivan attempts to reconcile these ‘contradictory’ terms in Machiavelli, 
Hobbes and the Formation of Liberal Republicanism in England.200 Liberalism posits 
that political legitimacy comes from the consent of the individual. By nature all are 
equal and free, and therefore there is no natural governor or governed. Political 
authority of one over another only exists when the other has given his consent to be 
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ruled. Political authority – or government – is established by the individual in order to 
ensure his natural rights are protected, because law is necessary for the protection of 
rights and recourse to punish violators required. Thus the government is established to 
serve the individual. The individual comes before the state; the state is therefore a 
human construct designed specifically to serve the individuals needs and protect 
rights.201 The most important function of the government is to protect the individuals’ 
interests and property. Locke suggests a moderate form of monarchy as the best 
option. This is contrary to the republican ideal of individual contribution: political 
participation; active citizens; to the government for the enhancement of the common 
good etc. The state is put before the individual. As Montesquieu posits, the moderns 
find striking the degree to which the citizens of ancient states would put the interest of 
the state before their own: ‘*p+olitical virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is 
painful’202; ‘*l+ove of the homeland leads to goodness in mores, and goodness in mores 
leads to love of the homeland’. 203 
 
Quentin Skinner, in discussing the concept of political liberty and the early 
republican theorists – Machiavelli, Sydney and Harrington – tells us they rarely if ever 
place their main emphasis on the importance of ruling, rather, they are principally 
concerned with what it means to be a free man living among other free men in civil 
society.204 What it means to be free is not to be dependent on the goodwill of another. 
He shows us that the neo-Romans, as they have been called, hold a distinctive idea of 
liberty, namely that liberty does not come from self-rule; the people do not wish to 
rule, but rather liberty comes from not being ruled, certainly not being ruled in an 
arbitrary way. Skinner is right to highlight that the early theorists rarely speak of rights 
as claims standing outside the boundaries of the state enabling us to judge its 
legitimacy, and discuss the relations between states and citizens without appealing to 
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the language of rights. Yet he is also right to insist that it is not anachronistic to 
‘reformulate’ the claims about the objectionable nature of arbitrary power in terms of 
the denial of rights, as the Roman law concept of sui iuris that can be expressed in the 
point that ‘if you lose your status of a freeman, you will find yourself bereft of civil 
rights’.205  
 
So, Skinner challenges the assumption that liberty and political participation 
can only be connected along Aristotelian lines of the good life; liberty in this republican 
negative conception can only be present if positive conditions such as civic virtue 
apply. Freedom of the citizenry depends on the freedom of the state. There are two 
ways in which the body politic can lose its capacity to act according to its own will. 
According to Skinner, the loss of standing as a free state occurs when: the power of the 
state falls under the control of anyone other than the sovereign body of citizens; or 
into a condition of dependence upon the will of another state as a result of conquest; 
or any process that has the effect of bypassing the will of the citizens as the source of 
law. 206 The loss of the states freedom reduces the citizen to a state of dependence on 
another, and so thereby it removes their individual freedom as well.  
 
According to Sullivan, English writers such as Sydney, Nedham, Harrington and 
Neville, Trenchard and Gordon all attempt to reconcile the inherent contradictions 
between republicanism and liberalism. Sullivan suggests that the neo-republicans 
merge republicanism with liberalism by finding that republicanism provides a means 
for the people to protect their natural rights and pursue happiness within the public 
arena. Self-interest motivates leaders and therefore the public realm is a vigorous 
place of political activity and efforts to secure individual rights and thus the public 
good. The vigorous public activity that takes place serves the private realm.207 Pocock 
tells us ‘There is a conventional wisdom to the effect that political theory became 
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“liberal” – whatever that means, and whether or not for more or less Marxist reasons 
– about the time of Hobbes and Locke, and has in America remained ever so since’.208  
 
There have been recent attempts to revive alternative traditions to moderate 
the liberal stranglehold over political theory, and considerable interest in the 
republican tradition since the 1960’s. Most influential in this revival has been Pocock’s 
Machiavellian Moment, in which he traces the civic humanist model from its 
Aristotelian roots through to 18th Century Britain and the American Revolution, 
challenging the reigning liberal paradigm en route. He does admit that he is 
overstating the republican tradition, replacing Locke with Harrington in importance in 
the eighteenth-century, but sees this as a temporary and tactical necessity in the battle 
against the entrenched liberal synthesis.209  
 
While Pocock provides an authoritative and highly regarded treatment of the 
republican tradition, there is a fundamental methodological problem with his thesis. 
Pocock overstates the theoretical incompatibility of liberal and republican paradigms, 
and is guilty of what Skinner would classify as anachronism; in particular, he places 
Aristotle neatly in the parameters of republicanism, ignoring the valuable contribution 
his theory of polity may make to contemporary liberal and communitarian politics. 
Onuf, on the other hand, suggests that the transition from eighteenth-century 
republicanism to nineteenth-century liberalism was more assimilating; in his opinion 
republics became liberal, yet remained republics, while cosmopolitan republicanism 
‘faded into liberalism’.210   
 
Freedom as recognised within a republican framework has focused around the 
Aristotelian tradition which maintains that an individual’s spirit can only fully be 
realised through political participation, his potential as a social being is only found in 
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his essential political existence. More recently, the Scholarship of Skinner and Pettit 
have challenged this claim, asserting the neo-Machiavellian republicanism which 
recognises negative liberty as it relates to the non-domination of others. 211  A 
commitment to citizenship and civic virtue is a pre-requisite to living in a free state, 
they claim, and according to Skinner, an essential component of republican liberty is 
that it guarantees personal liberty, ‘understood in the ordinary sense to mean that 
each citizen remains free from any elements of constraint (especially those which arise 
from personal dependence and servitude) and in consequence remains free to pursue 
his own chosen ends’.212 
 
This version of Neo-Republican or Neo-Machiavellian republicanism equates 
personal freedom with public freedom, an amalgamation that is unnecessary in the 
early modern republican paradigm which holds personal liberty as unnecessary for 
public liberty, and certainly not a necessary liberty. In fact, this is what gives early 
modern republicanism its distinction from liberalism. The individual liberties are 
forfeited in favour of the public good, and the freedom of the community, civic virtue 
is more important than any claim to a right of non-domination.  By approaching 
republicanism from either the historical (Pocock, Skinner) or normative (Pettit) modes 
of analysis, either fails to articulate an alternative to the dominant liberal discourse. 
Given Skinner’s understanding of liberty within a neo-Roman conception – that 
assumes liberty is absence of fear – he challenges liberals to consider the various 
institutions and practices that are characteristic of dependence, but not necessarily 
indicative of non-liberty. 
 
Republicanism and Liberty 
What the neo-Roman writers repudiate avant la lettre is the key assumption of 
early modern liberalism to the effect that force or the coercive threat of it constitutes 
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the only form of constraint that interferes with individual liberty. The neo-Roman 
writers insist, by contrast, that to live in a condition of dependence is in itself a source 
and form of constraint…. To live in such conditions is to suffer a diminution not merely 
of security or you liberty, but of liberty itself.213  Skinner is proposing that the absence 
of dependence given in his theory of republican liberty is a more appropriate and 
durable account of liberty than we may find in any liberal conception. As Halldenius 
helpfully reminds us, a further important distinction can be drawn at this point 
between liberal and republican understandings of liberty.214 According to the former, 
civil laws are inevitably the enemies of individual liberty, since their imposition always 
involves the use of force or the threat of it. But according to the latter, any civil law 
which I help to enact, and to which I agree to submit myself, can be construed as an 
expression of my will rather than a restriction upon it, and must therefore be 
compatible with my liberty.  
 
This idea of freedom as non-domination recognises that liberty is achieved 
under the condition where one lives in a common society but is at the mercy of none. 
Of course, as Pettit recognises, one may live within society, subject to some agency – a 
law or government – without being dominated.215 Domination is defined as one person 
dominating another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in 
particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis.216 According to Pettit, this 
republican conception of freedom as the ‘absence of mastery by others’ or non-
domination, is a negatively based conception of freedom that incorporates positive 
elements, because ‘the condition of liberty is explicated as the status of someone who, 
unlike the slave, is not subject to the arbitrary power of another, that is, someone who 
is not dominated by anyone else.’217  
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In order to have arbitrary power or dominance, then, an agent must have the 
power to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of another agent without considering 
the interests of that other agent. If the agent whose interests are to be interfered with 
has been consulted, or his interests have been considered, then he is not in this regard 
being dominated, nor does the other agent have arbitrary power. Within a republic, 
the onus is on the interfering agent to ensure the interests of the other have been 
either tracked, or he has been consulted before acting – this is a ‘manifestation of civic 
virtue and civility’.218 For Pettit, what constitutes domination is the fact that the holder 
of power has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, even if they have no intention of ever 
doing so. It therefore follows that agents who are subject to others who may have the 
capacity to interfere arbitrarily with them are dependent on the will of others for their 
freedom and, therefore, are not free in the republican sense. Thus, agents are free to 
the extent that they are not subjected to arbitrary interference.  Individuals’ interests 
may be interfered with, but as long is this in not arbitrary – the individuals’ interests 
have been tracked or considered – then it does not restrict their freedom. Indeed, it is 
this interference that, for republicans, helps secure liberty through properly 
constituted laws and institutions.219 The crux of Pettit’s argument is that republican 
political theory offers a third way, a moderate theory which allows us to disregard the 
‘false dichotomy between negative and positive liberty’. This is in line with a early 
modern conception of republicanism which seeks to limit the powers of the state, not 
through the abolition of the state or a very limited conception of governance, but a 
strong state with limitations on power.   
 
John Maynor charges Pettit with making a fundamental mistake in his 
characterisation of republican liberty, one which leaves his model open to the liberal 
criticism that it is just another instrumental approach with no significant differences to 
make it meaningful. According to Maynor, Pettit overlooks the significance of the 
reciprocal power of non-domination, favouring the constitutional power which 
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emphasises the need for citizens to actively participate in politics to ensure the 
continued liberties which non-domination provides.220 In doing so, Maynor criticises 
Pettit for denying republicanism ‘a robust account of civic virtue and civility which 
helps to differentiate it from rival liberal approaches in a way which is compelling and 
attractive’.221 Furthermore, in doing so he is giving weight to the arguments put forth 
by Rawls and Patten that the Neo-Roman version of republicanism put forth by Skinner 
and Pettit sides with liberals on these issues because, at its most fundamental level, it 
favours a negative sense of liberty. The thought is that the versions of citizenship and 
civic virtue of the neo-Roman republican approach are instrumental to the attainment 
and maintenance of negative liberty.222 
 
However, as I will show in the discussion of the civic-republican theories of 
Fletcher, this conceptualisation of freedom still holds that it is neither the absence of 
interference or domination; it is the absence of mastery which is fundamental to 
liberty. In attempting to develop a model of republicanism that fits within our modern 
liberal sensibilities but is still distinctive enough from communitarianism (Etzioni), 
Pettit has uncovered the early modern conception of liberty which differentiates 
between private and public liberties. Interference is an essential aspect of liberty 
within the early modern republican tradition, as long as that interference is not 
arbitrary, because the citizens, through active participation allow that certain 
interferences secure liberty.223 
 
Alan Patten is critical of what he calls this ‘instrumental republican’ approach 
which emphasises the importance of political institutions – forms of citizenship and 
civic virtue, and the intrinsic value of each – claiming that these are merely means to 
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an end for republicans. It is Patten’s belief that republicans draw upon these issues to 
criticise liberals such as Dworkin and Rawls, and that there is no interesting difference 
between the two paradigms, or at least none that should matter to liberals, because 
instrumental republicanism does not offer any improvement on liberal attitudes.224 
The underlying assumption of Patten’s argument, and to those other liberals who 
agree including John Rawls and Will Kymlicka, is that contemporary republicanism has 
as yet failed to prove that there is any significant difference between it and liberal 
normative approaches, and thus it adds no value to contemporary debates.225 This 
argument is central to the hypothesis that instrumental and contemporary 
republicanism, according to Rawls anyway, is not in ‘fundamental opposition’ to 
liberalism.226  
 
This is a common critique of contemporary republicanism, the proponents of 
which seem to have abandoned the fundamental suppositions which gave it its unique 
and practical attributes. Within early modern republicanism, there could be no 
assertion that civic virtue or social responsibility was merely a means to an end. But in 
this respect the liberal critics are wrong. Pettit offers a conception of liberty that is 
closest in form to that of the early modern civic republicanism as adopted in the 
sixteenth through eighteenth-centuries, based on a free society which is highly 
participatory and incorporates checks and balances, the rule of law, with a strong 
constitution based on equality and liberty.  However, according to Patten, there is no 
special connection between Pettit’s conception of negative liberty and public service: 
‘if freedom is understood as an absence of external constraints on one’s activity, then 
it makes no sense to identify it with a life of active citizenship and virtue’.227 But, 
according to Pettit, ‘the writers who identify with the broad republican tradition of 
thinking, take liberty to be defined by a status in which the evils associated with 
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interference are avoided rather than by access to the instruments of democratic 
control, participatory or representative’.228  
 
If what contemporary republicans such as Patten are attempting is a neo-
republican theory which emphasises a new concept of freedom, one which may be 
acceptable to our modern sensibilities, then it is sadly lacking in any ‘newness’. There 
is no lack of concern for liberty in early modern republican thought. On the contrary, 
freedom from interference meant freedom to attend to the common good. ‘Libertie 
…is not the libertie of particular men; but the libertie of the commonwealth’, according 
to Hobbes.229 Freedom of non-domination for the eighteenth-century commonwealth-
man is freedom from tyranny, from the arbitrary rule of a monarch or governing 
power. Machiavellian republicanism (‘atlantic republicanism’ in Pocockian terms), sees 
a mixed monarchy as the perfect form of governance, avoiding the Polybian cycle of 
good and bad governance, and more importantly, domination. Under a mixed 
government therefore, one which provided checks and balances on the powers of the 
various arms of the state, no one branch would be able to accumulate enough power 
to exercise those powers arbitrarily ‘for if in one and the same state *citta+ there was a 
principality, aristocracy and democracy each would keep watch over the other’.230  
 
According to Pocock’s reading of Machiavelli, inequality is the cause of 
corruption and corruption is the end to freedom. Corruption is self-interest, and is 
against virtue and the common good. Corrupt men act in self-interest and use their 
powers to promote that self-interest over the interests of others. This, in Pettit’s 
republican terminology, would be domination of arbitrary powers and this corruption 
is therefore contrary to the early modern republican ideals of civic virtue, equality and 
freedom. Therefore it seems clear that the only thing new about neo-republicanism 
with regards to freedom is the terminology. It is clear however, that there is a great 
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distinction to be made between liberal liberty and republican liberty. Whereas liberal 
political theorists deny any loss of liberty in the absence of interference, republicans 
insist there can be a loss of liberty when no interference takes place, what is important 
is the lack of potential for interference.  
 
But republicanism is not anti-liberal. A ‘liberal republicanism’ may be 
characterised by four central principles – civic virtue, equality, the common good (or 
universalism), and citizenship – all of which derive from an understanding of political 
freedom, while they also provide ways of limiting governmental power: civic virtue 
provides the opportunity to input private interests into the deliberative process, 
private interests being a political issue; equality provides each person the means to 
participate; the common good is derived from the republican commitment to 
universalism and made possible through practical reason; while citizenship is manifest 
in the guaranteed rights of participation. 
 
There is no one conception of republicanism - it does not fit any standardised 
form. The early modern republicans emphasised the role of the citizen in the polis; the 
citizen is to subordinate his private interest for the public good as the means of 
achieving both freedom and civic virtue. This notion of civic virtue is still central to 
modern republican ideals, but is no longer invoked to inspire the self-improvement of 
the individual as a member of society but to promote social justice. Under the early 
modern republican model of politics, law and legislation must be supported by 
practical reason; self-interest or private deals cannot be fought for nor be a foundation 
for law. The public good is the sole stimulus of political action and legislation. The 
central tenet here is that the function of politics is to set values or ‘preferences about 
preferences’.231 But this does not exclude any protection of individual or group 
autonomy: indeed, moreover individual rights have a purpose in early modern 
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republicanism, as the preconditions for an ‘undistorted deliberative process’.232 This, 
according to Sunstein, is the basis of many liberal systems, the difference being that 
republicans would not recognise any notion of pre-political or natural rights, and 
instead the existence of any private right must be justified in public terms.233  
 
Richard Dagger also accepts the importance of civic virtue to liberal thought, 
and insists on a hybrid of liberal-republicanism that combines civic virtue with 
individual autonomy. As he sees it, for republicanism to be defensible, it must include 
‘a commitment to liberal principles such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the 
rights of others’.234 Furthermore, Cass Sunstein claims that modern republicanism is 
lacking what made eighteenth-century republicanism so important. His aim for 
contemporary republicanism is to reintroduce the constitutional themes that modern 
scholarship has ignored. Not ignorant to the difficulties of a ‘revival’ of a tradition, 
Sunstein carefully predicates his argument:  
 
‘History does not supply conceptions of political life that can be applied 
mechanically to current problems. Circumstances change; theoretical commitments 
cannot be wrenched out of context without regret or risk of distortion; contemporary 
social and legal issues can never be resolved merely through recovery of features, 
however important and attractive, of the distant past’.235  
 
In addition, eighteenth-century republicanism is based on unattractive 
elements including racism, sexism, and elitism, but Sunstein insists that eighteenth-
century republicanism can still be revived despite these conceptual and distasteful 
difficulties. In Sunstein’s revival, he draws upon both the liberal and republican 
traditions, insisting that while the ‘most collectivist forms’ of republicanism contradict 
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certain versions of liberalism, ‘republican thought, understood in a certain way, is a 
prominent aspect of the liberal tradition’. 236  Even liberalisms preoccupation with 
rights is historically compatible with the republican tradition. Unfortunately for the 
early modern republican tradition, Sunstein never extols the virtues of early modern 
republicanism, or provide an account of historical republicanism with which we may 
compare with contemporary republicanism, but rather offers a contemporary theory 
of republicanism and notes that, at times, the founders of the American constitution – 
the historical republicans as far as Sunstein is concerned – have had similar proposals.  
 
Contemporary uses for Early Modern Republicanism. 
Robert Goodin suggests that we were right to look at, and right to reject, 
republicanism in the quest to find a use for republicanism within contemporary 
politics.237 According to Ceceile Laborde and John Maynor, this is because proponents 
of republican theory have suggested it as an alternative to the dominant liberal 
philosophy.238 Skinner suggests his updating of the ‘second  slogan of republican 
theory’ which argues that no state or agency of comparable power should be able to 
dominate or seek to dominate another state, has a valuable contribution to make to 
contemporary discussions of global justice. Freedom is a value of fundamental 
importance, and as such ‘to reduce a state to dependence on the goodwill of other 
states is to cause not merely the state but every one of its individual citizens to fall into 
a morally intolerable condition of servitude’.239 However, modern republican theorists 
have polarised the discussion around two opposing schools of thought. Pettit and 
Skinner have both shown that the early modern republican tradition has a significant 
contribution to make to modern debates without being distorted to fit any ‘modern 
conception of liberal sensibilities’. Distributive and global justice can be arranged 
around principles of equality, mutual respect and non-domination as proposed by 
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Pettit, based on the early modern ideas of Machiavelli and Harrington, amongst 
others, including an understanding of the fundamental principles of early modern 
republicanism as proposed by Sunstein. 
 
The biggest challenge facing contemporary republicans is perhaps not the 
formulation of a model that will fit with modern ideas of liberty and philosophical 
sensibilities, but the practicalities of creating a (global) political system based on civic 
virtue and political participation. David Miller has addressed the general question of 
what kind of political community is required for republican politics and republican 
values to flourish.240 He approaches this question with the European community in 
mind as a potential political community of the ‘right kind’, seeing these republican 
values as a basis for the prospective European Constitution, but recognising that the 
bonds of national identity may obstruct the potential of republican values as a 
motivational force in larger communities. 
 
It is to the question of size that Miller first turns his attention – noting that 
early modern republicans assumed the city as the source of the political community – 
and even then the population of citizens was much smaller than the overall 
population. Even the scholars who investigated the notion of the ‘commonwealth-
man’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries in Britain turned their attention to 
smaller communities, some suggesting a federal Britain to facilitate the application of 
republican values as the political model. Put simply, size matters. In order for the 
community to bond together for the common good, there must be more than just 
geographical proximity, but there must also be a deterrent on what Miller calls 
‘democratic turbulence’ – when passionate beliefs lead a community to act wrongly 
towards enemies out with, or minorities within, the community.241  
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Further, and in a contemporary world where city-states are no longer viable 
political bodies, it is understandable why David Miller has connected republican 
politics to national identity. As he puts it, nationality offers the shared history, 
language and culture necessary for large scale communities to encourage the people 
to engage politically with one another.242 Leaving the critical evaluation of this model 
aside, it can easily be argued that Miller is rehashing the early modern republican 
model; utilising patriotism’s worth as a shared interest in the common good that is 
protected from the interference of others with competing interests. Does 
republicanism work on a national level? The major problem with national identity as a 
motivator for political action on a republican level – i.e. for the common good – is the 
potential for the fragmentation of that shared identity and history to force the 
communities into smaller political entities or factions. As Machiavelli predicted, there 
were two ways in which a republic can destroy itself: the division between the nobility 
and the commons; and the division into factions or small communities within the 
republic which work not for the common good but for their own narrow interests.  
 
Cecile Laborde claims that the republican tradition faces a bigger challenge in 
contemporary politics than its inability to provide an acceptable concept of freedom 
for our modern philosophical sensibilities, suggesting it has to overcome its perceived 
‘blind spot’ with regards to global justice and pressing international issues such as 
poverty and global inequalities.243 Laborde addresses the scepticism towards the 
cosmopolitan argument, namely, that republican cosmopolitanism is an oxymoron 
with regards to global society because it is not possible to reproduce the institutions 
and practices necessary for founding and maintaining republics at the international 
level.244 She refutes this by offering the ‘three Vs’ of republicanism as ‘foundation of a 
distinctive and attractive republican approach’ to theorising global justice.245 The first 
of which, ‘voice’, assumes non-domination or ‘anti-power’: in other words, freedom 
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from arbitrary rule246 It is Laborde’s contention that cosmopolitan republicanism is 
more valid in a global society characterised by remote and perhaps unchecked decision 
making by anonymous powers across national borders in which peoples may have little 
or no say whatever. Within this model, traditional republicanism which highlighted the 
‘evils of arbitrary power in the sub-state unit’ can also be utilised to point towards the 
evils within the transnational.247  
 
The upshot of Laborde’s argument is that global injustice is a primary concern 
for republicans because injustice breeds inequality and this in turn allows the rich to 
control the poor. Developing countries become dependent on, and subservient to, 
large organisations such as the UN, World Bank and IMF, who make decisions over 
which the developing country has little or no say. But being concerned doesn’t 
necessarily make it a useful model for contemporary politics.  Laborde claims that 
republicans have grounds for extending their critique of inequalities in the global 
realm: lacking the ‘democratic minimum’ or the ‘right to have rights ‘is ‘functionally 
equivalent to tyranny’; but the commitment to non-domination provides reasons to 
combat poverty and global injustice without providing the tools to do so. 248 And 
Laborde admits the insufficiency and incoherence of the republican model basing 
human rights along lines of political citizenship.  
 
There is however, scope to use the non-domination paradigm of republicanism  
to address global poverty ‘insofar as much as it can be traced to the dominating effect 
of global inequalities of power and justice’; put another way, the citizens of rich and 
powerful states have the obligation to ensure that their institutions are not dominating 
others.249 Non-domination is a moralised conception, but it can be amoral if it is 
brought down to its most basic level, namely, that sovereign states should neither be 
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dominated nor dominate others, which is a basic republican argument since the 
augmentation of state-centred rational in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and a central tenet of the democratic institution. This can be applied to international 
organisations and such as the IMF and UN. There is no question in republican theories 
of freedom of interference, and this is perhaps why it is a more practical model to 
answer questions of global justice in a cosmopolitan global society. This early modern 
republican line of line of reasoning was captured in arguments at the turn of the 
eighteenth century regarding the balance of power in Europe and the domination of 
Louis XIV. The point here is not to suggest that Laborde is wrong: on the contrary, 
Laborde has shown, just as Andrew Fletcher attempted to show in the seventeenth 
century, that republican theories of non-domination (or in seventeenth-century 
parlance, independence, or freedom as non-dependence) are suitable for a society 
that crosses state borders. Granted, the seventeenth century republicans would not 
have envisaged the global society or concepts of global justice in the same way we do 
because their main priority was that of their own citizens and states. However, as 
Machiavelli stressed, freedom comes from not having to fear that another is capable of 
imposing their will.  
 
For Lena Halldenius, this forms the ‘building blocks’ of a republican 
cosmopolitanism that is political rather than moral.250 Republican freedom as a 
political conception should take account of the fact that a person may infringe upon 
the freedom of another without intent, or even unwillingly, given the structural reality 
of power and freedom. The institutional theory that Halldenius proposes, however, is 
in direct opposition to any early modern ideal; by suggesting that, if we are all part of a 
global community then we all inhabit the same moral world and share the same rights, 
therefore one must question the ‘political and legal primacy of the state’.251 But in this 
regard it is difficult to see where the republicanism is in Halldenius’ institutional theory 
of justice in cosmopolitan republicanism. There are few similarities to republicanism as 
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defined by citizenship, participation and civic virtue. Even the dominant contemporary 
republican theory of freedom as non-domination is inconsistently applied. For 
Halldenius, ‘solidarity is not necessary for political legitimacy’.252 
 
Conclusion 
According to Onuf, modern republicans have absorbed the key themes of 
ancient republicanism and have attempted to utilise them in an entirely ambiguous 
context. The function of political society (for the ancient republicans) was for the 
common good – the provision of the conditions conducive to a shared experience 
judged as ‘good’.253 Republicanism refers to the organisation of a political society, 
where political association takes precedence over individual autonomy. For the 
moderns, as society separated into a system of states, from Grotius through to Kant, 
the stress is on the interconnectedness over the independence of states. Onuf divides 
the republicans into two categories, continental and atlantic: continental republicans, 
he says, believe that international society is bound by its people and states through 
natural law; meanwhile the atlantic republicans stress the independence of states and 
set the stage for the rejection of the republican ideal of the common good in 
international society. Onuf’s treatment of republicanism is within the international 
thought frame of reference, and accordingly, the republican ideal is rule by those best 
suited, to ensure those who can rule for the common good do so.254 
  
Fallon assumes, therefore, that the republican revival was a consequence of an 
intellectual dissatisfaction with liberalism, while he also questions whether it is a true 
revival of the original republican paradigm at all. As this chapter has shown, the 
contemporary conception of republicanism serves no extra substantive purpose than 
the conception available from the seventeenth century. It is barely distinguishable 
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from the early modern republicanism of the Neo-Harringtons and the commonwealth-
men. The major assumptions of these key thinkers are essentially the same.  
 
Virolo attempts to revive the civic consciousness assuming as the early modern 
republicans did before him, that patriotism is vital for preserving self-government. This 
patriotism is denied any worth as a useful motivator in global politics, the assumption 
being it would trigger the fragmentation of society and the factions that, according to 
Machiavelli, would tear society apart. This would end any attempts at a global justice 
or bringing an end to global inequalities or poverty. However, the method used to 
critique Viroli’s civic republicanism is an updated and grander (global) version of the 
(federal) civic society version of the common good offered by Fletcher as the 
republican answer to a united Britain which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
There are of course difficulties in attempting to apply an early modern civic-
republican tradition to contemporary politics and institutions, not least the sexist and 
elitist foundation on which it was built, but also its overly paternalistic system of 
government in a modern (western) world. In this respect, the revival has not been an 
exact replication but incorporates a slight modification of the early modern paradigm 
in order to make it credible – at least, this is Sunstein’s approach. Although this in itself 
has its difficulties as Fallon suggests, it risks a substantial revision of early modern 
republicanism or at least a loss of its unique characteristics. However, a complete 
revision is unnecessary in order for republicanism to be a credible model in 
contemporary politics as it is compatible with modern conceptions of liberty and 
justice. At its core, the civic republican model has a commitment to freedom and 
equality, the same values dear to modern republicanism and liberalism. As for its 
applicability, in a contemporary global system where ‘democracy building’ is used as a 
justification for interference in sovereign state affairs, and where this democracy 
building is known to have failed, it would appear that there should be more emphasis 
given to a civic-republican exemplar, where freedom and equality are achieved 
through the democratic process of self-government and political action.  
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Even Etzioni, when proposing his ‘third way’ – a communitarian model 
proposed to counter the extremes of liberalism and republicanism – resembles the 
neo-early modern republican model. The basic assumption that society requires a 
balance, built upon the interdependence of society and individuals for their mutual 
survival and security, as well as the stability of the state, is a fundamental republican 
hypothesis. Furthermore, both Dagger and Sunstein have proposed a liberal republican 
theory which would be defensible in contemporary society, and places individual 
liberties at its foundation, combining civic virtue and individual autonomy.  The history 
of liberalism is in many ways very closely related to the history of republicanism, while 
the neo-republicans continue to attempt to find a third way. As Skinner and Pettit have 
shown, the early modern civic-republican tradition has a significant contribution to 
make without the need for distortion in order for it to fit with modern liberal 
sensibilities.  
 
In an attempt to make a distinction between early modern and contemporary 
republicanism, both Pettit and Skinner propose themes of freedom which they suggest 
contradict the early modern models which subdue personal liberties for the preferred 
liberty of the state and the obligations to the common good. But once again, if we 
assume that political participation helps enact laws which the people agree to submit 
to for the public good, such can be construed as an expression of will and not a 
restriction of personal freedom (i.e. as an expression of positive freedom). 
Furthermore, Pettit’s theory of freedom as non-domination is, at its very core, a clear 
early modern republican ideal. The history of early modern republicanism is its 
conception from arguments concerning patriarchy and arbitrary power and tyranny. 
The republican model of mixed government is offered to provide checks and balances 
on the ruling parties to ensure no one authority can achieve the power or influence 
necessary to act arbitrarily, which Pettit himself recognises in his third way proposal 
that recognises the false dichotomy between negative and positive liberty and sees 
both as necessary. Therefore, it is clear that the only thing that differs in this case is 
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the terminology used. Pettit and Sunstein both recognise that the neo-republicans and 
third way proponents are old, new republicans. 
 
The biggest challenge civic republicanism faces in contemporary society is how 
to make it fit with the global challenges of poverty and justice. David Miller’s national 
identity approach misses the key issue of fragmentation and factions within larger 
societies – if a republic is small it is destroyed by a foreign force, if it is large it is 
destroyed by ‘internal vice’255 – and he misses the opportunity to suggest a federal 
model based on small republics forming one community of Europe (again, a model that 
can be seen by ways of analogy to Fletcher’s theories for a united Britain) and a united 
Europe which ensures a balance of power is maintained. 
 
Laborde recognises that issues of global inequality are primary concerns for 
republicans as inequality leads necessarily to domination. Furthermore, Laborde is 
right to suggest that republicanism is an ideal model to address global inequalities: its 
acceptance of interference allows institutions such as the UN and IMF to have some 
measure of influence in developing communities while they develop democratic 
institutions and processes, proving republicanism is a suitable model for politics that 
crosses state borders. Therefore it is clear that neo-republicanism is early modern 
republicanism redrafted and applied, showing that civic republicanism has value in 
contemporary politics without any interference in the paradigm. In the next chapter, I 
will set out the early modern republican theories of Andrew Fletcher as a model for 
updating contemporary republican theory.  
                                                          
255 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. A Cohler, B Miller and H Stone (eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989: 131. 
110 
 
Chapter 2. Fletcher’s Civic Republicanism  
 
‘...under arbitrary government (who for the sake, and from a necessity of what they all 
government, has joined to the quality of a slave the office of a tyrant, and imagines 
himself a man of quality, if not a little prince, by such pre-eminence) is altogether 
slavish; since he is under the protection of no law, no not so much as to his life, or the 
honour of his wife and children; and is subjected to stronger temptations than any 
man, of being a slave to men in St. Paul’s sense, which is a worse sort of slavery than 
any I have yet mentioned. That is of being subservient to, and an instrument of lusts of 
his master the tyrant: since if he refuse slavishly to obey, he must lose his office, and 
perhaps his life. And indeed men of all ranks living under arbitrary government (so 
much preached and recommended by the far greater part of churchmen) being really 
under the protection of no law (whatever may be pretended) are not only slaves, as I 
have defined before, but by having no other certain remedy in anything against the lust 
and passions of their superiors, except suffering or compliance, lie under the most 
violent temptations of being slaves in the worst sense, and of the only sort that is 
inconsistent with the Christian religion. A condition (whatever men may imagine) so 
much more miserable than that of servants protected by the laws in all things 
necessary for the subsistence of them and their posterity, that there is no 
comparison’.256 
 
Andrew Fletcher is a civic republican of great importance. He adapts the 
republican theories of liberty, civic virtue and the common good to fit the problems 
facing society (in particular, Scottish society) without losing the fundamental values at 
the core of the republican paradigm. Fletcher is of significance in contemporary politics 
because his theories can be utilised in this global political era. His theories of justice 
and liberty sit well within our modern philosophical sensibilities, and his adaptable 
ideas encompass a wide range of political issues that we are currently facing. Fletcher 
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sees classic republican ideals as the foundations for an ideal society based on civic 
virtue as participation, the common good, equality and liberty, and the rule of law. 
Fletcher has a notion of popular sovereignty that is vital to the modern model of a 
liberal democracy. Despite the suggestion by Robert Axtmann that this idea did not 
gain wide currency until the late eighteenth-century, Fletcher, Locke and the 
eighteenth-century commonwealth-men were already arguing for a republic based on 
the idea of sovereignty resting with the people.257  
 
This chapter will focus on the fundamental republican theories of Andrew 
Fletcher and how they fit in the early modern model; how he utilises the republican 
model to answer the key concerns of best government, liberty and the rule of law at 
the turn of the eighteenth-century. Using Fletcher’s as a republican archetype, it will 
show that Fletcher’s unique model of civic republicanism is a valuable addition to any 
canon of republican theory. It will outline the republican model of freedom as freedom 
from arbitrary rule as evident with the standing army controversy, and the importance 
of the republican tradition in the arguments against arbitrary rule – or freedom as non-
dependence. Thusly, this chapter will prove the early modern republican influence on 
contemporary theories of liberty. This chapter concludes that Fletcher’s emphasis on 
popular sovereignty and freedom from arbitrary power and coercion as the 
fundamental basis for republican freedom holds the same standards and philosophical 
ideals as the contemporary notion of liberal democracy and Pettit’s republican 
hypothesis of freedom as non-domination. It therefore shows that Fletcher’s civic 
humanist republican theories are both relevant and necessary for the contemporary 
understanding of the republican theory of liberty. Where communitarianism lays at 
one end of the spectrum, and liberalism the other, Fletcher’s own brand of civic-
humanist republicanism narrows this broad spectrum. 
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Fletcher, like Pettit and Laborde, believes that inequality results in domination. 
This chapter will discuss Fletcher’s theories on how this domination affects the political 
order of Scotland, England and Ireland, and his attempts to avoid further domination 
of Scotland by proposing a model of fair trade and limitations on power between the 
two. By discussing Fletcher’s ideas on the relations between Scotland and England, and 
the ordering of political society, this chapter will show Fletcher as having the 
fundamental ideas as the republican theorists discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Civic humanism motivated the translation and study of early modern texts and 
was a major influence on the development of political thought in Scotland and pre-civil 
war England, encouraging the ideas of virtue and honour in public life, and gravitas; 
emulating the roman ideals found in the newly translated texts.258 The humanist 
scholarly experience emphasised secular historical analysis and political interpretation 
which influenced Fletcher’s own political analysis and ideas of public life. Worden 
insists that Humanism encouraged alertness to the contrasting characteristics of the 
various forms of government: monarchical, aristocratic, democratic and mixed, as 
identified by the early modern writers.259 He notes that this preoccupation with the 
early modern forms of government produced as much praise for monarchs as it did 
criticism, and therefore we should not assume that political thought in England and 
Scotland was dominated by thoughts of any ‘ideal republic’ without a monarchical 
head of state. 260  Fletcher himself was not against monarchy per se, rather the 
arbitrary or tyrannical rule often associated with monarchical rule, which could also be 
attributed to the Roman Empire immediately before its decline and fall. It is a concern 
for liberty that is at the heart of any republican theory of politics and is the 
fundamental concern for Fletcher.  
 
Like Harrington before him, Fletcher calls for a return to the republican 
principles of early modern antiquity: wisdom, virtue and military discipline. He wishes 
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to establish a political order on institutions that are immune from corruptibility – the 
imbalance of (arbitrary) power which is the threat to liberty. Fletcher, again like 
Harrington, approaches politics as history, believing that the underlying forces and 
laws that shape history could be discovered through a rigorous study of the European 
past. As was shown, Harrington proposes that the foundation of government is in the 
sword and that fortune and providence have overthrown the monarchy and left both 
sword and conscience free to see out new foundations. He offers a civil history of the 
sword which shows how it has passed from the monarchy and nobility into other 
hands through processes which were both fortuitous and providential. 261 Fletcher also 
offers the sword as the basis of power; the balance of power between the king, the 
barons and the people, and the limitations of monarchy being based on the necessary 
condition that the sword remains in the hands of the people. The constitution of the 
government puts the sword into the hands of the subject, because the vassals depend 
more immediately on the barons than on the king which effectually secures the 
freedom of those governments; ‘For the barons could not make use of their power to 
destroy those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could 
the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own 
demesnes to rely upon for his support in such an attempt’. 262 Since ‘in our times most 
princes of Europe maintain the sword by standing mercenary forces kept up in times of 
peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changing 
from monarchies to tyrannies’.263  
 
Pocock suggests that Fletcher’s Discourse of Government with Relation to the 
Militias developed the neo-Harringtonian version of history further than anyone else 
had, and significantly revealed its latent ambivalences. But Fletcher eliminates 
Harrington’s distinction between ancient prudence and ancient constitution and 
locates the balance of the commonwealth in modern prudence, maintained by kings, 
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lords and commons, (feudal tenure) which Harrington had dismissed as ill-regulated 
disequilibrium. Harrington maintains that the land and sword of the vassals always 
belonged to his master; Fletcher’s Scottish vassal is intractable from his land and helps 
keep the sword where it belongs – with the subjects. 264 According to Fletcher of 
course, this old way had been eradicated about the year 1500, an ‘alteration of 
government which happened in most countries in Europe’. 265  The luxuries and 
pleasure brought in from Asia and the America’s ‘brought a total alteration in the way 
of living, upon which all governments depend’… 
‘The far greater share of all those expences fell on the barons… This plunged 
them into so great debts, that if they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they 
found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them, 
into money; partly by way of rent, and partly by way of lease… And by this means the 
vassal having his land no longer at such easy a rate as before, could no longer be 
obliged to military service, and so became tenant. Thus the armies, which in preceding 
times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of course, and the 
sword fell out of the hands of the barons.266  
 
Whereas Harrington sees this as a liberating moment, freeing the vassals from 
military service, Fletcher sees it as the end of liberty, taking the sword (power) from 
the subjects and creating an imbalance of power between the political class and the 
crown - placing the sword in the hands of the prince and his mercenary armies. 
Fletcher maintains that arms should never be denied to any man who is not a slave 
since it is the only badge of liberty he has, it maintains the balance of equilibrium 
between the citizens and their monarch, and denies anyone arbitrary power.267 By 
holding the means of coercion the monarch holds the majority of power which he can 
exercise arbitrarily. And, as already shown, this arbitrary power is against both early 
modern and contemporary conceptions of republican liberty. For Fletcher, freedom 
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from the dependence on and domination of the arbitrary power of others is the 
fundamental source of liberty. 
 
Jealousy of Trade and Cosmopolitan Republicanism 
International relations at the turn of the eighteenth-century put raison d’état 
before considerations of justice or rights, including the unrestrained use of force in 
pursuit of the state interest and trade. Fletcher denounces the use of neo-
Machiavellian political economy as the justification of the pursuit of economic power 
and suggests a countervailing paradigm of international relations, civic humanism and 
republicanism based on pursuing the interest of mankind grounded within the 
sociability of the human race, or as Hont suggests, cosmopolitan republicanism. 268 
Fletcher complains that a political theory grounded solely within a paradigm that 
places the nation at its centre without regard to mankind lacks sufficient measures 
against the corruption of raison d’état and the subsequent aggressive wars of 
aggrandizement. He opposes state-centrism, declaring that ‘not only those who have 
ever actually formed governments, but even those who have written on the subject… 
have always framed them with respect only to particular nations, for whome they 
were designed, and without regard to mankind’, a clear indication of a more  
cosmopolitan inclination within his civic-humanist political ideals. 269  
 
Bonham is right to make the strong claim that republicanism is ‘neither 
inherently anti-cosmopolitan nor inseparable from the nation state’ despite the 
republican adage that ‘to be free is to be a citizen of a free state’ but misses a 
fundamental aspect of federal republicanism with regards to freedom as non-
domination.270 Fletcher sees that non-dependence is vital for the republican state and 
points out that the threat to Scottish national interests is an issue of domestic politics 
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that is an indication of the large scale international or European order, and the conflict 
of commerce and dominance of trade: ‘trade is now become the golden ball, for which 
all nations of the world are contending, the occasion of so great partialities, that not 
only is every nation endeavouring to possess the trade of the whole world, but every 
city to draw all to itself’. 271 
 
According to Hont, ‘Fletcher was convinced that by 1700 jealousy of trade had 
become an integral part of modern English patriotism’.272 The examples of Ireland and 
Wales prove to Fletcher that anything less than a fully equal union with limitations on 
the powers of the parliament regarding interference in trade would be disastrous. 
Scotland’s economic interests would be destroyed as the Irish and Welsh had before. 
He had no reason to have confidence that the cultural or political integrity of the 
country would fare any better. Hont uses the term ‘jealousy of trade’ to refer to 
England’s self-interest and raison d’état. He suggests that Fletcher observes in minute 
detail how England’s jealousy of trade towards Ireland played itself out; assuming rich 
metropolitan countries like England would always override all considerations of 
morality and justice if they perceived reciprocal trade with poorer nations to be an 
existential threat to their economy.273  Fletcher outlines his concerns in his Account of 
a Conversation, suggesting Wales as the only place in the kingdom without 
considerable trade, a consequence of the dominant force of England and ‘a sufficient 
demonstration that trade is not a necessary consequence of a union with England. 274  
 
When pressed to give example of England’s partialities, Fletcher highlights but 
refuses to be drawn into a discussion about the failed Darien scheme, nor does he 
‘enquire how far the late erected council of trade did in that affair second the 
partialities of a court engaged in mysterious interests with France’.275 Instead, he asks 
                                                          
271 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 193. 
272 Hont, ibid: 64.  
273 Hont, ibid: 64. 
274 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 193. 
275 Fletcher, ibid: 193 
117 
 
the opinion of the assembled party’s to England’s ‘usage’ of Ireland, referring to 
England’s foreign and trading policies with regards to Ireland. 
‘I speak of a nation, said I, who affirm you have no shadow of right to make 
laws for them; that the power which the King’s council has assumed was gotten by 
surprise; and that their first submission was founded on a treaty of union, which now 
on account of some rebellions suppressed, is called a conquest. . . Now if after a union 
with us the least commotion should happen in Scotland, suppose on account of church 
government; might we not expect that the suppression of this would likewise be called 
a conquest, and we our posterity be treated as a conquered people?’276 
 
Reflecting on the argument that it was necessary for England to treat Ireland 
with a ‘good measure of strictness and severity… to keep them from the thoughts of 
setting up for themselves, and pretending to no longer depend on England’ Fletcher 
illustrates the extent that England’s interests have superseded Ireland’s and been 
allowed to frustrate any attempt at improvement.277 Sir Charles replies that Fletcher is 
speaking of a conquered nation, but that Scotland and England would be united 
peacefully, but Fletcher remains unconvinced. He will not accept England will treat 
Scotland fairly, no matter how wholesome its proposed intentions. To submit Scotland 
to an incorporationist union with England is to subject it and its people to a dominated 
position in which it must rely on the goodwill of its master for any benefit or non-
interference in its internal affairs. He is particularly concerned that an incorporating 
union would reduce Scotland to the extent that a dominant English parliament had 
already reduced both Ireland and Wales. It is Fletcher’s belief that England would treat 
Scotland as it had Ireland before it – as a threat to its economy and trade; seeing 
English ministers as regarding trade as a zero-sum game, both domestically and 
internationally. Fletcher prefers the vision of a United Kingdom with shared trading 
links that will bolster both economies, furthermore, his theories of justice extend to 
the international system, a system where the rich nations could no longer suppress the 
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poor who would enjoy a ‘just share in the government of themselves’.278 Fletcher 
could not suppose that England would ‘destroy their own established manufactures to 
encourage Scotland’s and denies that free trade with England would be of 
‘incomparable advantage’, but would rather further exhaust the Scottish people who 
had recently come through famine and large numbers of emigration, and be the utter 
ruin of all the merchants.279 By admitting that England wishes to keep Ireland in a 
position of dependence, Sir Charles is showing it to be no ‘benevolent despot’ but 
rather a dominating country which suppresses the interests of its conquests and rivals.  
 
As this example shows, there is no room for both states to flourish under one 
king and one parliament making the decisions for both, as it stands. England would 
inevitably put its interests first and fetter any others that may conflict. There is no such 
thing, to use Pettit’s term, as a ‘benevolent despot’, competing interests will always 
take precedence.280 The benevolent despot scenario is, as Pettit argues, a non-starter. 
Trusting one state or organisation with the unconstrained power, or ‘source of 
domination’, however benevolent its intentions, would be to allow it unlimited 
domination and the power to interfere in the choices of all others, not that it would 
need to as the other states would adjust their interests in order to please the 
benevolent despot.281 This, for Fletcher and Pettit, reduces the state to a position of 
dominance, and non-domination and non-dependence are the fundamental bases for 
liberty. Fletcher is here recognizing the importance of commerce in relation to 
freedom. One cannot be free if it relies on the goodwill of another for its continued 
pursuit of its interests, and that goodwill will not be forthcoming if these interests may 
interfere with the interests of the dominant party. It is a clear that Fletcher sees 
inequality as a source of domination and injustice. 
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Fletcher recognises this problem both in the Anglo-Scottish union and within 
the European system. England would thwart Scottish development and trade at every 
turn, as was clearly demonstrated with the interference of the Darien scheme which 
resulted in many thousands of Scots perishing and the almost complete ruin of the 
Scottish nation. Whereas in Europe, Louis would only behave benevolently as far as it 
suits his needs. Fletcher recognises that if Louis is successful in succeeding to the 
Spanish throne, and with it secures his hegemonic position in Europe, he would gain 
the power to interfere in the domestic and international affairs of all his neighbours; 
interfering in their trading and economic efforts, as well as placing them in a position 
of fear, resulting in their desire to appease Louis for fear of recrimination.282  
 
There is a growing awareness of the relations between government, war and 
finance; war is necessary for the constant procurement of luxuries from other 
countries, and as a consequence, war becomes ‘a constant trade to live by’ as a form 
of mercantilist warfare emerges.283 The harsh reality of the European economic 
competition is revealed in the statement made by Musgrave that: 
‘ we must not rely too much upon our own speculations, or think the world can 
ever be rightly governed; but must take things as they are, and consider the interest of 
the society in which we live. And if any profitable trade be in the possession of our 
neighbours, we may endeavour to dispossess them of that advantage for the good of 
our own society’.284  
 
Fletcher understands the need for cooperation in the emerging commercial 
modern system of states, recognising also the reliance Scotland has thus far had on 
English benevolence, and the resulting decline due to its subservient position. What is 
necessary is for Scotland to remove itself from this dependence so it may compete 
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commercially within the wider international order. This puts him in a unique position 
at the time, other political commentators recognise the importance of trade, but it is 
Fletcher who identifies the increasing European interconnectedness.  
 
Fletcher laments that politics is considered purely in terms of distinct societies, 
disregarding the rights and interests of others. He is adamant that ‘justice is due even 
in point of trade, from one nation to another… because all mankind have a right to the 
fruits of their own labour’.285 Accordingly, if the governments of the world were 
regulated and ordered in such a way as raison d’état gave way to considerations of 
justice and virtue, then mankind could live in a ‘more free and manly way, attended 
with a more equal distribution of riches than trade and commerce will allow’.286 ‘For 
the light of nature teaches, that men ought not to use one another unjustly on any 
account, much less under the specious pretext of government’.287 The function of 
society is to provide the common good (the other republican ideal) removing 
individual pursuit of particular interests.288 Therefore, the raison d’état of international 
society should be the interests of mankind as a whole. Fletcher wrote that: 
‘Not only those who have ever actually formed governments, but even those 
who have written on that subject, and contrived schemes of constitution have, as I 
think, always framed them with respect only to particular nations, for whom they were 
designed, and without any regard to the rest of mankind. Since, as they could not but 
know that every society, as well as every private man, has a natural inclination to 
exceed in everything, and draw the advantages to itself, they might also have seen the 
necessity of curbing that exorbitant inclination, and obliging them to consider the 
general good and interests of mankind, on which that of every distinct society does in a 
great measure depend. And one would think that politicians, who ought to be the best 
of all moral philosophers, should have considered what a citizen of the world is’.289 
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Thus he comprehends that in order for a state to effectively secure the 
freedom and security of the citizens, it must be representative and effective. For the 
state to prosper, the citizen must also flourish and vice versa. Fletcher sees that the 
state/citizen balance is reciprocal - both must work for the good of the other. States 
that are ineffective, underdeveloped or unrepresentative do not have the mechanisms 
to ensure the security and freedom of the people. And states that have external 
interference hampering their development or the political participation of the citizens 
are in a more difficult position - a stronger state that has the capacity to interfere in 
another state’s decision-making processes -will interfere where interests compete and 
are threatened. Fletcher sees this as a zero-sum competition which will inevitably 
leave the weaker state in a worse position than before – unable to develop and 
become strong enough to challenge the dominating state.  
 
Pettit has developed a similar point, and suggests that states should plan for 
non-domination amongst themselves in order to avoid the dangers of poverty and 
dependence that would make the state a prime target for ‘predators’.290 He argues 
that non-domination should be conceptualized in order to command allegiance, 
supported as it is by common reason already acknowledged with regards to how states 
should behave towards one another.291 This idea is available in Fletcher’s proposed 
federal union, arguing that limitations on the ability of English ministers to interfere in 
Scottish affairs are uncontroversial and the very minimum requirements for Scotland 
to be able to secure the future of the nation and the citizens, with regards to sharing a 
monarch and a parliament with the stronger England.  
 
Fletcher is concerned that England will be able to exert arbitrary power over 
Scotland if the union goes ahead without the limitations on the monarch being 
accepted. He fears that the Scottish people will have no say in Scottish affairs – no 
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political participation – and English ministers would dictate Scottish policy in ways 
which would benefit the English interests. This would remove any freedom from the 
Scottish nation and would be to the very detriment of its society and economy; the 
conflicting interests of the English nation taking precedence. This is so abhorrent to 
Fletcher that he states that if the limitations are not accepted by parliament and given 
royal approval, Scotland and England must fully separate.292 Fletcher, like Mair and 
others before him, sees the benefits an equal union along federal lines would bring to 
Scotland in particular, and until this point been a supporter of a united Britain, yet his 
commitment to freedom from tyranny and arbitrary power is so absolute that he is 
willing to sacrifice the union. English rule without the limitations is a loss of liberty and 
the enslavement of the Scottish nation.293 
 
 Fletcher maintains that Scotland is an independent nation whose power and 
reputation has been very much in decline since the union of crowns. The reason for 
this decline is the failure to put limitations on the monarch when he took the crown in 
England and securing certain conditions in order to ensure the continued prosperity of 
Scotland. He insists that Scotland is right to seize the opportunity to put limitations on 
the successor to the throne to ensure the continued sovereignty of the kingdom, the 
freedom, power and frequency of their parliaments and the liberty of religion and 
trade from either English or foreign influence: 
‘…that by the influence of English ministers upon our government, we are 
brought wholly to depend on that court; that by reason of the prince’s absence, the 
laws are not put in execution: I say, these being the causes of our present ill condition, 
what other remedies can be found, that that the parliament of Scotland should for the 
time to come bestow all pensions and offices both civil and military; that our 
parliaments should be annual and not interrupted in their sessions, and have power to 
appoint committees for the administration of the government during the intervals of 
                                                          
292 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 147. 
293 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 150-160. 
123 
 
sitting’?294 He argues that since the union of crowns, Scotland’s trading powers have 
diminished through interference from English interests, and the property values have 
sunk.295  
 
Fletcher’s suggestion for a British federal solution, freeing Scotland of the 
threat of alien control from the English dominant power is simple and effective, 
avoiding the obvious difficulties with the not-so benevolent despot scenario. Fletcher 
proposes a federal model of republican governance for Britain in which the 
constitutional restraints on arbitrary power and checks provided by rotational elected 
offices, public scrutiny, separation of powers and the rule of law, provide a system of 
government which empowers the weak and limits the strong, and avoids domination 
by any one power, believing the only fair system of government for a united Britain is a 
system based on equality.  
 
Act of Security and Limitations 
This notion of justice is a crucial and recurring aspect of Fletcher’s political 
thought. He is passionate against the amalgamation of Scotland and England if it 
means that power would be centralised in London. Such an incorporationist union, he 
argues, would be disastrous to Scotland’s political and economic interests and would 
essentially remove all liberty from the people; ‘Within ‘an incorporating union, as they 
call it, of the two nations, Scotland will become more poor than ever’.296 He lobbies for 
a reorganisation of the political administration to ensure a redistribution of wealth 
throughout the country; introducing a system of local authorities that would bring an 
end to London’s monopoly on the income brought in through parliamentary processes. 
Not only would this reorganisation spread the wealth of the nation, but would help 
bring an end to the corruption of the city. To ensure the continued autonomy and 
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development of Scotland, it and its people must be free from domination of or 
dependence on another. England must be seen to recognise the self-determination of 
the Scottish nation and not interfere with its goals and interests. Refusing to recognise 
the self-determination, or willfully interfering or impeding Scottish interests, is akin to 
domination, and unjust. The relationship between Scotland and England must be 
constitutionally organised to ensure non-dependence, non-domination and justice. 
With this federal framework for equality Fletcher presents theories of non-domination 
as non-dependence, applicable to contemporary republican ideas of the same 
character. Furthermore, Fletcher is the only theorist at his time considering the union 
in terms of the implications on liberty and justice, not just in raison d’état as a distinct 
or discrete interest.  
 
Fletcher proposes a decentralisation of power built upon lesser unions working 
towards the achievements of their own interests and together pursuing the common 
good of the larger community; the division of power in Great Britain amongst twelve 
cities. Each of Fletcher’s local authority units would provide the basis for participation 
in society and government at a local level. This would allow for the local units to 
respond to regional needs. 
‘if a sufficient provision be made to prevent the exhausting of our money by the 
attendance of Scotsmen at court, and to take away the influence of English ministers 
upon out affairs, no condition of men will be more happy. For we shall then be 
possessed of liberty; shall administer our own affairs, and be free from the corruptions 
of court, we shall have the certain and constant alliance of a powerful nation, of the 
same language, religion and government, lying between us and all enemies both by sea 
and land, and obliged in interest to perpetual peace and amity with us/ and this you 
cannot but allow to be a much happier condition, that any we ever could propose to 
ourselves all the projects of union that have hitherto been formed’.297  
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Furthermore, the decentralisation of power would bring a transparency to the 
system and thus accountability, reducing the corruption of the politicians and office 
holders. Each unit would be built to pursue the common good and protect the 
interests of that region and their nearest neighbours, bringing with it a domestic 
balance of interests and pursuit of the universal common good’.298 With this bold 
proposal, Fletcher is proposing a federal balance which provides a lasting peace based 
on commercial interests. As Onuf, discussed in the previous chapter, Fletcher proposes 
that the function of society is the pursuit of the common good; Fletcher’s 
republicanism refers to the organization of political society for this good and the 
liberties of the people within. 
 
Pettit rightly states that ‘the free individual is protected against the domination 
of others by the undominating and undominated state’, adding that individuals enjoy 
freedom from domination by being protected from domination by a non-dominating 
state.299 This is a well-defined republican position; that freedom can only be achieved 
if the undominating state is itself free from domination by another state. Fletcher 
clearly understands freedom as non-dependence to include the state and is quite 
resolute in his position that English domination of Scotland is equivalent to the 
enslavement of that nation and its people. Fletcher recognises the sovereignty of the 
crown, and therefore Scotland and England as interconnected yet self-determined 
states whose interests and actions necessarily affect one another, but he recognises 
the sovereignty of both crowns as separate. He is arguing for an institutionalised set of 
procedures to regulate the activity of each and provide means of negotiation when 
these activities affect the others interests. His federal system of governance at both 
the local and national levels provides a means for both nations to be represented fairly 
and equally at a transnational decision making level. The difficulty lies with 
                                                          
298 This is a commonly held concept in seventeenth- century political literature. Leibniz also considers „lesser unions‟ 
political unions. For him the state was the fifth degree of natural society. The Church of god was the highest natural 
degree above it, including the church as the representative and the emperor as the defender of the respublica 
Christiana. Below the state were in ascending political order: husbands and wives; parents and children; masters and 
slaves; and whole households. Both Althusius and Leibniz were in this regard going against the trend in international 
relations theory at that time by maintaining the heirarchy of political entities both above and below the state. 
299 Pettit. “A Republican Law of Peoples”, ibid: 77. 
126 
 
confederating the sovereignty of the British monarch with the separate self-
determination of both countries within the United Kingdom, but Fletcher avoids this by 
identifying self-determination not as independence or autonomy, but as a form of non-
dependence.  
 
Fletcher is ‘endeavouring to lay hold on the opportunity put into our hands, of 
enacting such conditions and limitations on a successor, upon the expiration of the 
present entail, as may secure the honour and sovereignty of our crown and kingdom, 
the freedom, frequency, and power of our parliaments, together with our religion, 
liberty, and trade, from either English or foreign influence’.300 To ensure the continued 
freedom of the Scottish nation, freedom from a tyrant, and freedom from external 
domination of another state, Fletcher has offered the limitations. As Skinner claims 
‘you can hope to retain your individual freedom from dependence on the will of others 
if and only if you live as an active citizen of a state that is fully self-governing, and is 
consequently neither dominating nor dominated’.301 Fletcher’s federal system, along 
with the limitations proposed in his speeches, afford the people of Scotland the 
opportunity to engage politically and construct the institutions that will minimise the 
domination of England. As Robertson points out, Fletcher’s proposed limitations, 
known as the Act of Security, were a bluff, there was no other viable successor to the 
throne than from the Hanoverian line, and after one-hundred years of union, England 
would not accept Scotland’s renewed independence or separate monarch.302 Yet, his 
speeches were insightful and risky, and put Fletcher at the forefront of politics in his 
own time. The limitations would ensure noninterference, non-domination as non-
dependence, and political participation; a civic republic with the ability to develop its 
economic and social structures for the good of all citizens which, in turn, would benefit 
the larger British society as a whole.  
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Fletcher’s limitations are proposed to ensure that the people of Scotland enjoy 
freedom from domination and an active public life in a self-governing state.303 These 
include the mandates that elections should be made every Michaelmas and an equal 
number of lesser barons be added to the Parliament as nobleman - only noblemen or 
elected members have the vote in parliament, thus reducing the King’s influence on 
votes. Furthermore, the king must sanction all laws offered by the estates; monarchic 
approval should be automatic - he cannot refuse the decisions of the parliament. A 
committee of thirty-one members, chosen by the parliament and not the crown, are to 
be elected every parliament to replace the Committee of Articles.304 The king cannot 
make peace or war without the consent of the parliament, nor conclude any treaty; 
Parliament, and not the crown, shall confer all places and offices. This was a further 
measure to end the corruption of the parliament and the monarchical bias and 
manipulation. Fletcher returns to the argument of the standing army when he 
stipulates that no regiment or companies of horse, foot, or dragoons are to be kept on 
foot in peace or war, but by consent of parliament. With this Fletcher is returning to 
his argument that standing armies should be abolished – the consent of the parliament 
rather than the king is a further measure to limit the potential for arbitrary rule of the 
crown -  a monarch who controls a standing army has the capability of tyrannical rule; 
‘all fencible men, betwixt sixty and sixteen…are to be armed with bayonets, and no 
general indemnity or transgression be pardoned without parliamentary consent – yet  
another instruction intended to limit the biased influence of the crown along with the 
division and distinction of the two courts of session and judiciary. The lord presidency 
responsibility is to be shared between three judges and the exclusion of the senators 
of justice from parliament in order to limit the power of any one standing member, or 
court from unfair influence. He ends his limitations with the statement that ‘if the king 
                                                          
303 For a full list of the proposed limitations, See Appendix 1.  
304 Up until this time, the Committee of Articles depended on the crown to choose the standing members, 
consequentially, the crown was able to manipulate parliament. This limitation was Fletcher‟s way of removing 
monarchical influence over parliament, and constructing an unbiased decision-making process. Robertson, Andrew 
Fletcher, ibid, 1997: 138.. 
128 
 
break in upon any of these conditions of government, he shall by the estates be 
declared to have forfeited the crown’.305 
 
Each of these limitations is designed to provide checks and balances on the 
decision makers and their offices, reducing the capacity for damaging interference and 
the potential for arbitrary power. Fletcher himself lays out the intentions of the 
limitations better than anyone else when he states in this fourth speech, delivered 
(according to Robertson) to parliament on either the 22nd June or 1st July:  
 
‘These are the ends to which all the limitations are directed, that English 
councils may not hinder the acts of our parliaments, nor interrupt their sitting; that we 
may not stand in need of posting to London for places and pensions, by which, 
whatever particular men may get, the nation must always be a loser, nor apply for the 
remedies of our grievances to a court, where for the most part none are to be had. On 
the contrary, of these conditions of government be enacted, our constitution will be 
amended, and our grievances easily redressed by a due execution of our own laws, 
which to this day we have never been able to obtain’. 306  
 
This not only demonstrates Fletcher’s commitment to Scotland’s liberty from 
the domination of England, but his awareness of the need to implement a federal and 
peaceful union between the two – Scotland always relying on the goodwill of its 
powerful neighbour. He has a shrewd understanding of the changing political structure 
of the emerging European system based on commerce and the need for Scotland to 
assert its place within it.  
 
To use Dworkin’s theoretical framework as a way to explain Fletcher’s vision of 
the state: two countries united under one monarch will each have different 
conceptions of the good life, and they risk brutality at the hands of the state as a 
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consequence.307 Fletcher regards the two countries as two separate communities 
united under the banner of Great Britain. This all-encompassing vision of the 
community raises some moral claims, these claims do not have universal scope but 
Fletcher does regard them as necessary requirements of justice, and views them as 
intrinsically political. They are particular and focus on the interest of one community, 
as Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghav puts it: a cultural community’s demand for survival 
and respect is basically a demand for the survival of, or respect for its own tradition.308  
 
Fletcher wants the laws and modes of conduct to be preserved, and the right to 
pursue the community’s interests with impunity. There is no reason to privilege one 
over another as both exist in this society as equal. Hence, in so far as their moral 
demands for survival, respect, the enforcement of their behavioural patterns, and the 
preservation of some rights for their members involve state action, they should be 
treated in an equal manner.309 The state must therefore remain neutral in each of the 
other nation’s attempts to secure the good life, to choose one vision over another, or 
to interfere with one if it interferes with another, is to prejudice the treatment of each 
– they would be treated unequally – the state has a duty to remain reasonable, neutral 
and fair.310 Fletcher argues that an incorporating union; with one monarch and one 
parliament, cannot remain neutral. He does not believe that the virtues of tolerance 
and fairness are enough to secure the common good in Scotland. However, a limited 
union as he has proposed, with separate and elected parliaments, and a limited 
monarchical power, has all the attributes of justice and fairness required to allow both 
countries to be united peacefully and equally with the capacity for growth.311  
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Of course, according to Fletcher, in his usual rhetorical style, the wisest of 
Englishmen will be able to see the advantages of his proposals, ‘wiser men will 
consider that when two nations live under the same prince, the condition of one 
cannot be made intolerable, but a separation must inevitably follow, which will be 
dangerous if not destructive to both.312 Fletcher appeals once more to the historical 
and Roman example, and despite his declaration that he does not wish to see the 
separation of Scotland and England, he has no hesitation in declaring his intention to 
vote for the separation of the two nations before he will consent to the continued 
‘miserable and languishing’ condition Scotland is presently in, by allowing the 
continued interference of Scottish affairs by English ministers who refuse the 
limitations proposed. This is further indicative of Fletcher’s belief that an incorporating 
union, without the limitations proposed, would be an act of enslavement of the entire 
nation of Scotland, necessitating its dependence on England and therefore placing it in 
a situation that would be complete domination. As Fletcher and the neo-republicans 
discussed in the previous chapter would agree - no agency or state should seek to 
dominate another.  
 
Fletcher attempts to make the limitations more appealing to Queen Anne by 
making clear that his proposal is for the limitations to be placed on the Scottish 
monarch only, thus also making it clear that the Scottish parliament should not be 
dependent on the English to settle the secession, it is a Scottish issue. Furthermore, by 
stating that his limitations are intended for the Scottish king and parliament in that 
realm only, the English parliament and crown could not be seen to oppose the 
limitations without revealing intentions to interfere with the Scottish interests and 
parliament after the death of Queen Anne.313 He continues to state that he does not 
wish to separate Scotland and England, but only to limit the influence of English 
councils and ministers on Scottish decisions, and free Scottish ministers from having to 
attend court in London. Fletcher is clear that by the ‘force and exercise of our 
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government . . . as far as possible, within ourselves’ will result in trade, manufactures, 
and husbandry flourishing, ‘and the affairs of the nation no longer be neglected’. 314 It 
is not the prerogative of the king of Scotland he wishes to diminish, but the 
prerogative of the English ministers of the nation.315 Fletcher is not alone in his belief 
that the sovereign should be limited. Pufendorf, not unlike Fletcher, believed that the 
sovereign was limited by the very obligations of government – to promote life in 
society.316 They were bound by the rule of law and ‘when they have once accepted of 
the Sovereignty under these Conditions, the solemn Oath by which the engage to 
observe the Conditions utterly forbids them to use any Means, whether of secret 
Contrivance or of open Violence, on order to subvert the Laws of the Kingdom and 
render themselves absolute’.317 
 
Fletcher is concerned with the obligations of the monarch to his subjects and 
the rights the subjects have to ensure that their interests are being considered. His 
concern with the union as it stands is that the interests and rights of the people of 
Scotland are not being considered with due care. Following Locke’s notion of the right 
to resist based on the concepts of consent and mutual obligations, Fletcher argues for 
the limitation of royal powers and advocates the social contract theories of obligation 
in order that the Scottish interest may be considered more fully and fairly. Fletcher 
appeals to a Lockean model of political obligation and reciprocity. Fletcher explicitly 
sets out the terms of the contract, which he calls conditions of government; the 
constitutional structures of the governments of Scotland and England. 318  His 
limitations draw heavily on Locke’s model for consent, including the stipulation that 
the King must sanction the laws offered by the estates; that he cannot, without the 
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consent of the parliament, have the power to declare war or peace; and that if he 
breaks any of these conditions of government, he shall forfeit the crown.  
 
Fletcher uses concepts of political obligation based on consent and legitimacy 
that are very similar to those of Locke. The government has an obligation to preserve 
its subjects and society and it does this through the establishment of laws. ‘The laws 
are the only security we have for our lives and properties, which if our sovereign 
subverts, subjects cannot be blamed, for making use of the ordinary means to preserve 
them, and since this cannot be done without withdrawing obedience from such a 
magistrate as goes about to destroy them, such an act cannot properly be said to 
punish him, (because we take nothing from him which he has a just claim), but do only 
shun the occasion of making ourselves miserable.319 Fletcher’s political understanding 
has all the fundamental aspects of intrinsic republicanism; he believes that active 
citizenship has intrinsic value and that the state should educate the citizens into civic 
virtue. Liberty, for Fletcher, is a matter of freedom from state compulsion - freedom 
from tyranny. Yet Fletcher’s political theories are grounded in those of Lockean 
liberalism, in particular, the notions of social contract, consent, and human nature. 
 
Fletcher draws his arguments from the canon available to him; republican 
ideals tempered by a Hobbesian understanding of human nature and a Lockean sense 
of liberty, to form a richer, more feasible republican theory. A mixture of Hobbesian 
human nature and a Machiavellian/ Republican inclination to do ones duty for the 
common good, encouraged by virtue and honour. ‘Nature in most men prevails over 
reason; reason in some prevails over nature: but when these two are joined, and a 
violent inclination finds itself owned by reason, required by duty, encouraged by the 
highest praises, and excited by the most illustrious examples, sure that force must be 
irresistible’.320 . Fletcher has used Locke to develop a richer variety of republicanism 
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that is more suited to his needs and interests, and provides us with an improved 
republican tradition in which to analyse political history.  
 
Sullivan suggests that the neo-republicans like Fletcher merged republicanism 
with liberalism by finding that republicanism provided a means for the people to 
protect their natural rights and pursue happiness within the public arena. Self-interest 
motivates leaders and therefore the public realm is a vigorous place of political activity 
and efforts to secure individual rights and thus the public good. The vigorous public 
activity that takes place serves the private realm. 321 Fletcher brings the individual into 
the political realm in order to secure his natural rights; more specifically the right to 
liberty. The purpose of government is to secure the liberties of the subjects, and 
therefore liberty is best served within a republic. Once a monarch attempts to subvert 
the liberties of the people – his only obligation to the people being to secure their 
liberties – he is no longer fit to be called the sovereign and must be removed from 
power. Fletcher is combining his Lockean liberalist leanings with a Harringtonian 
republicanism in order to posit that consent is necessary and resistance legitimate, 
while maintaining that the common good of the people is the fundamental duty of 
each individual above their own interests.  
 
Fletcher’s last speech was delivered to parliament on the 7th July 1703, after 
Queen Anne announced her refusal to accept the limitations proposed by him at the 
previous sitting. He could not see how this refusal was anything other than a clear 
statement of intention to interfere with Scottish affairs and continual subjection of 
Scottish interests to those of the English court. After a long career supporting the 
federal union between the two nations, Fletcher finally sees that there is no room for 
the equal status for Scotland, or much hope that England’s interests will not supersede 
its own. As Skinner points out; ‘to reduce a state to dependence on the goodwill of 
other states is to cause not merely the state but every one of its individual citizens to 
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fall into a morally intolerable condition of servitude’.322 Fletcher thus removes all 
support for the Union and retires from politics.  
 
Republican Theories of Power and Freedom 
It is Fletcher’s belief that monarchical prerogative in the seventeenth-century 
was wearing away the institutional safeguards against tyranny. Consent of and 
consultation with these institutions was decreasing despite the general belief that the 
good will and cooperation of the nobility and landed freeman was necessary for 
effective rule. He wishes to ‘disabuse those who think them [the monarchies] the same, 
because they are called the same names; and who ignorantly clamour against such as 
would preserve that liberty which is left’.323 The balance that was maintained when the 
monarchies were limited by the relative power of the nobility was being eroded by the 
threat of the standing army taking the power of the sword out of the hands of the 
people and placing it directly into the hands of the monarch. I do not deny that these 
limited monarchies, during the greatness of the barons, had some defect: I know few 
governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those 
governments steady, and an effectual provision against the encroachment of the 
crown. 324  
 
According to Fletcher, all governments who do not have sufficient security in 
their constitution against the encroachments of the arbitrary power of princes – 
whether it is through maintaining standing armies in times of peace or tax raising 
powers – are tyrannical. The ability to coerce individuals through arbitrary means goes 
against the republican ideals of equality and freedom. It is only by adopting the 
republican principles of popular sovereignty, or political participation, that the 
organised society could hope to achieve its highest goals. Sovereignty and political 
power rest in the hands of the people with the administration of sovereignty resting in 
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the hands of the state. When the individual citizens are empowered and obliged to 
take an active role in the running of the state, and only when equality and liberty are 
secured, can the state realise its full potential and capacity for achieving the common 
good. Like Machiavelli before him, Fletcher believes that it is not the well-being of the 
individual’s that make the city great, but the well-being of the community and, as with 
Machiavelli, it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is 
looked to properly.325 What is required is courage, public spirit and a role in res publica 
– those things that according to Fletcher had been eroded by the corruption of luxury 
and freedom of choice and an individualistic sense of liberty that does not sacrifice 
self-interest for public good. Although Fletcher accepts that it would not be possible to 
return to a gothic constitution, he does wish to highlight the causes and consequences 
of its demise. 
 
Fletcher’s first treatise, ‘A Discourse on Government with Relation to the 
Militias’ is a discourse on the history of liberty. It is a treatise on the proposal for the 
maintenance of a standing army in peacetime. He intends to show that, despite the 
claims of contemporary governments, they are attempting to subvert the constitution 
of Scotland and the liberties of their subjects. These governments cannot be the same 
as the honourable governments of the past because as long as they have standing 
armies there is no balance to measure the power of the government or the 
encroachments of the crown.326 Fletcher argues that a free and fair society requires 
limitations on the power of the government, by keeping standing armies in times of 
peace; security and liberty are lost alongside the loss of control of internal affairs. 
Whosoever controls the means of coercion – the sword - has the power of the state. 
The sword in the hands of the prince instead of the people destabilizes the balance of 
power and turns a prince into a tyrant because he who controls the means of coercion, 
controls liberty.327  
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Fletcher believes that political freedom ensures private liberty and that the 
political constitution changed for the worse in the sixteenth-century with the change in 
the form of feudal-monarchical relations, and the unintended ill-consequences of good 
intentions. With a system overhauled to provide the common man with more 
individual autonomy came a system that allowed the ruling elite to grasp more power 
and oppress more people. The alteration of government was intended to emancipate 
the vassals from military service, allowing them to exist independently; however, this 
liberation had far reaching social consequences. The most important of which is the 
corruption of the international system that allows the growth of mercantilism. Not 
only does this result in the means of coercion being placed in the hands of the state, 
but a newly burgeoning economy threatens to corrupt the civic way of life. Fletcher, 
responding to what he sees as the moral degradation of man following his 
emancipation from the virtuous military way of life, recognises the threat to liberty as 
a threat from the increasing and arbitrary powers of the decision makers – the king 
and the nobility. In this regard, Fletcher is equating corruption with the excessive 
individualism that capitalism and wealth brings. This European historical approach is an 
attempt to underline the structural causes for the economic and political problems, 
and provide solutions to improve the infrastructure and with it the wealth and social 
stability of the nation.328 He refers to a model of the ideal state and the ‘gothic 
constitution’, based on a civic and militaristic way of life for a solution.  
 
The formation of standing armies is a product of mans greed. By turning 
soldiers into tenants, landlords can impose taxes and demand rents however, in times 
of war there are no vassal soldiers to call upon and so standing armies, kept by the 
state, are required in times of peace. Standing armies require payment and the 
government requires income from taxes to make that payment. Similarly, landlords, 
having been corrupted by luxury and seduced by debt, take command of mercenaries 
to impose heavier duties on their tenants. This is similar to the Aristotelian civic and 
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humanist values that define rentiers and entrepreneurs as corrupt, seduced by 
material gain. War has made the society cohesive, capable of refinement, luxury and 
specialization. Growth of professional armies is encouraged to enable man to seek 
material gains and leave defenses to other men. There is a growing awareness of the 
relations between government, war and finance - war is necessary for the constant 
procurement of luxuries from other countries, and as a consequence, war becomes ‘a 
constant trade to live by’ as a form of mercantilist warfare emerges.329 Fletcher 
recognises that the economic growth of the European powers is directly linked with 
the growth of standing armies – public finance and standing armies are 
interdependent. As war becomes a trade to live by, the European powers become 
dependent on the armies they command. This, according to Fletcher, further distracts 
from the primary good - the public responsibility of economic development to 
eliminate poverty and create public wealth.330 Instead of focusing the efforts of 
government on welfare and social stability, the monarch intends to subvert the 
constitution and undermine the stability of the nation in order to gain material wealth.  
 
As much as this wealth is necessary for the stability of the nation, Fletcher goes 
on to argue that the economic growth created through the wars benefit only the 
English nation. Fletcher is adamant that it is unjust for England to force Scotland to 
maintain an army for the sole purposes of the English and the Dutch interest, neither 
of whom had been willing to allow Scotland any attempt to improve their worth. There 
is no advancement of the common good; since there is no advantage to this force, only 
disadvantage, Scotland should refuse to maintain a standing army on their behalf.331 
The fact that he declares that Scotland should ‘refuse’ to maintain a standing army on 
behalf of England is indicative that he maintains a right to the separation of interests 
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and powers within Britain. This is indicative of the republican foundation to Fletcher’s 
political machinations; he sees the monarch wielding arbitrary power in England and is 
attempting to limit this power in Scotland. This is an early modern republican 
argument that has been utilised in contemporary theories of liberty. F. A Hayek defines 
personal or individual freedom as ‘The state in which a man is not subject to coercion 
by the arbitrary will of another or others’.332 The task of a policy of freedom must be to 
minimize coercion or its harmful effect, even if it cannot eliminate it properly. Standing 
armies do the opposite; they provide the means for coercion and arbitrary power, 
increasing it instead of limiting it. 
 
The original meaning of the term freedom, according to Hayek, is ‘the 
possibility of a person’s acting according to their own decisions and plans, in contrast 
to the position of one who was irrevocably subject to the will of another, who by 
arbitrary decision could coerce him to act or not to act in specific ways’, or more 
simply ‘independence of the arbitrary will of another’.333 Freedom refers solely to the 
relation of men to other men, and the only infringement upon it is coercion. Freedom 
‘does not depend on the range of choice but on whether he can expect to shape his 
course of action in accordance with his present intentions, or whether somebody else 
has the power so to manipulate the conditions as to make him act according to that 
person’s will rather than his own’. 334  Freedom thus presupposes that the individual 
has some assured private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in his 
environment with which others cannot interfere.  
 
Fletcher’s citizens are not free as long as the threat of the standing army is 
upon them. They may have options, but not all of them are actual options if they have 
to consider the threat of the standing army and thus consider the wishes of the 
monarch, and what he thinks is acceptable. Coercion occurs when one man’s actions 
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are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own purpose, but for the purpose of 
others. There is still freedom to choose, but that freedom is to choose the lesser evil 
under the circumstances. Coercion necessarily implies either the threat of harm or the 
intention to bring about certain conduct.335 Power is the power to coerce others into 
doing ones will through threats of harm. It is this power, the power to subject others 
to our will or force them to act against their will that is contrary to liberty.  
 
According to Fletcher, the establishment of a standing army has several 
harmful consequences for society. Standing armies are used by the crown to oppress 
subjects through a process of intimidation and fear – the main forces of coercion.336 
Unlike ancient times there is no recourse against a tyrannical monarch, no means of 
deposition if he controls both the power and the purse. The best way to ensure the 
absolutism of a monarch is to give him a standing army. Fletcher is fundamentally 
concerned for the liberty of the people and the safeguard of the sovereignty of the 
people within a representative government. An imposition of a standing army is 
tantamount to removing sovereignty from the people and this cannot be accepted. 
Here Fletcher warns that removing the right to political participation – the essence of 
freedom – is taking sovereignty from the people and giving it to the monarch and thus  
creates an absolute monarch who will remove the last vestiges of freedom that 
remain.337  
 
Hayek agrees that power and coercion are closely related, but denies that one 
necessarily follows from the other. He prefers the term ‘force’ or ‘violence’ to 
coercion, since it is the threat of force or violence that are the most important forms of 
coercion, but not the only forms. However, he does agree that the threat of violence is 
the most powerful form of coercion, and for Fletcher, there is no greater threat of 
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force than the threat of a standing army in peace-time. Laski puts it succinctly when he 
says: ‘true coercion occurred when armed bands of conquerors make the subject 
people toil for them, when organised gangsters extort levy for ‘protection’, when the 
knower of an evil secret blackmails his victim, and, of course, when the state threatens 
to inflict punishment and to employ physical force to make us obey its commands’.338  
 
Pettit adds: I am not free to do what I already do if it is a matter of luck or 
goodwill that I am not interfered with. If I have no claim to the right to do what I 
already do, should there be a need to make such a claim, even if that need never 
actually arises.339 Pettit describes circumstances where there is no overt interference 
as the ‘invigilation’ of the dominated – whereby the domineering power stays watchful 
of the choices made by the dominated and is ready to intervene when the choices 
made are not to his taste. In this respect, the dominated find themselves restrained in 
the options open to them, and are forced to adjust their behaviour, choosing what 
they believe the dominating party or ’master’ is willing to accept in order to avoid 
intervention which might be detrimental to their interests.340 Being subjected to the 
will of another is being dominated, and domination undermines the status of the 
individual as a free agent; all their actions have the ‘character of permissions’ based on 
actions that they may perform without intervention from the dominus.341 Therefore, 
the evil of domination as ‘unfreedom’ is the refusal to acknowledge that ‘what marks 
us off as a species is that we are each able to make our own choices, and indeed to 
form our beliefs in a reason sensitive way’.342 The emphasis here is not on interference 
per se, but the arbitrary interference of another. Fletcher regards freedom in this same 
negative sense - as freedom from the arbitrary rule of another.343 It shows Fletcher is 
committed first to the conception of the good as it is held in common, and liberty as a 
result of political contribution to that good life.  
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Fletcher, among other anti-standing army pamphleteers, is of the opinion that 
the constitution of Britain was based on a limited monarchy for the purposes of 
balance and liberty. A standing army imposed by a monarch is in direct contravention 
to the principles of the limited monarchy and would establish the king as an absolutist 
sovereign, altering the constitution and eliminating liberty. Fletcher is firmly of the 
belief that a standing army is fatal to a free constitution. Unlike his contemporaries, 
however, Fletcher approaches the subject from an historical and European 
perspective. Moyle and Trenchard’s Anglo-centric approach misses the originality of 
Fletcher’s arguments, basing them on examples in history that showed nations that 
had lost their freedom and liberty had only done so after resorting to standing armies. 
They were only able to regain that freedom after the armies had been disbanded. 
Fletcher believes the corruption of the Gothic order had been a European 
phenomenon that began in the 1500’s; neither of the Anglo-centric arguments of 
Moyle and Trenchard on one side, and Somers and Defoe on the other were adequate 
to address the issues that the establishment of a standing army would cause. The 
interdependence between the corruption of the constitutional order and the modern 
political and economic system required the issues to be addressed from a European 
perspective. 344   
 
Fletcher does not appeal for a return to the gothic way of living of the warlike 
nations, but does appeal to the civic morality that existed at that time. Virtue is to be 
found in history, the gothic simplicity and militaristic life. He assumes the existence of 
a certain pre-commercial morality, a civic virtue that was eliminated when men were 
allowed to choose their education and leisure pursuits. By pursuing an expensive 
lifestyle, man, according to Fletcher, sells the means of his personal liberties for the 
materials of culture. Culture is luxury, leisure and choice and each carries its 
concomitant ill. The present is characterized by decadence, corruption and debt as 
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man is seduced by extravagance. As Pocock observes, the political health of the nation 
has been corrupted by the intrusion of the war economy into the domestic sphere.345 
Virtue is the moral and material foundation of civil, social and political life and Fletcher 
recognizes a need to return to pre-commercial morality.346  
 
He does not consider – or certainly does not refer in his pamphlets and 
speeches to – the theory of private interests leading to public good. It may be that he 
considers that pursuing material goods such as elaborate clothing and jewellery is a 
corruption of virtue, and thus linking finance with corruption and where private 
interest may achieve public good. Fletcher’s proposal for civic virtue and the common 
good is somewhat limited. He assumes that the freedom the people enjoy depends on 
their active commitment to collective goods, however he does not assume that the 
people will be motivated to social acts of benevolence, rather the collective goods are 
governance, trade and defense of the nation. Commitment to the maintenance and 
development of the parliament and the economy are the essential attributes of the 
civil society to maintain the freedom of the nation. Compared to our contemporary 
conception of civic life – or as Honohan calls it, civility and our modern idea of 
common goods and services, as well as public spirit.  
 
Fletcher recognises that virtue is a weak basis for a republic, especially with 
commerce as its main competitor for societal progress. Although he does emphasise 
the need for virtue, he places it within the economic context, arguing that virtue is a 
sound basis for economic growth, that a strong republic working together to achieve 
the common good would necessitate growth in trade and commerce, manipulating the 
greed of the ministers and decision makers. He does not attempt to move away from 
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individual virtue as a basis for a republic, as others had before him, but argues that 
they are compatible, if not complimentary and beneficial to one another.347  In order 
to secure the common good, one must exercise virtue, self-restraint from individual 
interest in political deliberation. However, as Rawls suggests ‘We must abandon the 
hope of a political community if by such a community we mean a political society 
united in affirming a general and comprehensive doctrine’348 But we should not 
altogether abandon Fletcher’s virtuous community driven by the common good, 
because such a community does not have to include any substantive common good, 
but the republican shared principles of liberty and equality. 
 
Honohan notes that the rise of commercial interest is incompatible with 
republics like the one advocated by Fletcher. Whereas Fletcher’s citizens would be 
motivated by the common good, consumerism is driven by self-interest and private 
desires – clear indications of corruption.349 It provides governments with the resources 
to exercise arbitrary power - such as the standing armies in peace time - while the 
removal of political decision making powers from the community weakens the societal 
bonds necessary for citizens to desire to work to achieve the common good. 
Corruption is a necessary consequence of society, with interdependence resulting in 
the rise of arbitrary power. It is a non-stoppable force and therefore there can be no 
return to a golden age but there can be freedom within that corruption of society – the 
freedom from the arbitrary power limiting dependence and inequality which are the 
main sources of the corruption.350 What has been overlooked in Fletcher’s political 
theories is his attempt to move away from a republican ideal which emphasises virtue 
to fully integrate commerce into his thought, modernising republicanism and making it 
relevant to contemporary political thought in a way that Machiavelli, who completely 
ignores commerce, cannot.351 
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In Fletcher’s arguments against the standing army it is clear he is more 
concerned with freedom than virtue; to maintain freedom powers must be kept in 
check. Fletcher recognises that a republic based on the pursuance of the common 
good, as in the Athenian model which he favours, is not workable in large societies and 
therefore proposes his federal system to provide closer checks on those with power. 
Freedom requires the ability to make decisions free from influence or interference. 
This freedom of decision making is also vital for the pursuit of the common good; to 
realise the common good, citizens must collectively decide on laws, and should neither 
influence or be influenced by external forces. 352  This idea of freedom as non-
domination includes the concept that liberty is achieved under the condition where 
one lives in a common society but is at the mercy of none. Of course, as Pettit 
recognises, one may live within society, subject to some agency – a law or government 
- without being dominated, domination defined as one person dominating another if 
and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of 
interference on an arbitrary basis. 353  This definition applies to Fletcher’s ideal of 
political liberty; however Fletcher had a larger concept of freedom in mind. His 
concern was for the freedom of the state from political interference and the arbitrary 
power of the monarch or parliament of England. It is Fletcher’s belief that interference 
has a necessarily ill effect; interference can only be for the benefit of the interferer, 
not those whose autonomy has been interfered with.354 
 
David Miller has outlined three main traditions of thought with regards to 
notions of freedom. The first, republican notion, maintains that to be free one must be 
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part of a free political community – freedom as self-government. The liberal tradition 
holds that ‘freedom is a property of individuals and consists in the absence of 
constraint or interference by others’.355 The final ‘idealist’ view claims that to be free 
meant to be autonomous.356 It is Miller’s contention that these notions can be 
combined, creating an amalgamation of liberal and republican notions of freedom 
which is concerned with both the freedom of the political community and the freedom 
of persons. Rather than choosing between republican freedom and liberal freedom, 
Miller suggests that we ‘see the former as a precondition of the latter’.357 The 
important distinction to make with regards to the republican theory of domination is 
that it is only arbitrary acts of interference which causes the loss of freedom. No actual 
interference needs to take place to cause the loss of freedom, the possibility that 
interference may happen, and therefore choices are limited and behaviour is changed 
in accordance with the possibility of this interference, is enough to render the 
individual as un-free. Fletcher is motivated by a desire to defend a civic moral way of 
life centered on equality and independence, and a desire to keep the threat of 
coercion and arbitrary power out of the lives of the citizens in order to maintain their 
political freedom which in turn maintains their personal freedom, as in Miller’s 
intermarriage of republican and liberal notions of freedom. 358  
 
According to Fletcher, there are only two securities for liberty: the sword 
(power) and the purse. With these two elements in the hands of the people, they are 
free from the threat of arbitrary power and free to participate in public life. The 
monarch, by attempting to impose a standing army, is attempting to take both of 
these securities and, if he succeeds, Scotland might as well give up on its constitution 
altogether.359 The perceived threats from English rule to the constitution and Church 
of Scotland are indicative of Fletcher’s visions for the segregation of the two decision 
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making bodies or parliaments under one crown. Having the monarch reside in England 
is acceptable, having an English government make decisions on behalf of Scotland is 
not. In order to balance the King’s desire for a standing army and the need to provide 
defensive militias when necessary against the threats to the constitution, Fletcher 
proposes a method to transform the militia. Scotland and England would remain 
independent political entities within a federal Britain, and this federal Britain would be 
defended by trained militias providing greater security than any standing army or 
mixed constitution could provide. 360  
 
Standing armies provide the opportunity for an unfair power accumulation and 
arbitrary power; this is against the early modern and contemporary conceptions of 
non-dominance, or freedom from arbitrary power. In Fletcher’s account of 
republicanism, freedom is a central value - a composition of positive and negative 
liberties - freedom from interference of arbitrary rule and freedom to pursue the 
common good by virtuous means. He creates the standard reference for a virtuous 
republic based on equality of citizens and participation in public life. However, he is 
deeply skeptical that this is feasible in the modern political realm where material 
goods and self-interest have corrupted the state. He proposes a model based on self-
governance and federal powers, limiting the power of any one institution whether it is 
the monarchy or parliament, to allow for a republic based on self-governing individuals 
capable of pursuing the interests of the greater society.  
Freedom as non-domination 
As previously discussed, Fletcher proposes several limitations on the crown in 
order to avoid arbitrary power. The parliament of 1703 in which Fletcher was first 
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invited as a member was called to discuss the secession of Queen Anne who had no 
living heirs. The Speeches Made By a Member of Parliament were made at Fletcher’s 
first parliament, this was his first and only opportunity to address the decision makers 
directly, and he did not waste time in bringing to the attention of parliament the issues 
that had been the focus of his active political life to-date, including re-addressing the 
militia and standing army issues, the dire economic situation Scotland was in, and of 
course the more constitutional issues at stake during the negotiations for a Treaty of 
Union: the independence of the Scottish nation, freedom from arbitrary power, limited 
monarchical authority and the rule of law. It is these constitutional issues that highlight 
Fletcher’s commitment to a republican paradigm with evidence of an early modern 
civic-republicanism which includes communitarian and libertarian elements. It is clear 
that Fletcher is not against a monarch but against arbitrary rule and tyranny. His 
conception of freedom has an emphasis on the freedom of the state, not the individual 
within the state, as a solid foundation for the common good; a state based ideal of 
non-interference from outside influence for the benefit of the people working towards 
achieving the common good. Fletcher is not a political philosopher. He does not ask 
the questions his peers were asking regarding the nature of man or his rights and 
duties, rather he is interested in liberty and power, and how one can be obtained in 
the face of the other.  
 
A central tenet of Fletcher’s political theory is his idea of the ideal constitution. 
Fletcher wanted government to be ordered by a system of checks and balances 
provided for by the political accountability of the governing elites in the hands of the 
majority. It is through this political system of checks and balances that Fletcher saw the 
solution to avoiding arbitrary rule and tyranny. If the monarch is to retain his power, 
he must serve the functions of his office and serve the interests of the community. In 
return, the people will obey the laws of civil society. In this way, the ruler is a servant 
of the people. The intention to extend the royal prerogative was one about which 
Fletcher felt particularly concerned. In several of the speeches made to the Parliament 
of 1703 Fletcher discussed the prerogative’s erroneous form. In the third speech in the 
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printed collection Fletcher speaks at great length against the expansion of royal 
privileges in Scotland. ‘Prejudice and Opinion’, he believes,   
‘Govern the World to the great distress and ruin of mankind… These Prejudices 
are yet stronger when they are taken up by great numbers of Men, who confirm in each 
other thro the course of several Generations, and seem to have their Blood tainted, or, 
to speak more properly, their animal Spirits influenc’d by them. Of these Delusions, one 
of the strongest and most pernicious has bin the violent Inclination on many men to 
extend the Prerogative of the Prince to and absolute and unlimited Power’.361  
 
It is in statements such as these that Fletcher’s commitment to a limited 
monarchy becomes most apparent. He is committed to the concept of a mixed 
constitution, and to a system of political accountability based on reciprocal political 
obligations which derive legitimacy through the consent of the subjects. He blames the 
‘speculative doctrine of passive obedience’ for the arbitrary rule of King James VII and 
his attempts to ensure the absolute power of the monarch.362 He argues that James, 
by attempting to remove opposition to his will and attempting to change the 
constitution and laws so that he could ensure his absolute power - and, in so doing, 
eliminating political accountability - gave up his right to rule. It is the subjects’ right to 
resist absolute power; therefore James’ overthrow was not only just, but inevitable. 
Ward suggests that these Lockean philosophical principles were largely ignored by the 
Whigs at the time – resistance, it was argued by Tyrell, was not a right of everyman. 
Only the estates represented in government could provide the legal sanction for 
resistance.363 Radical Whigism was associated with the beheading of Charles II and the 
republic of Cromwell, a failed experiment which had left Englishmen deeply suspicious 
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of republicanism. Despite this, Fletcher and Locke still proposed republican values and 
limited governments.364 
 
In his speeches he proposes a mixed government to avoid the dangers of 
arbitrary rule and partiality; the government and the sovereign must remain separate. 
Administration must be carried out by an executive chosen by election via balloting 
which will in turn limit any unfair influence over the voting procedure. The government 
will also be limited and there will be checks to ensure that it does not become too 
powerful.365 As Robertson points out in his essay Andrew Fletcher’s Vision of Union, 
Fletcher was not vague in his references to the covenanters whose vision of mixed 
monarchy he appeared to be reproducing, setting the crown within rather than above 
the constitution.366 His limitations were recognised as instruments for controlling the 
monarchy in the interest of Scotland, and were neither new nor radical, having been 
inspired by the ancient constitution and the liberties ‘enjoyed by our ancestors’. 
Although Fletcher never suggests abolishing the monarchy, he seeks a constitution 
which limits their input as far as possible within the mixed monarchy framework. 
 
Fletcher recognises that in order for freedom as non-domination to work in the 
case of Scotland and England, the resources of both must be more equal so that 
Scotland may defend itself against England’s potential for domination. The idea of 
voluntarily subjecting Scotland to permanent interference from England is incredible. 
Pettit calls this reciprocal power; if each can defend itself effectively against the 
interference of the other, then it can avoid being dominated by that other.367 
However, the problem of how this equality of defense can be achieved is not easily 
overcome. Pettit suggests that the only defense from arbitrary power in this sense may 
be the recourse to punishment, and this may be what Fletcher had in mind when he 
suggests in his twelfth and final limitation that any monarch found guilty of wielding, 
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or at least attempting to wield arbitrary power can be deposed. 368  Such recourse 
assures a certain (but not exhaustive) amount of immunity from arbitrary power. 
Fletcher’s limitations are intended to guarantee immunity from interference or 
arbitrary power, the only way to guarantee this immunity, is to ensure that it is not 
possible for another to gain the power of interference. It is not enough that one (in 
this case, England) is able to exert arbitrary influence but chooses not to use it; 
Scotland has to be correspondingly powerful.  
 
Fletcher’s limitations, as set out in his speeches, seem to substantiate Pettit’s 
claim that the republican language of freedom is that of non-domination. Not only is 
the monarch to be limited but any attempt to impose arbitrary rule is to be deemed 
illegitimate and the monarch is to be deposed. The arbitrary rule does not necessarily 
imply the imposition of decisions or laws that were against the will or interests of the 
people, arbitrary power for Fletcher, implies that the decisions to be made are at the 
whim of one person or institution without adequate checks or balances. The proposed 
limitations negate the chance of the monarch to impose arbitrary rule, while 
governments are constrained by regular elections and the disbanding of sitting 
parliaments after a certain period of time.  
 
It has been argued that the freedom from non-domination clause in 
republicanism means it is incompatible with democracy. James Bohman suggests, 
however, that it is this cause that supplies the normative warrant for democracy that is 
generally lacking in more liberal version of political cosmopolitanism.369 Freedom as 
non-interference is intuitively innocuous, non-interference in internal affairs should, 
according to Fletcher, be a given rather than something that is necessarily fought for. 
Yet, Fletcher was unable to secure the non-interference in internal affairs for Scotland. 
England had too vested an interest in being able to interfere with the economic 
development of a country that may, as a consequence of that development, interfere 
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with its own economy. Scotland after the Treaty of Union was both dominated by, and 
entirely dependent on, England.  
 
Unlike Pettit, Fletcher does not limit ‘interference’ solely with the effect of laws 
upon an individual’s freedom of choice.370 There is an inherent weakness in Pettit’s 
claims for freedom as non-domination that does not exist in Fletcher’s theory of 
freedom as non-dependence, because for Fletcher there is a clear source of 
domination - the arbitrary use of power and authority, and the subjection of one to a 
position of dependence on the other. Whereas the source of domination for Pettit may 
be unknown and unwitting, the source of domination for Fletcher is obvious, it is the 
attempts of one to make the other dependent upon them and influence their decisions 
based on this dependence. Furthermore, Pettit talks of the domination of the violent 
husband, the emotionally volatile parent, and the teacher who forms arbitrary likes 
and dislikes, amongst others.371 These instances of domination would be quite difficult 
for the state to combat and without accusations of another form of domination – big 
brother or the nanny state. Fletcher overcomes this problem by ensuring the public 
and private realms remain separate. Individual freedom remains the responsibility of 
the individual, achievable by ensuring public liberty. The underlying assumption for 
both Fletcher and Pettit is that public and deliberative participation in political and 
social affairs strengthens both their public and individual freedom, and thus their self-
interests and equality is guaranteed. In this way, freedom is a choice. People can 
choose to enjoy freedom from domination by others if and only if they exercise their 
duties as citizens. It is only through active citizenship that one can be free from the 
domination of others.  
 
Extending this from a Fletcherian model which considers only the male landed 
gentry, to Pettit’s more egalitarian model, Pettit argues, 
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 ‘This does not mean that the people must have actively consented to the 
arrangements under which the state acts. But what it does mean is that it must always 
be possible for people in the society, no matter what corner they occupy, to contest the 
assumption that the guiding interests and ideas are shared and, if the challenge proves 
sustainable, to alter the pattern of state activity’.372 
 
Like Pettit, Fletcher assumes that freedom as non-domination is a social 
property. That it cannot be satisfied outwith the confines of society – the interactions 
of individuals acting in accordance with the public good. Freedom is not an individual 
right, but a public concern. Freedom in this respect has both a negative quality, not to 
be dominated, and a positive attribute of equality in public life. But unlike Pettit, who 
it would seem relies on a Humean principle of self-respect and pride underlying his 
theory of social equality in which the agent wishing to be treated well by others 
attempts to cultivate positive feelings towards himself by doing the right thing, 
Fletcher’s agent recognises the individual gains of the common-good, and that 
freedom needs to be sourced for the group in which the individual resides.  
 
However, Pettit claims that ‘To enjoy non-domination is to be in a position 
where no one has that power of arbitrary interference over me and where I am 
correspondingly powerful’.373 In light of this argument, it appears that the republican 
ideal of freedom as non-domination is inherently unachievable since this presupposes 
that it is possible to eradicate arbitrary power and that the designated authorities will 
observe the common good. Fletcher’s version of non-dependence would go some way 
in resolving this inherent problem. It is based first and foremost on a concept of non-
domination, but with enough lee-way for interference that overcomes the first 
dilemma, at least. Eradication of the arbitrary power is not necessary as long as one is 
not dependent on any arbitrary power, thus in some way eradicating the arbitrariness 
of that power.  
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The most significant problem with contemporary republican theory is that it 
fails to address the salient source of domination – the corrupting influences of money 
and power and economic inequalities which act as a source of domination and 
disempowerment. Fletcher recognises this necessity of economic and political 
equality.374 Inequality, or the existing structures of property and distribution, does not, 
according to Pettit, threaten freedom as non-domination. The fact that there are 
inequalities does not mean that someone is in a dominating position.375 Fletcher 
however, would argue that although there may not be domination but there is 
certainly dependence. Freedom does not exist within such an unequal relationship and 
therefore non-domination alone does not address either the issues of either liberty or 
justice.  
 
Fletcher’s ideal modern republic state, as checked by his limitations was later to 
be taken up by the authors of the Federalist Papers in discussing the main institutional 
forms that they endorse:  
 
‘The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of 
legislative balances and checks; the institutions of courts compose of judges holding 
their offices during good behaviour; the representation of the people in the legislature 
by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their 
principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful 
means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its 
imperfections lessened or avoided.376  
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As Pettit and Tully point out, this approach to freedom was often intertwined with 
jurisprudential and natural law thinking of the commonwealth-men. Fletcher, although 
not explicit in his use of natural rights theories, is happy to follow Locke in using 
natural rights, as Tully puts it, in order ‘to constrain or limit the king or parliament to 
act within a known and recognised constitutional structure of lawfulness: to subject 
their governors to the rule of law by exercising their rights’.377 Perhaps unlike Locke 
and his fellow Whigs, Fletcher was more teleological in practice. For him it was the 
ends that mattered – Scotland being free from dependence on and domination of 
England, and the people being free from arbitrary rule - and not the rules and means 
used to achieve those ends. But Fletcher’s commitment to this teleological approach in 
his practical philosophy is already clear from his often contradictory demands on state 
action. Whereas it is unjust to interfere with the internal affairs of Scotland, it is just 
for the Scottish parliament to interfere with the internal affairs of individuals insofar as 
they have a detrimental impact on the common good of the people. Freedom from 
interference is at a state and not an individual level. Scotland can only be free from 
English dominance if they are free from arbitrary interference from the English 
monarch or parliament and free from any dependence on another. However, despite 
endorsing traditional republican values: rule of law; liberty of non-interference; 
accountability and the separation of powers, the people within that state are not free 
from the arbitrary interference in their own affairs in-so-far as they affect the common 
good.   
 
Republican Rights and Liberty  
Freedom for Fletcher is the freedom from arbitrary rule. As Pettit defines 
freedom – the notion that liberty could only be achieved when others are deprived of 
arbitrary rule.378 According to Pettit, this notion that freedom could only be achieved 
in this way is a central tenet in republican theory and it is crucial to Fletcher’s 
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understanding of freedom. 379  For Fletcher, this republican line of argument means 
one can hope to retain individual freedom from dependence on the will of others if 
and only if one lives as an active citizen of a state that is fully self-governing - neither 
dominating nor dominated. Fletcher does not suggest freedom as non-interference, 
that kind of freedom would cause insecurity and in the case of Scotland, stagnation. He 
has plans for the public morality of Scotland being influenced and structured by the 
state.380  In this way, Fletcher’s theories are the very antithesis of liberal freedom, but 
the republican ideal of civic virtue and the common good providing freedom for all are 
at the heart of his proposition. His suggestion of a militia; compulsory service of all 
young men of eighteen years of age is an excellent example of Fletcher’s belief that 
the moral and economic welfare of his countrymen has to be regulated and provided 
for by the state. Individual freedom is not Fletcher’s main concern, and he endorses 
state interference in the private lives of individuals for the sake of the common good. 
 
The liberal premise of citizenship is that the individual is an ‘unencumbered 
self’ (Sandel) based on a Hobbesian supposition that man is prior to society: ‘consider 
men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like Mushromes) come 
to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other’. 381  Sandel’s 
unencumbered self is reminiscent of Hayek’s freedom from coercion:  
‘No role or commitment could define me so completely that I could not 
understand myself without it. No project could be so essential that turning away from it 
would call into question the person I am. For the unencumbered self, what matters 
above all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but 
our capacity to choose them… what is denied to the unencumbered self is the possibility 
of membership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice… Freed 
from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human subject is 
installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only meanings there are… we are freed 
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to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given. 
And as actual, individual selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unbound 
by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. 382  
 
The idea that unfreedom and political injustice stem from the imposition of one 
person’s will or control over another is common. Fletcher has attempted to outline it 
in the simplest form: freedom from threat of adverse consequences. This is any threat 
that removes an actor’s ability to rightfully believe that certain options are available 
regardless of whether this is a consequence of manipulation, coercion or arbitrary 
interference in the decision and acts of any person - any means of obtaining the 
desired change in belief or circumstance. If the result is a loss of a freedom then the 
individual is subject to domination. During the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries, 
the means of coercion and domination was the standing armies imposed on the 
communities around Britain; those not complying with the demands of the monarch or 
earlier, would find themselves host to the troops who would be stationed there to 
maintain the peace, leaving a long legacy of fear of militaristic dictatorship.  
 
Domination can be overt, as in the case of the imposition of the standing army, 
or a modern dictatorship subverting the rights of the citizens. In these overt cases, the 
coercion and domination is obvious and people have some limited recourse to resist, 
albeit a very violent path to choose. However, in a modern context, some domination 
is not overt and the path to resistance is not obvious. A multi-national company in a 
developing country can be in a dominating position, manipulating the choices of the 
government and the people who rely on the company for their livelihood. If this 
company is polluting the local area with waste from its factories, several local people 
become seriously ill and crops fail, and the community wishes to hold the company 
liable and sue for compensation, what options do the people have? In this example the 
multinational company has the advantage of power; it can make it so that any legal 
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action would have undesirable consequences for the community and for the country. It 
may simply refuse to cooperate and thwart legal proceedings by withholding evidence 
or threatening witnesses, bribing state officials with aid or fiscal benefits. It may 
threaten to withdraw from the region altogether – with disastrous economic 
consequences - and avoid legal action. In this respect, the multinational corporation is 
in a dominant position, removing the people’s ability to change the situation. The 
company need not even deliberately threaten or coerce, its perceived power and the 
reliance of the community on it for economic stability may be enough to dissuade any 
legal action. The community who relies on the company’s good will for their livelihood 
is unlikely to do anything that may provoke bad will, the option to pursue legal action 
and compensation is not available. According to Pettit, this kind of domination is 
currently exercised by corporations and manufacturers with potential for global reach. 
The corporation may never explicitly threaten to remove its business elsewhere, or to 
finance opposition parties to ensure the weak state offers favourable conditions or 
turns a blind eye to environmental infractions. The dominating power is sufficient to 
render threats and reasoning unnecessary.383 
 
When is freedom not liberty? 
In order for the public model to work, the community has to be free from the 
arbitrary rule of a government or monarch. Autonomy in political and economic 
decisions on a local level is vital – it has to be free from the competing interests of 
others. Freedom as non-domination would be an attractive proposition to Fletcher, 
desperate as he was to improve Scotland’s miserable condition. Non-domination 
appeals to his desire not to have to sit and wait for the dictate of a distant, unfriendly 
and competitive government. Pettit rather interestingly suggests that this freedom – 
freedom only achieved by non-domination; the deprivation of arbitrary rule – was 
popular up until citizenship was extended beyond propertied males. It was then 
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impossible to think of freedom as conferring non-domination on women and servants. 
Freedom then had to be reconsidered.384 
 
Laski suggests that liberty means there is no restraint upon those conditions 
which, in modern civilisation, are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness. 
There is no liberty if a dominant opinion can control the social habits of the rest 
without persuading the latter that there are reasonable grounds for the control. The 
paradox of self-government is that certain restraints on freedom are necessary to add 
to individual happiness. No man stands alone, his liberty is never absolute –
‘imposition, broadly speaking, is essential to liberty since it makes for peace; and peace 
is the condition of continued liberty’. 385 ‘A man’s citizenship is the contribution of his 
instructed judgment to the public good, and right action is action upon the basis of 
that judgment’. Political freedom is ‘the participation of men in their choice of 
government, in the process of legislation, and in the control of administration’, derived 
from the concept of groups of men as a whole which gives them ‘collective liberty’;386 
what would commonly be considered republican freedom. But as Hayek points out, to 
choose ones government is not necessarily to secure ones freedom. Political freedom 
is not essential to a free life. 387And as Fletcher shows, private liberty is not necessary 
for political freedom, but political freedom is necessary for private liberty. 
 
Thus, communitarianism emphasizes society's need for strong bonds of 
community, civic virtue, citizenship, and public deliberation about moral issues. It is 
often seen as an alternative to contemporary liberalism, criticizing liberals for overly 
emphasizing doctrines of individual autonomy at the expense of the social allegiances 
necessary for the common good. Fletcher is almost fully advocating the communitarian 
principles when he refers to the traditional republican political theory which taught 
that democratic freedom is accomplished not so much by leaving persons alone as by 
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fostering the virtue it takes to govern according to the common good rather than self-
interest, although he combines it with a very cosmopolitan understanding of moral 
norms. 
 
Fletcher’s account of the mechanisms required to maintain the communitarian 
republic directly challenge those of his liberal contemporaries who were already 
speaking in terms of the individual. H N Hirsch suggest that any challenge to liberalism 
includes a specific challenge to the constitutional values of the liberal order. He argues 
that owing to the contradictory nature of the fundamental values of each, and the 
resistance to liberal theory, communitarians must oppose the liberal constitution. The 
liberal theories of Locke, of whom Fletcher was a great admirer, were being 
popularised at the time of giving his speeches, however Fletcher maintains his position 
that the proper ordering of society is based on communitarian principles of 
community, wider political participation, and socially constructed reason, reciprocity 
and interdependence, the communal realization of values such as freedom, equality, 
and rights. This is a direct contradiction of the liberal values of individual freedom, 
autonomy, and liberal analyses of society. It is only on issues of the rule of law and 
autonomy that Fletcher’s view of the state and the liberal view coincide. Yet there is 
no denying that the liberal view poses the greatest challenge to Fletcher’s fundamental 
political aspirations for the ordering of society.  
 
Fletcher emphasises the commonality of interest: the product of the will of the 
members of that community that is also the will for the good and interests held in 
common. Unlike contemporary communitarian thinkers such as Tönnies, Fletcher does 
not insist on historical ties, as long as the members of the community share common 
concerns and a view of the good.388 Most importantly, Fletcher’s community is not 
limited geographically or territorially, but may be universal in scope to include ‘all of 
mankind’. Of course, he does not believe that politics can be ordered in such a global 
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manner, but morality in international politics recognises the commonality of peoples 
and their desires for the common good.  
 
Fletcher has a clear regard for what is public and private within the polity. 
According to Kukathas this is because a community, distinguished by its shared 
understanding of the public concern, must also recognise the existence of a private 
realm.389 But Fletcher has a very anti-liberal stance on what is considered as legitimate 
matters subject to political deliberation, including personal conduct in public life and 
private: in his militias, young men would be flogged for masturbating; however, what is 
to be decided by each of the polities regarding religion and trade is clearly a private 
matter.390 The public and private realm for Fletcher has been turned on its head. What 
is public is the common good of the individual communities as prescribed in his 
conversation with Musgrave and others, what is private is the that political community 
from the overarching authority of the monarch or the government with regards to 
their movements towards achieving their goods. This early kind of communitarian 
thinking, according to Bell, is because the whole point of communitarian politics is to 
structure society in accordance with people’s deepest shared understandings.391 
 
Republicans took seriously the analogy between the natural and the political, 
‘Just as natural bodies are said to be free if and only if they are moved to act by their 
own wills, so too with political ones. To live in a free state is to live under a 
constitution in which the body politic is never moved to act except by the will of the 
citizen body as a whole’.392 As Van Geldern and Skinner put it ‘the 18th Century 
republicans assumed that the subjection to unchecked power is equivalent to 
servitude’.393 Fletcher is concerned with the interests of the state and the community 
within that state, not any individual. He certainly would not be an advocate of popular 
democracy a la Athens, but does recognise the need for local level political 
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participation. Fletcher assumes the community rather than the individual as the basis 
for his theoretical concept, ascribing value to the community and considering it to be a 
social necessity as well as the basis for political and moral action. As Loewy puts it:  
 
‘Persons are social beings who for that reason have obligations toward each 
other. Autonomy does not exist in a vacuum but is developed, enunciated, and 
ultimately exercised in our common life together. To deny the social nexus of autonomy 
is threatening both to the social nexus and to autonomy. Persons cannot truly be 
persons outside their social nexus or outside their community, and the community 
cannot exist, develop, thrive, and grow without the unique contributions of the 
individuals within it’. 394  
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that Fletcher puts the community before the individual. He places a 
love of his country before a love of mankind. By improving the lot of the state as a 
whole, the condition of the people within would improve as a necessary consequence. 
This does place him outside the realms of cosmopolitan republicanism, which for some 
always places the love of mankind before any love of a country, (Nussbaum), and for 
others sees the primordial community as unable to meet the ambitions and needs of 
the citizens (Waldron). Fletcher emphasises the common or universal aspects of the 
republican ideal, seeing the position of the individual within the overall community of 
the state and of humanity; emphasising the moral and normative aspects that 
connects all humans, namely their rights and their needs. He recognises that citizens 
need some form of common identification in order to provide the basis for a freed and 
equal society based on a local sense of community, identifying needs and sharing the 
burden and rewards.  
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Charles Taylor suggests that this is an example of the importance of an 
Aristotelian particularism within cosmopolitan thinking.395 It is at this point that we see 
Fletcher’s reasoning behind his desire for a Treaty of Union based on equality and 
mutual interest, and the conflict between his communitarian approaches to social 
order within Scotland that are not shared with his approach towards Britain. It must be 
emphasised here that Fletcher was not seeking a universal theory of morality or ethics, 
but rather was interested only in the political order required to bring Scotland out of 
its miserable condition and thus improve the quality of life for the citizens within. 
Fletcher flirts with cosmopolitan idealism in order to give emphasis to society’s need to 
work together to meet the needs of the people, but rejects the same universalism with 
regards to the idea that the interests and activities of individuals were shared by all 
men at all times.  
 
The Speeches Made By a Member of Parliament were made at Fletcher’s first 
parliament, this was his first and only opportunity to address the decision makers 
directly, and he did not waste time in bringing to the attention of parliament the issues 
that had been the focus of his active political life to-date, including re-addressing the 
militia and standing army issues, and importantly, the threat of arbitrary power, the 
dire economic situation Scotland was in, and of course the more constitutional issues 
at stake during the negotiations for a Treaty of Union:  freedom, limited monarchical 
power and the rule of law. It is these constitutional issues that highlight Fletcher’s 
commitment to a republican paradigm with evidence of a civic-humanism which 
includes communitarian and cosmopolitan elements. It is clear that Fletcher is not 
against a monarch but against arbitrary rule and tyranny. His conception of freedom 
has an emphasis on the freedom of the state, not the individual within the state, as a 
solid foundation for the common good - a state based ideal of non-interference from 
outside influence for the benefit of the people working towards achieving the common 
good. Fletcher is not a political philosopher. He does not ask the questions his peers 
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were asking regarding the nature of man or his rights and duties, rather he is 
interested in liberty and power, and how one can be obtained in the face of the other.  
 
Fletcher endorses state interference on the individual at a very profound level. 
The main issue here is the arbitrariness of the interference. Fletcher is objecting to the 
idea that if Scotland is subject to the laws and will of England, it may be the case that 
laws will be imposed by legislators who are not themselves subject to them. Laws are a 
necessary element for freedom, protecting as they do, the individual from arbitrary 
power. In order to highlight this same claim, Pettit makes a clear distinction between 
republican freedom and liberal freedom, that ‘interference as such is a secondary evil 
from the point of view of republican freedom’, the law should be viewed as 
conditioning rather than curtailing freedom.396 The intuitive question is, how can 
interference understood in the negative sense that it impedes in the life of another, be 
seen as a secondary evil to domination? Are they not equally disruptive of liberty? 
Brennan and Lomasky claim, ‘Republican theory is compatible with extensive 
paternalistic control’.397  The emphasis here, however, is on the claim that law 
conditions freedom. The law is not arbitrary, while the biggest threat to freedom is the 
dominating relations in which an agent may find themselves in. The rule of law 
protects the dynamism of republican theory of freedom. Freedom as non-domination 
is considered a common good, a good that all must work to protect through active civic 
participation. In this way, freedom is to be protected from the corruptibility of those in 
power, and extended to the whole of society who can be assured that they are not 
dominated by any arbitrary power.   
 
According to Axtmann, Hobbes and Locke held that ‘the law preserved our 
liberty essentially by coercing other people. It prevents them from interfering with my 
acknowledged rights, helps me to draw myself a circle within which they may not 
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trespass, and prevents me at the same time from interfering with their freedom in just 
the same way’. 398 And in this way, early modern republican theories of liberty are 
more important for a contemporary global political order where interference and 
imposition of international laws are considered essential for the sustainability of that 
order. Locke assumes consent is necessary for men to enjoy equal rights under the law 
of nature; non-one may exert any authority over another except with full consent. This 
consent is also necessary for the formation of government: instituted to protect the 
life and liberties of the subjects. 
 
The end of liberty is a consequence of giving the power of the sword, military 
power (the means of coercion) to the monarch; by controlling the means of coercion, 
the monarch is able to use his power arbitrarily. This power is akin to domination, and 
both liberal and republicans agree, this means the end of freedom. It is coercion and 
arbitrary rule that is the threat to freedom both in the contemporary global political 
order, and the emerging European political order of the late seventeenth-century. 
Hayek, Laski, Pettit, Laborde and Halldenius are arguing the same points some three 
hundred years later: unfreedom is coercion and arbitrary power; having to rely on the 
goodwill of another in the choices that one makes is not freedom, it is dominium, and 
society should function for the common good of the people. Fletcher even considers 
the idea of freedom as non-interference, a contemporary liberal concept. Unlike other 
republican theorists surrounding him, Fletcher’s main concern is a concern for 
freedom, freedom form interference, coercion and arbitrary power. His is a modern 
republican theory which recognises the importance of non-dependence as well as non-
domination, comprehending commerce and economic interdependence and how it is 
set to change the parameters within which politics is theoretically based. 
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Chapter 3. A Republican European Peace  
 
The Fletcherian republican state is indispensible because it exercises publicly 
controlled power – that is, a form of anti-power which is intended to counteract 
domination and secure freedom. The power exercised in a republican state is a 
common power and intractable from the polity.399 The state must take care not to 
become a threat to freedom or an instrument of domination while being charged with 
interfering in the lives of its citizens to ensure the common good. Though, the reverse 
also being true of the citizenry: to ensure limitations are placed on the government to 
avoid domination. Both objectives are achieved through constitutional and legal 
measures and the rule of law. The function of the republican state is to ensure non-
domination, the publicly controlled republican state aims to protect its citizens from 
threats and protect them against domination while providing the platform in which 
they ensure their private liberties through exercising their political freedoms. In order 
to protect the liberty of the citizens, the state must also regulate the economic and 
other activity of powerful individuals and groups within society, including the role and 
function of the governing body itself. When it operates with a view to the common 
good of the state, the republican state does not cause the freedom of its residents, it 
constitutes it. It is this recognition that citizens are members of a republican state with 
well-functioning institutions that enables the citizenry to conclude they are free from 
the domination of arbitrary power and coercion. The early modern civic-republican 
theories of Fletcher allow for such interdependent relationships; what is most 
important in the civic society is the common good, and if that must mean a limit on 
certain freedoms then it is the republics responsibility to the people to do so, and the 
people’s responsibility to give up their rights to individual liberties for the greater 
good. The political order that he envisages sees the role of the republican government 
as being the transformation of politics to the international view of the good. He is 
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concerned by the processes by which the state and the people arrive at a conception 
of the common good, and in what shape politics takes to achieve it.  
  
Freedom as non-domination is best pursued through this Fletcherian model of 
a republican state, as the current global political order gives us reason to think of 
freedom as non-domination. The state is no longer the only actor within the domestic 
sphere and non-state actors threaten the security of non-domination. Many decisions 
made globally can have profound effects locally and places individuals and states in a 
position of vulnerability. An argument exists in favour of finding ways to extend the 
concept of freedom as non-domination beyond the state. Yet this in itself runs into 
dangerous territory; it is not possible to demand or defend the importance of liberty as 
non-domination for one group at the expense or denial of the same freedoms for 
another. Intervention and interference puts some at risk of political and economic 
domination therefore, the idea of liberty as non-domination is discursively admissible 
in a global context as it can refer to the whole population (unlike in the eighteenth-
century) and has a broad appeal; citizens having a clear interest in it.  
 
According to Skinner, the contractarian places individual rights before civic 
duties whereas the republican claims that one’s rights are a result of being a member 
of a civic community, grounded in the duties and virtues of the citizens.400 John 
Charvet denies the distinction between rights and duties based theories is clear cut, 
questioning the validity of systematically aligning contractarianism and republicanism 
in direct opposition to one another, citing Rousseau as an example of a contractarian-
republican.401 Skinner defines the positive and negative concepts of freedom, negative 
freedom is said to be an opportunity concept of freedom, one is still free whether or 
not he uses his power to act or not. Positive freedom, on the contrary, is an exercise 
concept of freedom and states that a person is only free if he exercises his power to 
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act. 402  This positive conception is concomitant with the republican tradition of 
freedom which places political action/civic virtue at the centre of its theory of liberty – 
freedom as the power of self-determination. The early modern republican theory of 
liberty relies on certain conditions under which people can act freely in pursuit of their 
interests, these conditions can be characterised as the rule of law. It is the rule of law 
that prevents interference in an individual’s interests (again, stressed that it is not an 
individualistic/libertarian view of individual interests, but a common approach to the 
individual acting in accordance with the common good, interference would not be 
from other individuals per se, but rather arbitrary powers). The republican regime in 
which the people practice their civic duties best promotes the rule of law.403  It curbs 
the abilities of those wishing to dominate others and provides the security of liberty 
and interests of all concerned parties by providing the opportunity for each to pursue 
his security through a common system of laws.  
 
Freedom from fear, according to Fletcher, can only be guaranteed within the 
rule of law. A sovereign power also controlled within the law is unable to coerce or act 
in such a way as to remove the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law guarantees 
respect for the freedom of the people, and the inability for power to be used 
arbitrarily or abusively. Haldenius suggests that it is this capacity of the freeman to act 
according to his own will without fear of obstruction or interference that is the basis 
for rights within the republican paradigm. To be entitled to act freely, without 
vulnerability, is what is ordinarily meant by having a right; there is ‘structural affinity’ 
between republican freedom and claims about rights. 404  Haldenius writes that 
‘republican freedom adds a substantial element to a justification of human rights in 
terms of entitlement, rather than mere satisfaction of interests, a satisfied interest is 
not a satisfied right if the satisfaction is dependent on personal goodwill and can be 
withdrawn at any time’.405  
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The rule of law is a central tenet of the republican ideal; it is a necessary 
safeguard against the abuse of power by government. Machiavelli was the first to 
break away from the scholastic tradition to challenge the divine origins of medieval 
hierarchical order; to claim power was derived from God was both absurd and 
blasphemous. Hobbes quite famously claims that the sovereign is not bound by the 
law as it is impossible for any person to be bound by himself, ‘because he that can bind 
can release’.406 The sovereign is the supreme law maker and the sole source of right 
and wrong, for ‘it is not wisdom but authority that makes laws’ ‘because covenants 
without swords are but words and no strength at all’.407 Fletcher was exposed to 
Hobbes and this way of thinking – popularised by James I who attempted to claim 
absolute power on the basis of his divine providence – but Fletcher emphasises the 
impersonal nature of the state, separating it from those who exercise its powers, 
namely the king. The validity of the crown and the government rests solely on the 
ability to promote certain ends: it is the duty of the people to overthrow those 
exercising arbitrary power, as the tyrant no longer has legitimacy. His proposal for a 
government elected on a yearly basis does not have the opportunity to accumulate 
powers that they can exercise arbitrarily.408 Both the duty to obey and the duty to 
overthrow a tyrant or arbitrary power are derived from the same source – the 
common good. Fletcher’s proposed limitations are an attempt at a form of written 
constitution emphasising the rule of the law and the fundamental maxim that all are 
equal under the law.409 ‘Nothing can be more absurd than to say, that one man has an 
absolute power above law to govern according to his will, for the people’s good, and 
the preservation of their liberty: For no liberty can subsist where there is such a 
power’.410 
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Up until the 17th century, the idea of a universal monarchy was popularised by 
the likes of Dante Alighieri (Convivio and Monarchia) and the personal ambitions of 
European Monarchs, especially France and Spain. Drawing on Aristotle’s premise that 
humanity stems from a shared purpose, Dante argues that peace is the vital condition 
of the human purpose, and can only be achieved if humanity is united. ‘Every kingdom 
divided against itself shall be laid to waste’ therefore, ‘there must be ‘one person who 
directs and rules mankind, and he is properly called “Monarch” or “Emperor”’.411 In 
Convivia he argues that this is achievable only if ‘the whole earth and all that humans 
can possess be a monarchy, that is, one government under one ruler. Because, he 
possesses everything, the ruler would not desire to possess anything further, and thus, 
he would hold kings contentedly within the borders of their kingdoms, and keep peace 
among them’.412 The concept of universal monarchy had its origin in the Roman 
Empire, and was appropriated by the papacy. Emperor Charles V took up the idea, 
combining the titles of Holy Roman Emperor, King of Spain and Archduke of Austria, as 
well as titles in Burgundy, Castile and Aragon, Mexico and Peru. Charles’ tutor was a 
student of Dante and he believed his universal monarchy was a fulfilment of God’s 
wishes for him to be the saviour of Christendom.  
 
This ideal fuelled the ambitions of later potential universal monarchs, from the 
Hapsburgs throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, through the Thirty Years War (1618-
1648) and the Glorious Revolution in Britain in 1689.413 The main protagonists of the 
Thirty Years War, France and Spain especially, desired domination of the entire 
Christian world.414 Kampman suggests that this desire for universal monarchy was 
driven through fear; the ambitions of each party were never openly articulated, but 
assumed by the other.415  The desire for control was fuelled by a desire not to be 
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controlled rather than a desire for absolute power.  It is this fear of domination that 
drives conflict and is, according to Fletcher amongst many others, the cause of 
militarism, dominance and empire building.416  
 
Two theories concerning the authority and origins of governments 
predominated in political debate during this time.  Support for each theory was 
dependent on the motivations and requirements of their advocates.  As a consequence 
of the civil disorder, rebellions, wars and oppressions of the previous century, stability 
of the state became the central concern for politics.  The political theories of the time 
were dominated by the contrasting themes of universal and absolutist monarchs 
against limited government ideals.  Both drew heavily on ideas of contract, on one side 
to prove the absolute right of the sovereign and on the other to demonstrate the 
subjects’ right to resist. 417 The Thirty Years War (1619-148) saw the European states 
vying for control and supremacy throughout Europe. Absolutism was most readily 
established in France: Louis XIII subdued the Huguenots and harnessed Catholic 
militarism to serve the monarchy, and, following a temporary setback caused by the 
Fronde, the latter half of the century saw a ‘golden age’ of royal absolutism under 
Louis XIV who promoted raison d’état as the highest law when dealing with subjects 
and other states. 418  Elsewhere, absolutism continued to flourish; in Denmark the 
Danish Estates were closed down in 1660 and in Sweden in 1680 constitutional reform 
effectively established absolutism.  Meanwhile, in England, attempts to establish royal 
absolutism were attempted several times and only averted by the execution of one 
king and the deposition of another. 
 
Despite the reasons or arguments in favour of universal and absolute monarchy 
that were common in the 16th and early 17th centuries, the post-Westphalian system of 
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small sovereign states saw its popularity wean. Efforts were made across Europe to 
prevent France and Spain from establishing a universal monarchy. Charles D’avenant, 
writing ‘An Essay upon Universal Monarchy’, a response to Philip De Bourbon being 
settled on the throne in Spain, warns of the dangers of allowing the major powers of 
Europe to make making further gains: ‘ I will venture to say from the time of the 
Norman Invasion, we never had a more dismal view before us; we are rent asunder by 
Factions, and are threatened with Attempts from abroad... we shall suspect, and not 
without Reason, that ever Step which increases the Strength of France, leads towards 
our Ruin.419 
 
  Pufendorf saw universal monarchy as the threat of French Catholic dominance 
across Europe.420 Even the staunchest supporter of absolute sovereignty, Thomas 
Hobbes, recognised the benefits of a plurality of states, ‘because states uphold the 
Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from the international state of nature, 
that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men’.421 Fletcher and Hobbes 
anticipate the development of international law between sovereign states; Fletcher 
however, goes further in his development of the idea, drawing up a model of a federal 
system based on equality and cooperation among states. Fletcher’s model involves 
dividing Europe into ten sovereign states, each with ten or twelve fortified sovereign 
cities, ensuring conquest was neither possible nor desirable: ‘*A+‘conquest divided into 
twelve parts would be of little account, they could not be made adjacent to the several 
cities to which they ought to belong’. He outlines the benefits of his republic of 
republics in his conversation with Sir Edward: 
  
‘But, said he, such conquered places might be governed in common to the 
advantage of the whole union. That, replied I, would be like a possession in common, 
for which no man has any particular affection, and on that account lies always 
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neglected’. But you talk, said Sir Edw-rd, of sovereign cities; I fancy you mean republics; 
which is nothing to us, who live under the benign influence of monarchy. You may 
suppose those cities, said I, to be the capitals of sovereign and independent kingdoms 
or countries. For of such sovereignties united under one monarch we have many 
examples. And the prince may either keep his court in each of them successively; or, 
which is better, reside in the country, and permit no more buildings about his palaces 
than are absolutely necessary for his domestics, and the dispatch of public business, 
and not to harbour a crew of lazy, profligate, and vicious wretches, fit only to render his 
court a mere sink of corruption, and a seminary to propagate all manner of vice 
through the whole nation. So that we may proceed to reason concerning the excellency 
of those governments, which consist of divers sovereignties united for their common 
defense, whether cities or kingdoms; whether independent already, or to be made so in 
order to put such a design in execution; whether governed by a prince, or by a great 
council of delegates. But certainly, said he, if these distinct sovereignties were 
incorporated under one head and city, such a government would be of greater force. If 
you mean, said I, to disturb their own peace, and that of their neighbours, I grant your 
assertion’. . . You must acknowledge, said I, that a great city is more tumultuous and 
disorderly, and therefore more capable of disturbing its own peace than small ones, 
and much more violently inclined to conquer other countries, because better able to 
retain the conquest. But sure, said he, if divers small sovereignties were united under 
one prince, his authority would better preserve peace among them, than if they were 
governed by a council of delegates, which in my opinion is only proper to set them 
together by the ears. I am very glad, said I, that you think such united governments 
more suitable to monarchies than to commonwealths; for if that be true, there will be 
greater hopes of introducing them into the world. And indeed a prince seems much 
more fitted to be at the head of such a league, than a council, as to the military part, in 
which principally such a union has occasion to exert its power. So that I have nothing 
more to do than to prove that such governments are of all others the best to preserve 
mankind, as well from great and destructive wars, as from corruption of manners, and 
most proper to give to every part of the world that just share in the government of 
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themselves which is due to them. If you can prove, said Sir Chr—, what you undertake, I 
shall have no more to say. It is indeed, said I, a most surprising thing to me, that not 
only all those who have ever actually formed governments, but even those who have 
written on that subject, and contrived schemes of constitutions, have, as I think, always 
framed them with respect only to particular nations, for whom they were designed, and 
without any regard to the rest of mankind. Since, as they could not but know that every 
society, as well as every private man, has a natural inclination to exceed in everything, 
and draw all advantages to itself, they might also have seen the necessity of curbing 
that exorbitant inclination, and obliging them to consider the general good and interest 
of mankind, on which that of every distinct society does in a great measure depend. 
And one would think that politicians, who ought to be the best of all moral 
philosophers, should have considered what a citizen of the world is’.422 
 
Both Rousseau and Kant envisaged a similar peace achievable through a system 
of states. Rousseau envisaged his Social Contract as a solution to war; enabling the 
establishment of well governed societies in which human beings would realise their full 
moral and rational potential. 423  Kant took this further with his system of an 
international state made up of republican states. According to Kant, republican states 
that, through the constitution, representative government and the rule of law, 
guarantee the freedom and equality of citizens are less likely to engage in war.424  
 
Where interests compete, and values create tension, Hobbes argues the only 
way to ensure equitable and fair laws to settle the issue, is to have laws that are 
drafted by individuals under the reverence of a sovereign who was himself above the 
law. ‘All laws written and unwritten, have need of Interpretation’, and due to the 
controversial nature of some interpretation, the sovereign’s word must be final. Of 
course, Fletcher has argued several times already that the rule of law must apply to 
the sovereign because the sovereign himself is fallible and subject to partialities. The 
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only way to ensure equitable and fair laws for Fletcher is to ensure the decision-maker: 
in this case the sovereign, is himself subject to the laws and subject to the scrutiny of 
his peers.425 The limitations would reduce this authority by placing the monarch on the 
same level as the parliament: the monarch would require parliament’s permission to 
raise taxes or declare war, and would have no choice but to pass laws on behalf of the 
parliament – reducing the law-making aspect of the monarchical role to merely 
procedural. Fletcher wishes to subdue the power of the sovereign, and limit the 
amount of interference the parliament and its ministers could have in the non-state 
matters - what Fletcher sees as the private matters of the individual: the economic 
development of the state through private enterprise and non-interference in 
international trade. 426  The political theory of Fletcher flourished during a time 
characterised by acute social, economic, political and cultural conflict and turbulence.  
The conflicts and divisions of the era are apparent throughout the prevailing theories 
of the period and these ideas were used as weapons in the struggle for political power 
and control.  As such, the theorists were rarely neutral commentators of the political 
battles, their works were a response intended to influence the outcome.   
 
This was a turbulent period in British politics. Religion and politics were 
inextricably linked as a consequence of the Reformation and the Union of the Crowns.  
The Stuarts’ fragile reign over both Scotland and England exacerbated the 
religious/political debate; as a single monarch ruled over two countries each with 
opposing religious beliefs which demanded the allegiance of their King to their religion.   
Whig politicians, like the Earl of Shaftsbury, were keen to ensure that James, Charles 
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II’s Catholic brother, could not become heir to the English throne.  However, Charles 
was keen to ensure that the Stuart reign continued and he refused to exclude James 
from the succession.  Shaftsbury’s opposition to James resulted in him being tried for 
treason in 1682, and fleeing to the Netherlands where he died the following year.  
Although Locke was no longer in residence with Shaftsbury, he was still associated with 
him and as a consequence his movements were monitored very closely for evidence of 
sedition or treason.   
 
 The ‘Glorious Revolution’, labelled the most remarkable and successful 
effort in political control, left a legacy which deepened the understanding of the 
substance of power within Seventeenth Century England. 427 The radical ideas of Locke 
were not in isolation: publications expounding Lockean ideas contributed to the 
political debate that influenced the Bill of Rights, and although these radical ideas did 
not prevail, they played a major role in the political reform which followed the 
revolution.428 In the year following Locke’s Two Treatises, the original contract was 
cited in the case against James II by the Convention Parliament: 
‘that King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of 
the Kingdom by breaking the Original Contract between King and People, and by the 
Advice of Jesuits and other wicked Persons, having violated the fundamental Laws, and 
having withdrawn Himself out of the Kingdom, has abdicated the Government; and 
that the Throne is thereby vacant’.429 
 
This statement sets out three examples of how the king has failed to uphold his 
part of the original contract and has therefore forfeited his right to the throne. 
Constitutional integrity and reform were crucial issues within Seventeenth Century 
political debate and the theory of contract was the theory most commonly presented 
as the solution.  Because the populace only swore allegiance to the monarch after he 
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had taken the coronation oath, their allegiance was contingent on this oath and the 
king’s commitment to the constitution.  As there was an exchange of oaths, there was, 
in some form, a contract.  Because this contract existed, mutual obligations existed.  
Obligations to the king were contingent on his performance of his duties as taken upon 
himself by swearing to the coronation oath.  Therefore, subjects had a right not to 
perform their duties once the monarch had ceased performing his.   
 
The discovery of The Rye House Plot – the conspiracy to kidnap and kill both 
Charles and James - led by the foremost members of the former ‘Shaftsbury Circle’ 
resulted in those members, including Algernon Sidney, being tried for treason and 
executed.  Sidney’s political treatise ‘Discourses Concerning Government’, questioning 
the ‘Divine Right’ of kings and arguing for a limited monarchy, was used in the 
prosecution case against him.430  Locke himself was at that time composing a similar 
treatise and, although not directly involved with the plot, he came under more 
suspicion and fled to the Netherlands in 1683.  It was during this time that Locke 
composed his Two Treatises.  He returned to England in 1689, after the Revolutionary 
Settlement of 1688 which removed James II from his disastrous three year reign and 
put the Protestant William of Orange and his wife Mary, eldest daughter of James, on 
the throne in 1689. This was fortunate for Locke, as a philosopher and political thinker 
in the sense that his political ideas and opinions were at last shared with the winning 
side in the political transformations and, as a consequence, his political ideas 
continued to be influential for many years.  This placed Locke in the fortunate position 
of being able to speak freely for the first time without fear of punishment or 
recrimination.   
 
Locke, like Hobbes and Grotius before him, relies on a theory of consent to 
elucidate the contractual obligations between ruler and subject.  Where Locke differs, 
however, is in his assertion that consent is explicit.  Man is not born into the subjection 
of a state or ruler, rather he subjects himself when he gives consent; it is through their 
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mature will that ‘the consent of free-born men born under government’ is given.431  
Man cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another because he is bound to 
preserve himself, therefore he cannot consent to be destroyed at the whim of 
someone else.  This, according to Locke, prevents people from contracting themselves 
into an arbitrary or absolute government.432  Therefore, any absolute government is 
illegitimate as it cannot be based on the consent of the subjects.  As with slavery, man 
cannot transfer that which he does not have: we have no right to destroy ourselves, 
we are the property of God, and therefore we cannot consent to this right being 
transferred to another.433 
  
Fletcher uses concepts of political obligation based on consent and legitimacy 
that are very similar to those of Locke.  The government has an obligation to preserve 
its subjects and society and it does this through the establishment of laws.  
‘The laws are the only security we have for our lives and properties, which if our 
sovereign subverts, subjects cannot be blamed, for making use of the ordinary means 
to preserve them, and since this cannot be done without withdrawing obedience from 
such a magistrate as goes about to destroy them, such an act cannot properly be said 
to punish him, (because we take nothing from him which he has a just claim), but do 
only shun the occasion of making ourselves miserable.434 
 
The withdrawal of consent is not required; the monarch has lost his legitimacy 
by ruling unjustly.  This suggests that consent is tacitly given on condition of the just 
conduct of both subject and sovereign.  Fletcher puts forward the theory that political 
authority requires the consent of the citizens of the state, and that this consent is 
conditional on the fulfillment of mutual political obligations, especially the political 
obligations of the monarch, and therefore some form of social contract must exist 
between the government and the governed.  No-one has the right to political 
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authority; no-one has the right to obedience, nor is anyone obliged to yield to political 
authority in the absence of a social contract.  Fletcher’s theory concerning this social 
contract is motivated by purely practical considerations.  He wishes to prevent the 
monarch from achieving absolute power and exercising it arbitrarily.   
 
Hayek claims arbitrary power is diametrically opposed to the rule of law. 435 A 
well-ordered society needs clear and general rules and laws to ensure the maximum 
freedom possible without infringing on the freedom of others; A ‘highway code’ 
allowing people to drive around without accident, not an order where to go.436 This is 
where the distinction between law and legislation becomes important. For Hayek, law 
is a system of general rule; legislation is the commands of the sovereign. Whereas an 
army may need legislation – direct orders for the achievement of clearly defined goals, 
society has no such goals and therefore requires only law to allow them to achieve 
their individual goals without interference from others. The rule of law is the primacy 
of law over legislation, allowing citizens the freedom from the arbitrary will and 
demands of the sovereign and the opportunity to pursue their own good; as in Fletcher 
there is a common purpose.   
 
Between 1688 and 1698 Fletcher wrote several pamphlets from a civic 
republican position which suggested ways to improve Scotland’s condition in Europe. 
Two of these pamphlets: Two Treatise Concerning the Government of Scotland and the 
Discorso Della Cosa di Spagna are particularly concerned with the balance of power in 
Europe, the federal relationship of Scotland and England and the rights and nature of 
man. In his 1703 composition, An Account of a Conversation concerning a Right 
Regulation of Government for the common Good of Mankind, Fletcher makes a 
profound shift from Machiavellian civic republicanism, introducing themes of 
international justice, perpetual peace based on mutual economic and commercial 
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interests, and a balance of power within Europe along federal lines.437 He proposes 
radical restructuring of both domestic and international political and economic 
systems in order to redistribute wealth from the corrupt city centres and to organise 
the nations of Europe into roughly equivalent military alliances.  
 
Fletcher suggests a model for a global political order using themes of civic 
republicanism and federal organisation of Europe to maintain the balance of power 
and prevent hegemonic domination and injustice. This model is suited to both the 
international order of the emerging modern political system and the contemporary 
global model. Fletcher’s civic republicanism is very much based on the Greek ideal that 
a republic is a political system designed and augmented by the citizens, through 
maximum participation. He improves on the theories of Machiavelli and the early 
modern republicans and modernises early modern republican theory by considering 
commerce as a motivational factor in political decisions. He refuses to be limited by a 
notion of the autonomy of states as the foundation upon which global order is built, 
suggesting a peace based on a balanced system of cooperation and interdependence. 
Fletcher moves away from early modern Machiavellian republican theory in an 
attempt to modernise his ideas, bringing in the themes of commerce and cooperation 
which is sorely lacking in the theories of Machiavelli and Harrington. Deudney would 
recognise this as an attempt at overcoming the republican dilemma; how to become 
both a large and secure while being free and republican.438 According to Deudney, the 
main problem facing international relations theories is the current domination of 
realist and liberalist theories that are unable to account for the increase in 
interdependence in a global system. In order to make room for globalization, the 
western political tradition must return to its original republicanism.  
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This chapter will examine Fletcher’s original republicanism and his civic 
republican model for international relations as put forward in his Account of a 
Conversation, Two Treatise and his Discorso Della Spagna, paying particular attention 
to his theory and understanding of International Relations. It will be divided into two 
major themes and there constituent parts. Theme one will focus on the domestic 
politics with regards to Scotland and England and Fletcher’s desire for a 
decentralisation of power and an equal union between the two nations. Theme two 
will be an examination of Fletcher’s International Relations theory, including issues 
surrounding the Spanish Succession crisis, the balance of power in Europe and 
concepts of international order and peace based on the theoretical framework and 
examples available to him - as found in the aforementioned texts. This chapter will 
show that Fletcher has a contribution to make to contemporary republican and 
international political theory; that he had a mature idea of international relations while 
the concept itself was still in its infancy. It argues that Fletcher developed a federal 
system for international peace based on an early model of the balance of power 
system, proving that Fletcher is an important republican thinker whose ideas are 
significant to an understanding of contemporary International Politics.  
 
By examining Fletcher’s discourses concerning international political structures, 
and his theories concerning the balance of power and just war, Fletcher’s modern 
understanding of international politics can be seen. Fletcher’s theory goes beyond the 
concept of single state autonomy and sovereignty, bunching states together in an 
international and interdependent arena and recognising a system of states as the 
fundamental anchor for a long lasting peace. He shifts further from the prominent 
seventeenth-century liberal theories, placing the state as the principal component and 
not seeing it purely in terms of individuals. Fletcher is a significant figure in the political 
development of enlightenment scholars, and is an important addition to any 
international relations canon of political theory.  
Balance of Power and Federal Power in Europe 
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‘It is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory 
of his native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and 
consider Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost 
the same level of politeness and cultivation. The Balance of Power will continue to 
fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be 
alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our 
general state of happiness, the system of arts and laws, and manners, which so 
advantageously distinguish, above the rest of Mankind, the Europeans and their 
colonies.’439 
 
When the Act of Security failed, and the Union was set to go ahead with only 
marginal limitations placed on the Monarchy with regards to parliament, Fletcher 
wrote a critique of incorporating unions and extended this to include his federal vision 
of Europe and Scotland and England’s places in it - An Account of a Conversation 
Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of Mankind.440 
 
European politics at the turn of the seventeenth-century was very much in 
transition. Commerce had become a reason of state and war ‘a constant trade to live 
by’. 441  The neglect of Scotland’s economic affairs continued throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and economically; Scotland was in a poor 
position vis-a-vis England. It depended on trade with the continent, France and 
Holland; however, once united under James VI&I, England’s wars with Scotland’s’ 
trading partners had a further negative impact on its already weakened economy. 
Duties were increased and trade became much less than it had formerly been.442 As 
Fletcher notes, war had become a trade to live by, the golden ball, for which all nations 
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contend and Scotland simply could not keep up.443 Trade was necessary for income 
and defense, as the wars of France and the Spanish Succession Crisis clearly 
demonstrated, the new international system was founded on warring nations vying for 
advantage in the marketplace; a zero-sum competition. According to Hont, the need of 
modern warfare created an ever increasing demand for finance on a scale that could 
not be met by the expedients of the past.444 Commerce as a reason of state highlighted 
the need to protect Scotland from aggressive neighbours. Fletcher recognised 
Scotland’s potential – with an abundance of natural resources, harbours and access to 
the seas of Europe, which only through neglect had not been developed to its full 
potential and through the neglect of its monarch it had been left to deteriorate to its 
current deplorable condition. 
 
In his Discorso Della cosa di Spagna, Fletcher affirms that the balance of power 
in Europe is under serious threat from France and the crisis of the Spanish Succession. 
Fletcher’s intentions are clear, he wants to show what caused the decline of the 
Spanish empire and introduce measures for its recovery. His main motivation is to 
warn the international community that whomsoever is to attain the crown following 
the death of the current king, will be in a position to disrupt the fragile balance of 
power in Europe and make himself the ‘lord of the world’, a universal monarch who 
has the power to disrupt the interests of all others. This is with particular reference to 
Louis XIV’s aggressive territory building campaign throughout Western Europe. The 
Discorso isn’t intended as an authoritive piece on the crisis, merely a further opinion to 
add to the conversation, a conversation aimed at enabling decision-makers to make 
better choices. According to Fletcher the right decision was one that was aimed at 
containing Louis XIV’s ambitions. 
 
At the time of writing the Discorso della Cosa di Spagna in 1698, France had laid 
claim to the Spanish throne through Louis XIV’s wife, the sister of Charles II who had 
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abdicated her right to the Spanish crown on her marriage to Louis. Louis denied that 
her abdication was legitimate and campaigned for her right to succeed, and his right to 
become consort. Most of Europe, including Charles II of Spain, The Holy Roman 
Emperor Leopold I, and William III of Britain, was in agreement that Louis must not 
succeed. Moreover, it could be argued that William’s greatest legacy was his ability to 
restrain the hegemonic ambitions of France. Throughout the 1670s Louis had led 
France into aggressive military campaigns through Europe and during the 1680s his 
territorial desires were sought through the ‘Reunions’: his lawyers scoured treaties 
that France had been involved in for evidence of France’s claims to territory in Flanders 
and Germany. In 1683, the Treaty of The Hague was agreed by the Dutch and the 
Swedish, the association later expanded to include the Holy Roman Emperor who 
wanted his son to succeed to Spain’s throne, and Charles II. This was an attempt to 
restrain the French militaristic and political might by re-establishing the frontiers 
agreed to in 1648 and 1678. However, war in Vienna took Leopold’s attention 
elsewhere and the association failed, having to concede to France’s Reunion claims.  
 
Fletcher was by his own admission more concerned with the affairs of his own 
country before any other considerations, however, he was conscious of Scotland’s 
place within Europe and the effects the Spanish succession would have on the country 
both politically and religiously; James VII and II having been a Catholic ally of Louis XIV 
and now living in exile in France. Fletcher’s idea for a federal union was based on the 
premise that small independent states could not subsist within the British Isles and 
would be unable to compete for trade or in war with the larger European nations. A 
hegemonic power has the ability to exert, according to Pettit, the most powerful kind 
of alien control – the ability to influence the choices without the need for any overt 
manipulation or interference: A controls B by always maintaining the possibility to 
interfere should B make decisions which it may not approve of. In this regard, B 
maintains a show of independence, avoiding internal conflicts or external 
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condemnation.445 And this is exactly what would happen in Europe if Louis was able to 
dominate by succeeding to the Spanish throne.  
 
Fletcher’s fears for the fragile balance of power in Europe, exacerbated by the 
threat of a standing army in Britain that would cause other European states to fear the 
threat of attack and themselves build forces or pre-eminently strike, was the threat of 
Louis XIV of France gaining control of the Spanish kingdom and all its territories posed 
a much greater threat. In order to highlight the dangers that the Spanish succession 
crisis threatened, Fletcher clearly spells out the best tactical way for each interested 
party – the Princes of Europe – to take Spain by disrupting the balance of power within 
Europe and shifting allies. He sets out the behaviour required for the Princes to obtain 
Spain, the advantages Spain would bring to them, and the opposition they would face 
and how to overcome it. ‘I do not speak of the right of succession, leaving that to the 
Doctors of Laws; nor am I concerned with what princes ought to do, which is for the 
Divines to teach; I am speaking of what princes have and always will do, which is, by 
any means, wherever they can, to enlarge their kingdom by occupying neighbouring 
provinces’.446 
 
In order to avoid the misery of war, Fletcher proposes a peaceful system of 
international order where society would be constituted in such a way as ‘would be no 
less advantageous to our neighbours that ourselves’, ‘instead of framing governments 
with regard only to a single society’.447 By recognising that the interests of each society 
are the same, war can be avoided as long as there is equality and justice. Like in a 
Hobbesian state of nature, international society can only maintain peace if each agrees 
not to take advantage from the others. The advantage of this system would be based 
on reciprocal arrangements of what is just – if I take from you I am justifying others to 
do the same and to take from me.  
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Fletcher’s proposal is simple. All nations should be rendered either incapable or 
unfit for conquest by decentralising the power sources. By dividing Europe into ten 
distinct alliances:  
 
‘God and nature seemed to have marked out certain portions of the world for 
several great society of men; having divided them from each other by seas and 
mountains, or some remarkable difference if the soil and climate. The island of Britain 
and that of Ireland seem conveniently situated for one government: Spain and Portugal 
for another, because they lie together in one compact body, and are divided from the 
rest of Europe by the Pyrenan mountains. In like manner France is contained within the 
Alpes, Jura, the Voge, the Ardennes and the Pyrenees. Italy is separated from all other 
parts by the Alpes; and the three adjacent islands seem naturally to belong to that low 
country. The seventeen Provinces, the circles of Westphalia and lower Saxony, with the 
archbishoprick of Cologn and kingdom of Denmark, seem commodiously places to be 
united under one government. The rest of Germany, with the Swiss Cantons, and the 
provinces that le between those countries and the Adriatic sea, might very well 
compose another. Norway, Sweden Finland, Liefland, and the northern parts of 
European Muscovy, lying under the same climate, may be conveniently joined together. 
Poland, Prussia,, Lithuania, and the southern parts of the European Muscovy, with the 
little Tartary, might likewise be properly united. The countries that lie to the north of 
Macedonia and Albania, and on the south of the Carpathian mountains, from Austria, 
Stiria and Carniola to the Euxin sea, might be a ninth distinct government, and 
Macedonia, Albania, Thessaly, Epirus , Achaia, Morea, Negropont, Candia, and the 
adjacent islands a tenth’. 448 
 
Within each of these distinct districts there would be ten or twelve sovereign 
cities, fortified and equipped to defend itself and its nearest neighbour, thus rendering 
attempts at conquest impractical, ‘a conquest divided into twelve parts would be of 
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little account, they could not be made adjacent to the several cities to which they 
ought to belong’. In order to exemplify the utility of this union of unions, Fletcher drew 
on the Tuscan and Greek city states whose arrangements could be seen in the 
contemporary examples of the Swiss Confederation and the Netherlands. The union of 
unions that Fletcher is here proposing is an extension of his proposals for a balance of 
power in Europe during the Spanish succession crisis. 
 
Fletcher bases his federal framework for Europe and Britain on the balance and 
participation of a civic republic, providing the basis for security and peace across 
Europe. His distinct sovereign city states would balance the power within each union, 
ensuring none could rise to any significant power at the expense of the other, whereas 
the localised authorities would reduce the social decay caused by large concentrated 
populations. These self-governed areas would have territorial integrity and be 
responsible for all the political decisions made within that province, albeit on a smaller 
scale than the self-determined political units we recognise in contemporary politics. 
Whether we can apply a similar model to contemporary politics is under question. 
Deudney is apprehensive of balancing theories, ‘internal balancing’ might weaken 
interior balances’, centralising the decision making structures and isolating the state 
and limiting cooperation externally, but he also recognises that with the advent of 
globalisation, ‘various forms of union (alliances, leagues, confederations and 
federations)’ may be necessary.449 What Deudeny terms co-binding, Fletcher would 
call balancing of power. It is only when republics join together in a mutually beneficial 
pact that they can sufficiently secure their positions without undermining the internal 
balance and freedom. Where Deudney and Fletcher agree is in the emphasis on 
republican security rather than international security. The emphasis is on the best 
international structure to ensure the security of the republics citizens not any 
republican conception of world order, per se, although the balancing system does 
require international security to work. Where Fletcher and Deudney are best, is in their 
emphasis on republican cooperation. Republics, by definition as well as by historical 
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record, have a greater record with regards to alliances and cooperation, based on their 
federal nature.  
 
Fletcher recognises the impact the advent of commerce and technology is 
having on the natural limitations of republics – size once determined by topography 
and common language/shared history. But technology and economic development 
change the material context which determines the political order. The early modern 
republicans such as Machiavelli recognise war as an important albeit problematic 
aspect of the polis, it is for this reason that the citizens should be the major players in 
war as they will fight for a variety of motives, courage and glory as well as security, but 
Fletcher recognises that war has now become inextricably linked with economic 
development and thus, the security of the polis is linked with the geopolitical 
advantage it has for both itself and others. There is no virtue in wars of dominance for 
financial gain. Fletcher hopes to limit wars of domination for political and economic 
advantage, he recognises what Deudney later recognises, that military virtue is no 
longer necessary. Considerations of honour and virtue are vital within the city walls, 
but for the sake of security, cannot be extended beyond the state. This sets Fletcher 
apart from his republican peers; he proposes a modern theory of republican security 
based on the international challenge and the recognition of commerce and empire as a 
risk to that security; individual states at risk of alien control from dominant external 
powers whose interests clash. This alien control can be exerted in one of several ways: 
domination through military control, by a simple military take-over, or by economic 
barriers. Fletcher has recognised commerce as a major feature in modern social and 
political interaction and sees it as the main security threat in the contemporary global 
political order.  
  
Despite the obvious republican basis for Fletcher’s political theories, the 
balance of power is arguably a fundamentally liberal concept – a pact between 
autonomous sovereign states, with no need for federal systems of governance. The 
common good is the preservation of peace within the region, banding together to 
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ensure no one power gains hegemonic power, a ‘pretended brotherhood where 
nations are in a state of war’.450 True peace is a necessary condition for true freedom, 
yet a balance of power system between states is not true peace – it is an uneasy 
constant game of risk with shifting alliances, weak states are at the mercy of the strong 
if they cannot find enough small/equal states to band with in order to equalise the 
power dynamic. Nowhere is this most keenly observed than the Cold War and NATO’s 
role within it. Morgenthau amongst others saw the Cold War and the threat of nuclear 
war as evidence that a move from sovereign states to a system of world governance 
was necessary, and it is here that Fletcher’s theory of federal Europe comes into its 
own. Fletcher’s federal Europe is a system of world governance based on a balance of 
power in a system of peace, not war. For Fletcher the balance is equilibrium, unlike the 
distribution of power definition in which there is no actual balance, just shifting of 
power centres, the equilibrium requires that no one state is able to gain an advantage 
of power. Fletcher’s republicanism is both civic and global in reach. The common goal 
is peace and justice.  
 
Deborah Boucoyannis notes that the concept of checks and balances, 
fundamental to balance of power theory, also form the basis for early modern liberal 
theory, with interest balancing interest at the core of the liberal solution to anarchy 
and power; the balance of power is also at the core of the realist approach to 
international relations. 451 However, in her attempt to show that the balance of power 
is a ‘liberal prediction’, and the main alternative to realist IR theory, Boucoyannis 
misses out the republican tradition – the main proponent of balance of power theory 
in Europe in the post-Westphalian/ pre- French Revolution era. Indeed, at the turn of 
the eighteenth-century, the balance of power in Europe was a fundamental concern 
with Louis XIV threatening the (relative) economic and political stability of the region 
that had been established with the Westphalian treaties after the Thirty Years War. 
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Describing Europe as a republic was common amongst enlightenment thinkers; 
recognising the post-Westphalian era as a relatively stable period for Europe, not one 
based on the anarchical state of nature, nor an hierarchical structure of order - thus 
illustrating the European order with republican terminology taken from domestic 
political structures, was an easy analogy to make.  
 
The theory of the balance had been very helpful when one state, whether 
Hapsburg Spain or Bourbon France, had threatened to dominate Europe and it was 
necessary to construct a countervailing alliance, but it was less useful when European 
politics ceased to be dominated by one struggle. Hume, writing his essays in 1752 in 
order to defend anti-Bourbon policy invokes the anti-Hapsburg policy of the sixteenth 
century and the balance of power policies used against Louis XIV. Hume’s concern with 
contemporary policy, and with France, is conspicuous:  
 
‘Europe has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against the 
greatest force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of 
mankind. And such is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho’ that 
ambitious nation, in the five last general wars, have been victorious in four, and 
unsuccessful only in one, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a 
total ascendant over Europe .... In the last three of these general wars, Britain has 
stood foremost in the glorious struggle; and she still maintains her station, as guardian 
of the general liberties of Europe, and patron of mankind’.452  
 
Hume is stressing that European liberty depends on the balance of power. Real de 
Curban agreed with the balancing sentiment: 
 
 ‘Speaking generally, the rulers regard Europe as a balance in which the 
heaviest side subdues the other side and believe that in order to retain Europe in a solid 
and peaceful condition it is necessary to maintain between the principal parties this 
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point of equilibrium, which preventing either side of the balance from sinking proves 
that they are on an exact equal level… The House of France and the House of Austria 
have been regarded as the scales of the balance of Europe. One or the other of these 
scales has received their support from England and Holland which acted as the 
balancers’.453 
 
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, with Russia partitioning Poland and 
vying for primacy in Eastern Europe, the links between international affairs in the two 
halves of Europe became tenuous and the balance theory became less useful. Nothing 
was found to replace it before the conquests of revolutionary France caused ‘a revival 
of older ideas of a single state which threatened the European system’.454 It became a 
confusing analogy during the French Revolution when the republic of Europe was 
being threatened by the excessive republicanism of France. Thus, the republican 
terminology fell out of favour and the arguments regarding power politics and balance 
of power, according to Deudney, were picked up and developed by theorists who later 
came to be known as liberals and realists.455  
 
However, as Boucoyannis shows, modern liberalism has again abandoned the 
balance of power theory in favour of utilitarian idealism, seeing the balance of power 
as a conservative ideology.456 This is a major flaw in the liberalist strategy. One of the 
fundamental problems facing those who wish to theorise the best order for the global 
political system to guarantee equilibrium, freedom and justice, is the underlying 
paradox of self-interest and concentrations of power. Indeed it is recognised that 
republican pluralist politics is undermined by such concentrations of power where the 
common good is overlooked in favour of private interest.457 The notion of balancing – 
where the weak band together to refute the domination of the strong – is more 
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necessary now in a pluralist global network than it was even at the conception of the 
balance of power theory in the seventeenth-century. And this is where we need the 
early modern republican ideas of Fletcher - asking a very important question for the 
international state system - how is power turned into order, a question that G John 
Ikenberry has posed as recently as 2001.458 According to Fletcher, international order 
is both necessary and morally better than international disorder, as it is the case that 
the maintenance of the balance of power is the best way of maintaining international 
order, it is a moral duty that states maintain the balance of power. Fletcher sees no 
alternative to the balance of power for maintaining the peace and security of the 
European order. Any other alternative would require either a hegemonic state playing 
the role of international police officer, or an independent ‘benevolent despot’, both of 
which we have already seen, would undermine the freedom and independence of the 
states within that order. 
 
Recent works have asked the question of whether we should abandon the 
balance of power theory or seek to amend it to fit modern challenges.459 Assuming 
that the current trends for integration and globalisation are to continue in conjunction 
with the state, what is the ideal version of the international order that we should 
expect to promote justice and peace? Petit supports the ‘utopian ideal of 
cosmopolitan justice’; the proposal that those already enjoying non-domination in a 
representative society should arrange things so that they may both continue to enjoy 
the republican ideal of non-domination while doing everything they can to facilitate 
the same agreeable situation for those less fortunate in non-dominating states in order 
to incorporate them into a non-dominating international society. As we have seen, this 
theme is apparent in Fletcher’s writing, proposals for federal Britain and balance of 
power in Europe based along a federal republican system. Pettit wants to argue for an 
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ideal in which effective, representative regimes avoid domination both by state and 
non-state actors and seek to enable others to achieve the same.460 
 
Martin Wight presents the balance of power as one of the fundamental 
institutions of international society, ‘the first article of the unwritten constitution of 
the states-system’.461 Hedley Bull sees the function of the balance of power is to 
‘prevent the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire. . . to 
protect the independence of states’. He claims that it has ‘provided the conditions in 
which other institutions which international society de-endes (diplomacy, war, 
international law, great power management) have been able to operate’.462 Butterfield 
sees the balance of power as the best guarantee for national independence and the 
safest defense against hegemony and empire.463 International society based on a 
peaceful balance involves a desire to restrict power politics through a constitutional 
arrangement. According to Hedley Bull, the assumption that states would actually be 
governed by a decentralised system of international law would be unfeasible; his 
concept of international society is not a matter of law or constitution but of politics 
and morality.464 The balance of power is an institution of international society and not 
merely a mechanism of the international system; states often behave as social actors 
and that they often respect the values, rules and institutions of international society. 
Therefore, the conduct of the balance of power is not assumed to be based solely on 
national interests or the interests of temporary alliances, but also to be founded on a 
commitment towards international society in general.  
 
This is clearly a Fletcherian model of international relations and balance based 
on conceptions of cooperation and common good; the import of balance and order is 
clearly of collective significance and therefore an obligation of the state system as a 
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whole. The core value of international society isn’t the establishment of perpetual 
peace - that, Fletcher maintains, is not possible - but the commodious existence of 
states in an international society designed to do the least harm. By reducing the 
capacity for advantage by ensuring that all nations were equipped to defend 
themselves against the ambitions of others, and reducing the opportunities of gain 
within the international sphere, ‘if the dominions of a state…might not be encreased 
by conquest’, a balance of power would be established by Fletcher’s alliances, ensuring 
that no one state would could gain advantage over others; coexistence would be 
possible in a society predestined for conflict and struggle for survival.465 As Robertson 
notes, Fletcher does not seem aware of any previous statesmen who had proposed 
such an arrangement, expressing concern that none had done so before him. But 
returning to the early modern civic tradition, Fletcher points towards the Achaean 
League and the Greek city states as examples of the archetypal constitution he had in 
mind. And as Robertson correctly points out, this is an indication of the civic principles 
which ‘gave coherence and precision to Fletcher’s constitutional thinking as a 
whole’.466  
 
Fletcher recognises the prominence of state-centrism in international politics, 
but does not assume this is the only method of interacting with politics on the 
international sphere; in this respect he differs from Locke, Hobbes and conventional 
international political theorists of the seventeenth-century, in recognising the state as 
the principal component and not seeing it purely in terms of individuals. This state-
centric view of the international world presented a new dilemma; concerns for security 
in an ungoverned arena where attempts to dominate or at least limit the power and 
advantage of others may trigger insecurity in others. Fletcher’s reliance on the balance 
of power system as a source of order provides a convenient model for his vision of 
perpetual peace that, unlike contemporary realist theories of international relations, 
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does not rely on war as a catalyst for peace. Despite his state-centric view of 
international politics, Fletcher attempts to move away from an entirely pluralistic 
concept, refusing to accept a minimal view of international politics with the state as 
the principal factor upon which global order is built. Peace is not merely an absence of 
war; it is a balanced system of cooperation and goodwill. In this regard, Fletcher 
anticipates Kant in his vision for perpetual peace based on cooperation, and would 
benefit theorists such as Iris Marion Young in her quest to develop a ‘decentred 
diverse democratic federalism’ a ‘thin’ theory of global governance which holds 
principles of morality and international justice. 467  Fletcher recognises the 
interconnectedness of the European system of states; their commerce and their 
security are dependent on the relationships they have with one another and the 
decisions they make with regards to internal and external politics. He basis his balance 
of power theory on the self-determined nature of the state within a larger federal 
European model which, necessarily, recognise each other’s integral role in their 
internal affairs.       
 
Republican terminology at the turn of the eighteenth-century was a 
consequence of the growth of an interdependent Europe made of independent states. 
According to Deudeny, as the European powers jealously competed for mutual 
advantage, they became both fearful that another would gain excessive pre-eminence, 
while becoming aware that their security was bound up within a variety of constraints. 
They sought to ‘locate the sources of their liberty from central rule and the 
moderation of factional strife’ and turned to the familiar language of republicanism to 
draw analogies between the politics of Europe and republican polities’.468 Building on 
similarities between the domestic pattern of politics in small republics and the 
European system, an international theory of balance of power politics using republican 
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terminology was employed in the eighteenth-century to describe and explain 
European politics. 
 
The fundamental point that Deudney makes is that republicanism as a tradition 
of political thought is better equipped than either realism or liberalism to articulate a 
feasible security theory for the global - nuclear - age. Republican theory recognises the 
threat to security from hierarchy as well as anarchy. ‘The overall republican security 
project has been to achieve security by simultaneously avoiding the extremes of 
hierarchy and anarchy over successively larger spaces in response to changes in the 
material context, particularly changes in violence interdependence’.469 The state, 
according to Deudney, exists to secure the needs of what is the primary referent of 
security; the individual, ‘achieving security requires restraint of the application of 
violent power upon individual bodies’ and any other aspect of international relations is 
directly linked to the security of the individual.470 To achieve security for the individual 
within the contemporary global political order, political not military, solutions are 
required. The correct, republican, political order based on political liberty, popular 
sovereignty and limited government secures the authoritative political conditions 
necessary; weak or authoritarian states undermine the political order. Here we must 
consider Fletcher’s proposal for a federal Britain and confederate Europe in which both 
the individual and the ‘rulers’ are bound by structures of restraint on their capacity to 
do harm.  
 
 Balance for International Order and Perpetual Peace 
James Bohman argues that there has been no ‘conceptual space’ for republican 
cosmopolitanism despite many of the eighteenth-century republicans being ‘clearly 
cosmopolitan’.471 He intends to develop a republican form of cosmopolitan order to fill 
the space he claims is left open, but fails to recognise Fletcher and other turn of the 
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century republicans defending a federal Britain as possessors of cosmopolitan 
standards, despite recognising Fletcher’s cosmopolitan commitment in his statement 
that ‘I think mankind might be best preserved from such convulsions and misery, if 
instead of framing governments with regard only to a single society, as I believe all 
legislators have hitherto done, we should constitute such as would be no less 
advantageous to our neighbours than ourselves’. 472  
 
Far from holding contradictory standpoints, Fletcher simultaneously develops 
his republican ideals within his federal discourse. Fletcher’s civic republicanism holds 
many elements of a cosmopolitan nature, as is most evident in his desire for a federal 
Europe; developing a cosmopolitan European community that functions to maintain an 
equilibrium between states and check hegemony. It can also be seen in his vision for a 
federal Britain, uniting the Scottish and English nations under one crown within federal 
framework of governance. His is a federal proposal for a united Europe for the sake of 
continued peace, economic and social development based on equality and freedom. 
 
Fletcher is committed to freedom as non-domination – difficult enough to 
achieve within a free state insofar as the citizens of the free state relate to one 
another, but as Bonham points out, there is a further difficulty in extending freedom as 
non-domination with regards to relations of political communities which are external 
to that free state; a ‘republic of republics’ would be necessary to check the dominating 
tendencies of states over less developed or weaker states.473  Fletcher’s model for a 
perpetual peace is built around a system of states of comparable military power 
establishing amity between them in order to protect them from external threats. 
Unlike contemporary balance of power approaches where the weak link up with the 
strong or along geopolitical maneuvers utilizing proximity to friends and enemies, he 
promotes a system where small states band together to protect each other from the 
threat of a single hegemonic power. Power here means military prowess, and military 
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might relies on trade. According to the English analyst of trade, Charles Davenant, 
those who possess the most profitable trade also acquire the best defense against 
foreign threats and the means to gain more power and wealth as a result: ‘War and its 
discipline, was the chief object of their thoughts, as knowing that riches always follow 
power, and that iron brings to it the gold and silver of other places’. 474 
 
Once again Fletcher is moving beyond early modern Machiavellian 
republicanism, updating it to suit modern conceptions of justice and fairness, with 
regard to commerce. Machiavelli proposes that expansion of the empire is necessary 
and should take the form of a league of unequal states or republics: Rome ‘rose to 
such excessive power by gaining ‘many partners throughout all Italy who lived with it 
under equal laws’, yet always reserved the seat of the empire and the status of 
command ‘so its partners came to subjugate themselves by their own labors and blood 
without perceiving it’. 475  Adopting this model, according to Machiavelli, would 
preserve the freedom of the dominant republic – in this case, Florence – at the 
expense of all others, showing Machiavelli’s priority as lying with the liberty of one 
republic only. Fletcher on the other hand wishes to preserve liberty for all republics, 
recognising that free, nondependent republics are better for preserving peace – 
appreciating the commercial ties would make them less likely to go to war with one 
another; this being in the best interests of all states. Fletcher was not alone in 
recognising commerce as a catalyst for war and peace within republics. According to 
Kennedy, by the close of the seventeenth-century, republicanism had been ‘so 
transformed by the advent of commercial society that the republican dilemma had 
now been transcended, Algernon Sydney was to proclaim at this time that trade was 
the sinews of war and the condition for republican greatness. 476 Whereas other 
republican thinkers of the time, including Sydney, were replacing the republican 
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discourse of virtue with the political and economic discourse of self-interest, Fletcher 
was combining the two theories to show that self-interest and the common good were 
one and the same thing.  
 
Trade in the seventeenth century had forced territorial states to become 
participants in international commerce and the international marketplace soon 
became an anarchic arena with ambitious monarchs resorting to war in order to secure 
lucrative resources and markets. As a consequence of this shift from domestic to 
international politics, the interests of society and mankind had changed significantly. 
Fletcher recognises Britain’s unique position in Europe; as an island it is separated 
from many of the conflicts between states on the continent, yet as its neighbour must, 
for the sake of its own security, be vigilant and active in its foreign policy; engaging in 
mediation and participating in defensive and offensive alliances and struggles put 
succinctly by Bolingbroke in 1713: 
 
‘Their several interests are the objects of their alliances; and as the former are 
subject to change, the latter must vary with them. Such variations, whether occasioned 
by the course of accidents, or by the passions of men, tho made by few, will affect 
many; because there always are, and always must be, systems of alliances subsisting 
among these nations; and therefore, as a change in some of the parts of one system 
necessarily requires a change in all the rest; so the alteration of one system necessarily 
requires and alteration of the others. Thus are they always tossed from peace to war, 
and from war to peace’.477 
 
Fletcher recognises the inevitable conflict amongst divided nations competing 
for wealth in an anarchic system with no regard for the general good for mankind, but 
he also sees the opportunity for peace. Instead of a mercantile peace – trade creating 
a peaceful bond between market powers (as envisaged by Fletcher et al) – rivalries 
become more intense and uncertain. Fletcher accepted that war was a prerequisite for 
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trade, and yet hoped for a perpetual peace in Europe also based on trade; supposing 
an early democratic peace theory in which trading partners preserved peace in order 
to preserve commerce. In an extension of his domestic federal policy, Fletcher sees a 
federal Europe as a cure for the corruption of power and the consequential universal 
wars. He proposes a division of Europe along the natural boundaries of language and 
culture as well as rivers and mountains. As in the ancient Greek model of city states 
designated through natural boundaries, small communities could form their own 
political units.  Smaller nations would be capable of defending themselves against 
powerful enemies; avoiding the threat of one power being allowed to rise in the world 
and disturbing the peace of all of his neighbours. Fletcher may have had the Greek 
model of a league of neighbours, or Amphictyonic league in mind when he designed 
his model of republic of republics. By dividing Europe into ten equal and distinct parts 
based on disposition as well as language, Fletcher intends that each alliance is obliged 
to ‘preserve common tranquility’, if one state should attempt to gain power against 
the others, the rest would come together against it.478  
 
Fletcher had many texts on Greek history and philosophy in his personal library. 
The Delphic Amphictyony is discussed in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian 
War, a copy of which was also held by Fletcher. The Greek Amphictyonic league had a 
profound influence on republican theory, Montesquieu endorsed the weighted voting 
mechanism, and Wilson praises the league for its mission to protect Greece from 
outside rule and religious defilement. ‘the Congress of the United States of Greece, 
The delegates who compose that august assembly, represented the body of a the 
nation, and were invested in the full power to deliberate and resolve upon whatever 
appeared to them to be most conducive to the public prosperity…  From the moment 
of its establishment, the interests of their country became the common concern of all 
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the people of Greece and the different states, of which the union was composed, 
formed only and the same republic’.479  
 
Fletcher proposes a system of international order based on nations being 
organised into military alliances of comparable power. Within this balanced 
international system, no one nation could achieve military advantage and there would 
be no recourse to aggressive conflict. The societies that made up the balanced 
international system would, according to Fletcher, be based on small scale local 
governance; avoiding the corruption of large scale urban centres. They would not have 
standing armies or the dishonest court systems as exemplified by France and England. 
As a consequence, the governments which presided over the nations would be more 
virtuous and organised with the purpose of protecting the interests of their citizens; 
they would respect the rights of human beings as well as nations. This international 
system supported by federal governments was ‘the best to preserve mankind’ from 
universal wars, and to guarantee ‘every part of the world that just share in the 
government of themselves which is due to them’.480 As Hont points out, Fletcher does 
not think that this would end the differences between rich and poor nations, rather 
the rich would no longer be able to suppress the poor. Justice, as the preservation of 
society, would be achieved through the satisfaction of needs. 
 
In An Account of a Conversation, Fletcher does not see international order 
merely in terms of a system of states, but as a value in itself – providing justice and 
peace. His international order is not based on shared values or norms; accepting that 
only some states have such shared norms, but a practical condition for the 
continuation of human social life in an increasingly global society. Based on a system 
with no common power, there are two fundamental goals: preserving the society of 
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states to ensure peaceful trade and cooperation, and maintaining the independence of 
those involved. The balance of power is a means of preserving the independence of 
the states, obstructing the hegemonic abilities of the most powerful. He recognises the 
fragility of the system he proposes. His interlocutor points out that there is nothing to 
stop half of this great federation combining against the other, to which Fletcher 
concedes that this is possible, and that the previous thirty years of continuous and 
universal wars prove it to be so, but he considers this as a failure of the system of 
universal society. If states are to be framed with regard to the good of only one 
society, this will continue to be inevitable, but if they are framed with regards to all of 
humankind peace is attainable. ‘The true interest and good of any nation is the same 
with that of any other. I do not say that one society ought not to repel the injuries of 
another; but that no people ever did any injustice to a neighbouring nation, except by 
mistaking their own interest’.481 Fletcher’s vision for a lasting peace in Europe built 
upon a European confederation of states is predicted to benefit all of humankind, but 
it is based in true state interest, not lofty idealism – founded on a conception of 
republican civic virtue and the common good. Bonham sees the creation of a 
cosmopolitan civil condition based on a federal republic as an obligation to 
humanity,482 Fletcher’s model; based on his joint commitment to democracy, freedom 
and the common good of mankind, and applied on a global scale best meets that 
obligation.  
 
Just War 
In his Account of a Conversation, Fletcher continues to examine the supposed 
expedience of wars for geopolitical advantage in his speculations on the just war 
theory; with simple logic and using the rhetoric of the Just War tradition, he outlines 
the imprudence of war for advantage. In a rather short exchange Fletcher claims that 
this type of war is unjust; his interlocutor, Sir Charles, claims that the interests of the 
country must come before private interests, that injustice is a consequence of pursuing 
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private war, but it is Fletcher’s claim that removing advantage of a neighbour is unjust 
– pursuing the interests of one’s country at the expense of another. ‘To take away by 
force any advantage that belongs to a neighbouring people, you not only do injustice 
to them, but injure yourself by example’.483 An advantageous war (claimed here as not 
unjust according to Sir Charles) may be justly renewed in order to reclaim that which 
was lost, thus the design for perpetual war continues. The only way to ensure that this 
cycle ends is by ensuring all nations are capable of defending themselves successfully 
against aggression for advantage, making conquest impossible. Sir Charles argues that 
advantage for one’s own country is more important – a zero-sum game that must be 
played out, continuing that a war of advantage is only unjust if ‘that which is done is to 
the prejudice of both’. But Fletcher maintains, and Sir Charles eventually concedes, 
that an unjust war can be waged, and if successful a just war may be used to readdress 
the injustice done. Fletcher’s theory of what constitutes a just war is heavily drawn 
from St Thomas Aquinas and Augustine before him - war for imperialism or 
expansionism or through fear of one’s neighbour is not a just cause. Fletcher does not 
mention who has the right to declare war, or what a just war actually entails – Aquinas’ 
first and third conditions for a just war, but it is clear that his own theory is based 
heavily on his second condition. If the intention of war is advantage at the expense of 
another’s toil, then the cause is unjust and the war unlawful. 
 
Fletcher had a canon of texts on which to develop his theories of justice and 
just wars based on notions of Natural Law and the Law of Nations. Natural Law for 
Grotius is founded within the rights to self-preservation and property rather than any 
common good of mankind. Political Europe had almost been destroyed by war in the 
seventeenth-century. Grotius rejects the realist contention that states and individuals 
are subject to separate codes of conduct and morality because both are bearers of 
rights (a claim that is rejected by sir Charles Musgrave).484 Furthermore, the Law of 
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Nations does not apply to only one or two nations, but the constraints are prescribed 
to maintain peace and security of all, therefore the doctrine of raison d’état is 
unjustifiable. Boucher contends that Grotius saved politics by developing a language in 
which politics was able to ‘reconquer and encompass war’; war was not where law 
ended, but was itself subject to the Laws of Nations and Nature.485 
 
Like Fletcher, he maintains that a just war is waged in self-defense or to punish 
aggressors, wars for conquest are unjust. However, according to Fletcher, each man is 
imbued with a sense of both justice and injustice; and has a duty to be a citizen of 
mankind as well as to his nation. It can therefore be argued that Fletcher’s theories of 
just and unjust wars are more akin to Pufendorf who stresses a duty of benevolence – 
including a moral basis within personal relations; state action does not take place in a 
moral vacuum. Pufendorf had acknowledged that states had rights and duties in 
relation to one another under the terms of Natural Law. Fletcher’s concerns for the 
obligations and moral actions states and men had to one another (as well as the 
effects of war, the balance of power and his aspirations for perpetual peace), are 
consistent with the conceptions of Natural Law and Law of Nations ideas derived from 
Pufendorf, amongst others.486 Although it must be noted that Fletcher does not use 
the terms himself. Whereas Grotius, Vitoria, Gentili et al are concerned for justice and 
legitimacy in war, stressing the importance of the Laws of Nations and natural law with 
regards to recourse to war, Fletcher is more concerned with the consequences of war, 
believing a war for gain would justify a war for regain and a vicious cycle of so-called 
just wars would ensue.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
can be a good citizen of a particular commonwealth, and a citizen of the world; no man can be a true friend to his 
country and to mankind at the same time. Fletcher,  An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 206. 
485 Boucher, David. Political Theories of International Relations. Oxford University Press: Oxford 1998: 210. 
486 It is well documented that Fletcher was an ardent book collector with over one thousand books in his personal 
library. His personal papers, held in the Scottish National Library in Edinburgh include careful documentation of the 
books he bought, where and for how much. His personal effects also include notes on many of these books, proving 
that he read as well as collected them.  
204 
 
Fletcher refers to concepts that were crucial to an understanding of philosophy 
in the seventeenth-century, without calling them by name. He refers to the 
corruptibility and selfishness of human nature but prefers to use the term humankind, 
a justice and Just wars based on concepts of natural jurisprudence. This is Fletcher’s 
method of being able to draw upon many historical and philosophical examples 
without being tied to one particular viewpoint or convention; by avoiding the familiar 
terms of natural law etc., Fletcher avoids being considered alongside any particular 
viewpoint or doctrine. He is able to draw upon the historical examples of Rome and 
Greece, and the philosophical examples of Plato and Cicero alongside the 
contemporary jurists and political thinkers without being tied to any one tradition in 
particular. It is clear he draws heavily from the civic humanist traditions which 
promote virtue and the common good, but he is also influenced by the liberal ideas of 
Locke, and the natural law and jurisprudential thought of Grotius. This is what makes 
Fletcher so important for the study of political ideas – he cannot be pinpointed as 
being a just war theorist, or a proponent of natural law, yet he has considerable 
influence in these areas.  
 
It is in the Account of Conversation that Fletcher’s civic humanism is most 
apparent, emphasising the moral disposition of the self towards the common, or as 
Pocock suggests, public good.487 Fletcher’s ultimate goal is the abolition of war and the 
happiness of all mankind, achievable through the removal of the incentive for 
offensive wars and the increase in defensive capabilities. Along these lines, Fletcher 
believes that states – as autonomous units – will wage war against each other through 
their desire for security. In this instance, Fletcher is not ascribing moral judgments in 
political affairs, merely expedience. Although it is unjust to take away by force any 
advantages of another nation, the threat is caused by ‘injuring yourself by example’, 
laying the ‘foundation as well for your neighbours to make a just war against you, as 
for your own nation to make an advantageous war (which you say is not unjust) 
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against them’.488 Allowing for wars for advantage, international society would be ruled 
by fear – each worried that their neighbours military power would be next aimed at 
them, that empire building would cause fear and stockpiling. By making wars for gain 
impossible – not through a display of military power, but through convenient alliances, 
this cycle of fear would end, returning us full circle to Fletcher’s arguments against the 
idea of a universal monarchy.  
 
As with Augustine, Aquinas, Gentili and Vitoria before him, Fletcher maintains 
that a war can only be just if there has been an injury committed or the goal is to 
secure peace. 489 Like Gentili, he believes that mankind is a community in itself, but 
whereas Gentili uses this community as a foundation for the justice of wars of 
intervention, Fletcher sees it as a more fundamental foundation for perpetual peace. A 
reasoned citizen of mankind will see the futility of wars for advantage if they result in 
retaliation and will endeavour to preserve peace.490 Fletcher is incredulous at the fact 
that politicians, who in his opinion should be the best of moral philosophers, have 
ignored the duty to mankind in favour of the duty to his nation.491 One may argue that 
this makes him a moral philosopher akin to Locke who argues that we have an 
obligation to preserve both our own life and that of others as best we can. 492 This 
comes close to an idea later developed by Christian Von Wolff and Vattel, that states – 
as the main actors in international relations – have a moral character with rights and 
duties. These duties are an extension of the moral duties of the individuals that 
comprised them, and therefore the state must exercise the duty that the individual has 
to mankind as a whole.493  
 
                                                          
488 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 206.  
489 Although Vitoria extends this to vindictive punishment of a wrongdoer and Aquinas and Augustine allow for 
moral punishment. 
490 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 206-208 
491 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 209 
492 Fletcher. Passim.  See also Locke, Two Treatises. Ibid: 294. 
493 See Christian Von Wolff, The Law of Nations as Treated According to a Scientific Method, 1748, and Elmer 
Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law.  
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Furthermore, Fletcher’s theories of justice are akin to Leibniz’s idea of justice as 
charity governed by wisdom and his theory of international justice. ‘Justice… is that 
which is useful to the whole community, and the public good is the supreme law – a 
community, however, let it be recalled, not of a few, not of a particular nation, but of 
all those who are part of the City of God and, so to speak, of the state of the Universe’. 
494 Justice is a social duty, or a duty which preserves society. A society is a union of 
different men for a common purpose. A natural society is one which is demanded by 
nature. ‘The signs by which one can conclude that nature demands something, are that 
nature has given us a desire and the powers or force to fulfill it: for nature does 
nothing in vain. Above all, when the matter involves a necessity or a permanent utility, 
for nature everywhere achieves the best. The most perfect society is that whose 
purpose is the general and supreme happiness. Natural law is that which preserves or 
promotes natural societies, therefore Natural Law is Natural Justice’. 495 This is where 
Fletcher overshadows the just war theorists before and after him and what makes him 
relevant for today. Fletcher looks to history for perspective, and to the contemporary 
situation for identification of and a prescription to the central issues.  
 
Fletcher further agrees with Locke that uncultivated land should not be left to 
waste, but it is here that the similarity ends. Whereas Locke insists that man has an 
obligation to God to utilise the earth to its best advantage, to further preserve the life 
of all men, and justifies the colonising of the Americas on the basis that the American 
Indians have left large tracts of land to spoil, Fletcher insists that war and colonialism 
encourages the populace to the powerful and corrupt cities by centralising trade, and 
this leaves the earth untilled and wasted. Locke attempts to justify the use of force and 
colonial expansion on a theory of property rights requiring ones labour (or that of 
one’s employees), but he does not legitimate colonial expansion in lands where the 
inhabitants have a justified claim to their property or are subdued by unjustifiable 
force, trade is forcing men to the cities and the seas, a consequence of the great 
                                                          
494 Leibniz. “Initium Instituionem Iuris Perpetui”. Patrick Riley (ed) Leibniz. Political Writings. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
495 Leibniz. On Natural Law. Riley 1988: 77. 
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disorder in human affairs.496 But as Pufendorf and Grotius before him, Fletcher does 
not believe that war for property is a just cause, ‘justice is due, even in point of trade, 
from one nation to another’; every man has the right to the fruits of his own labour, 
and any nation that is suppresses man of this right is violent, and by extension, any 
nation that attempts to remove this right from another is unjust.497 Fletcher, at this 
juncture, does not agree that anything other than justice and the common rights and 
goods of man provide reason for the interests of states.  
 
Conclusion.  
Fletcher is not the first to recognise the importance of commerce on the 
increasingly international political order, but is the first to combine it with republican 
values of virtue and the common good and raison d’état to produce a much more 
viable and workable republican discourse suitable for modern politics. According to 
Hont, this is Fletcher breaking further away from Machiavellian politics. A new concept 
of civic virtue was being proposed which sought to secure lasting political communities 
and preserve peace in Europe.498 Fletcher denounces the aggrandizement politics of 
the Roman empire which Machiavelli so admired and adopted by the universal 
monarchs; ‘Whoever contrives to make a people very rich and great, lays the 
foundation of their own misery and destruction, which in a short time will necessarily 
overtake them’.499 Institutional restraints were required to overcome man’s natural 
desire for dominion on both a national and private level. Fletcher did not envisage that 
this utopian ideal would come to pass, nor that a civic republican Europe would break 
the divide between rich and poor to create a distributive justice or even distribution of 
wealth, but he did believe that this would bring an end to the rich being able to 
suppress the poor, and the ‘international trade would return to its godly design of 
satisfying the mutual needs of nations living under the different climates and in regions 
                                                          
496 See Boucher. Political Theories, ibid:  256, And Fletcher. Account of a Conversation ibid: 200, also Locke. Two 
Treatises ibid: 297. 
497 Fletcher. Account of a Conversation ibid: 201. 
498 Hont. Ibid: 264 
499 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 210 
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on varying natural advantages’.500 This is indicative of Fletcher’s desire for distributive 
justice, arguing that politics should not consider just the national interest, but also the 
common interest of mankind.501  
 
Fletcher’s proposals for a federal Britain is a system based on cooperation, 
equality and balance which he later expands to fit the European model; highlighting his 
confidence in an international political republic based on amity and peace, one in 
which states could prosper if raison d’état was recognised as dependent on trade and 
therefore the interconnectedness of states stimulating cooperation. Fletcher’s concept 
of non-dependence leads the way for contemporary republican theorists of non-
domination but his most important contribution to republican theory is his 
modernisation of the paradigm and his theories regarding the proper conduct of affairs 
between states - that no state should seek to dominate or interfere in the affairs of 
other states. The right regulation of conduct between states requires a system of 
checks and balances which limits the influence one state has with regards to another, 
and thus providing a basic model for global justice and international equality and 
peace.  
 
Throughout his discourses concerning the balance of power, peace and just 
war, Fletcher displays a very modern grasp of international relations theory that his 
contemporaries had yet to present. His is a republican theory of international relations 
based on economics and interdependence which comprehends the need for morality 
                                                          
500 Hont. Ibid: 264 
501 This is an interesting dichotomy in Fletcher‟s political and social theories. Despite his clear concern for the poor 
and the fair distribution of resources and wealth, Fletcher has a reputation for being an advocate of slavery. Indeed, 
one proposal to help the labouring poor of Scotland was a form of servitude where men were indentured for a fixed 
period in return for his and his families rooms, board and education if necessary. Others were to be sent to the 
Venetian galleys to labour there. Fletcher insisted that this domestic servitude was not the same as slavery. See Two 
Discourses Concerning the Affairs of Scotland. Part of this same domestic proposal to end poverty in Scotland was to 
insist that any landowner who could not work his land directly must dispose of that land and use the proceeds to buy 
half the rents of smallholders, thus providing them with the capital to improve their own farming techniques. 
Robertson suggests that Fletcher was not seeking to eliminate inequalities of wealth; rather wealth was a public good 
to be spent not on provisions for the poor, but on projects of public benefit. Robertson,1992 xxi. This line of 
argument is only acceptable if one is to read the Two Discourses alone and not consider Fletcher‟s obvious concerns 
for mankind and distributive justice and human rights as seen in his other works, especially the Account of a 
Conversation. It is frustrating that, as a political observer and commentator rather than a philosopher, Fletcher‟s style 
was to introduce profound concepts such as distributive justice but not elaborate further.  
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in politics. As such, Fletcher’s international relations theories should be considered an 
important intellectual contribution to the so-called canon of political texts that 
contemporary IR theorists rely upon. 
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Chapter 4: Looking Forward 
 
‘Since, then, one nation, in its way, owes to another nation every duty that one man 
owes to another man, we may confidently lay down this general principle: - one state 
owes to another state whatever it owes to itself, so far as that other stands in real need 
of its assistance, and the former can grant it without neglecting the duties it owes to 
itself. Such is the eternal and immutable law of nature’.502 
 
In a contemporary world where the actions of one necessarily have an impact 
on the actions and wellbeing of another, it has become more important than ever to 
regulate relationships between autonomous states. But it is how these relationships 
can be regulated while respecting the autonomy and self-determination of the citizens 
that is the focus of this chapter. Communitarians, cosmopolitans, republicans and 
liberals alike have their own theories on how to structure global civil society for the 
common good of mankind and, with luck, a form of perpetual peace. Iris Marion 
Young, for example, offers a conception of ‘relational autonomy’: self-determination 
involving institutionalised procedures for negotiating between autonomous units when 
one’s activities will have an effect on the others basic interests.503 The ideals of these 
thinkers - perpetual peace, global cooperation, equality and freedom - are often 
dismissed as lofty idealism in a political history that has emphasised realist politics, 
excessive individualism and self-interest for too long. The increasing 
interconnectedness and interdependence between and among states is evidence that 
these notions must be considered more than ideals. They should be used to challenge 
the current state-centric assumptions and realist models of contemporary global 
politics. This is not to suggest that any one theory provides the definitive answer - 
cosmopolitan thinking, for example, neglects the human need for roots - but it is a 
                                                          
502 Vattel, Emerich, De. The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs 
of Nations and Sovereigns. G.G. and J Robinson. (eds) London. 1797. 3.47. 
503 Young, Iris Marion . Global Challenges. Cambridge. Polity Press. 2007:7. 
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good starting point for the purposes of this argument. 504  Fletcher is not a 
cosmopolitan; he does not suggest a model for global governance or attempt to 
remove self-determination or sovereignty from nation-states, but instead suggests an 
order based on cooperation and the common good with the same goals of peace and 
freedom in mind.  
 
The previous chapters have shown that civic republican theory has value in 
the global political order. Its adaptability and focus on the concept of freedom as 
non-domination as opposed to freedom as non-interference is vital for a global 
order that is interdependent and, at times, interventionist.  They have outlined the 
shared political position of Andrew Fletcher and contemporary political thinkers with 
regards to the global political system; how it should be arranged to maximise the 
freedom and welfare of the whole of humanity. In this chapter, what Fletcher has to 
offer contemporary political theory is outlined further. It considers the political ideas 
that have as yet to be shared by modern republican thinkers; his plans for a republic of 
Europe, and how his theories may be applied to contemporary republican theory 
including debates on arbitrary power and the Scottish Independence movement. 
Fletcher, unlike his early modern republican predecessor Machiavelli, believes there is 
a place for morality in International Relations and it is from this position that we can 
see Fletcher as a significant figure for contemporary republican political theory.  
 
Fletcher’s doctrine has several major themes – Republican ideals of liberty and 
justice, combined with an awareness of the corrupting influence of commerce as well 
as its contribution to peace, together with a commitment to virtue in politics that he 
recognises as being corrupted by the emerging modern state system. Each of these 
themes can be used to illuminate the operation of contemporary power politics and 
the theories presented to limit damage and tender justice. Fletcherian civic-humanist 
republican themes can be utilised within the British context – the question of the 
                                                          
504See Shorten, Andrew. “Borders and Belonging. Recent Work in Cosmopolitan Philosophy”. European Journal of 
Political Theory. April 2007 vol 6 no 2: 227 
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union, devolution and independence. Thus Fletcher’s civic humanist version of 
republicanism is a good match for contemporary British and international politics. This 
chapter proves that contemporary political theorists should return to the civic 
republican ideals of Fletcher for a model of global order on which to form their own 
paradigms; that his intellectual contribution is significant to contemporary debates, 
especially with the recent developments in British politics and the Scottish 
independence question.  
 
Commerce and Europe 
Fletcher’s pamphlets are connected by several themes which are 
interdependent - marked by a unity of purpose if not method. The first theme is 
broadly methodological and relates to Fletcher’s use of European historical examples 
to provide credence to his political principles. This contextual methodology is entirely 
within keeping of his civic humanist pedigree which cultivates his republican views. 
Fletcher connects the similarities between the decline of the ‘Gothic’ constitution with 
the decline of the Athenian and Roman Empires, and uses these examples to warn of 
the dangers of a loss of virtue which commerce is bringing to Europe. It is Fletcher’s 
belief that the moral health of the civic individual; his ability to concern himself with 
the commonwealth, is dependent on his independence from the government or 
executive powers. Linking commerce and wealth with the government or king through 
the ever increasing public credit and national debts introduced during the reigns of 
Charles II, William and Ann, and the expanding professional standing armies, increase 
the dependence of the individual on the government and makes him a threat to civil 
society. Independence in modes of social and political interaction is necessary for the 
individual to maintain his virtue and maintain his position as a contributor to the res 
publica.  
 
This approach allows Fletcher to explore the proposition that the several 
branches of the mixed government – the king, parliament, judiciary, and legislature – 
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must remain independent from one another, allowing Fletcher to claim the 
independence of the individual from the government, and the independence of 
Scotland from English dominance. Unlike the later Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Smith and Hume, Fletcher’s morality in politics is not a result of any concern for 
individual economic justice or redistribution of wealth - seeing as it was that he was 
happy for the ‘undeserving poor’ to be supported through a form of domestic 
servitude, but morality is due to mankind, and justice is due as a result of one’s’ own 
labour - a Lockean conception of property being what one earns through his own toil. 
Commerce is seen as eroding civic virtue and the political agent is selling his 
participation in the governance of his country to the king and parliament, allowing 
them to establish political control and dominance over the subjects. However, whereas 
the early modern republican ideas of Harrington and the Court Party sees commerce 
merely in terms of corruption, Fletcher also recognises its binding force, 
acknowledging that mercantile politics on the European stage necessitate cooperation 
between states, and compels peaceful relations.  
 
To illustrate this point further, Fletcher looks to history for his evidence. He 
claims Athens increased its power because it developed a mercantile economy – 
developing trade and expanding its colonies for economic advantage. Rome expanded 
for glory and lacked any economic or commercial interest. The military domination of 
Rome saw them rise as an empire while Athens fell, taking commerce with it.  
Commerce was again to flourish in Machiavelli’s time, building Florence and Venice, 
and opening up Europe to trade. Peaceful intercourse was necessary for commercial 
Europe to flourish, yet the legacy of empire continued to dominate international 
politics and commerce once again failed. Fletcher therefore predicts that the end of 
empire building is necessary for economic growth and cooperation to exist within civil 
society, moving towards international cooperation as opposed to competition. His 
study of history leads him to formulate a structure for European politics based on a 
regular system of relations between independent states that are mutually dependent 
on the development of commerce. This mutual dependence requires international 
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politics to develop a system based on principles of justice and law, and it is commerce 
that Fletcher appreciates is allowing for the revival of republics, not the republics of 
antiquity, but a republic of Europe based on justice and fairness that would replace the 
power politics of empire and universal monarchy. Despite lamenting the loss of virtue, 
Fletcher recognises the binding force of commerce and the potential for peace. He 
recognizes the need for development of peaceful trade among states for the stability 
of Europe and the welfare of mankind; it now being necessary for the Roman model of 
military empire to make way for the Athenian model of peaceful trade. 
 
Fletcher is committed to a universal peace based on commerce; a theme we 
recognise in the democratic peace theory. He suggests that economic gains could best 
serve peace by maintaining the mechanisms of the balance of power in Europe than 
any display of military might could. Overt aggrandizement would only serve to unsettle 
the neighbouring states and threaten the stability of the region. Growth is much better 
achieved internally, through economic development. Prosperity is necessary for the 
stability of the state, sufficient for peace, allowing foreign policy to be directed 
towards increasing the stability of other states. Fletcher seems to assume that states 
have an obligation to one another to help them improve their economic status which 
goes deeper than just the pure self-interest of a state wishing to do trade. There is an 
inherent moral obligation to provide assistance where assistance is required.505 
Fletcher outlines this need for morality in politics in his conversation with Sir 
Musgrave, while outlining the miseries left behind now that ‘every nation is 
endeavouring to possess the trade of the whole world’.506 ‘Justice is due, even in point 
of trade, from one nation to another’.507 
 
                                                          
505 Unlike Vattel, who some thirty years later wrote on the appropriate action of states against a threat to the balance 
of power: [Sovereigns] may also mutually favour each other, to the exclusion of him whom they fear; and by 
reciprocally allowing various advantages to the subjects of the allies, especially in trade, and refusing them to those 
of that dangerous potentate, they will augment their own strength, and diminish his, without affording him any just 
cause of complaint, since everyone is at liberty to grant favours and indulgences at his own pleasure‟. Vattel. Law of 
Nations. Ibid 3.46. 
506 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 193. 
507 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 201. 
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The general problem Fletcher faced was how to provide this mutual assistance 
while retaining full sovereignty and interests meanwhile maintaining a peaceful 
balance within the international state system. Fletcher’s approach is a model based on 
commercial mutuality; he is one of the first political thinkers to recognise commerce as 
a means to peace, and a source for the balance of power.508 …Mankind might be best 
preserved from such convulsions and misery, if instead of framing governments with 
regard only to a single society. . . we should such as would be no less advantageous to 
our neighbours than ourselves’. As  ‘no people ever did any injustice to a neighbouring 
nation, except by mistaking their own advantage’.509  To avoid the cycle of unjust wars 
for advantage, Fletcher’s commercially inclined nations are required to appreciate the 
expedience of preserving a peaceful international society beyond the limitations of the 
state system; tolerating certain constraints on their trade and interests, and refraining 
from damaging the trade of other nations, all on a purely voluntary basis.  
 
Fletcher’s theories are not based purely on morality or ethics, the goodness of 
non-dependence and the rights to freedom and self-governance; he is very aware of 
power politics and how interest determines the interactions between states. 510 
Common values are not a necessary element of cooperation, but common interests 
and the coordination of such have an impact on the political benefits of order. The 
question is not how we realise an international order which is fully just and peaceful, 
but under what conditions can man exist peaceably together and avoid the total 
destruction of universal wars. Fletcher talks of a perpetual peace, but it is clear that he 
doesn’t intend to provide a model for perpetual peace, rather a more pluralistic model 
for minimising the inevitable conflicts between autonomous sovereign states with 
competing interests.  
 
Fletcher’s proposal for a federal republic of Europe is more than just a balance 
of power system based on alliances or commerce, but on a republic of republics. The 
                                                          
508 A theme picked up by the Enlightenment thinkers around forty years later. 
509 Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, ibid: 205 -206. 
510See  Fletcher. An Account of a Conversation, passim. 
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republican virtue of the individual state and the limited autonomy held by each would 
secure the union and the balance; if one state should attempt to gain power against 
the others, they would come together against it and foreign policy would be a joint 
venture. This Fletcherian model of federal republic is an uncomplicated process of 
shared sovereignty and negotiated policy. Commerce brings more benefits than purely 
economic gains; improved social relations may not eliminate conflict, but the 
adjudication of conflicts is much less violent – states and merchants recognizing the 
need for good relations, even if it is for self-interested reasons. The realist assumption 
that interests are inherently incompatible is tempered by the cooperation required to 
promote trade. Undermining the Hobbesian state of war, Fletcher hopes to encourage 
the emergence of a peaceful Europe out of the necessarily cosmopolitan ethic of the 
commercial interest. Fletcher is conscious of the shared destiny of Europe – that the 
increasing mutuality in Europe requires peace.  
 
Contemporary neo-liberal politics has ensured that the late twentieth-century 
has been marked by increased economic globalization in the form of extended capital 
markets and international supply systems. The impact of globalization is a central 
concern for policy-makers and civil society. The challenges we face demand new 
approaches to global governance that are more inclusive and representative. While 
there are no clear solutions to the challenges facing global governance, different 
models of global democracy or civil society have been proposed to overcome the 
global welfare deficit through establishing representative democracy beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state, and generalizing its norms and institutions around the 
world. David Held questions whether globalization creates new patterns of inequality 
and stratification, and if so, whether the state is as important as it once was in 
addressing issues of justice.511 Local, regional and national forms of self-government 
are at risk of being supplanted by global forms of governance which obstruct political 
participation of the ordinary citizen. 
 
                                                          
511 Held, David. A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics. Politics. London: Routledge, 2000. See also  
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The intergovernmental negotiation model, as exemplified in conventional 
international negotiated governance, still has the tendency to sacrifice global welfare 
while prioritising national interests; others have argued for building international 
governance based on collective movements and recognition of common interests and 
welfare; a bottom-up approach. Yet, the question remains how any one of these 
models can gain legitimacy; where is a credible account of how it could come into 
power and acquire authority, constitutional legitimacy and accountability across 
national and cultural divides.  
 
The weaknesses of all the current proposed models require us to rethink global 
governance.512 Rather than inventing yet another model, there is an argument for the 
establishment of balances between existing institutions based on Fletcher’s idea of 
checks and balances of the state powers. Globalization has led to the erosion of 
exclusive government control and we need to revitalise governance as a more 
encompassing approach that also involves other parts of society. The European Union 
can be regarded as a contemporary example of Fletcher’s republic of republics. It 
includes high levels of supranational law while remaining entirely committed to 
negotiation and accord; requiring all members to reach negotiated agreement on 
action. The European community provides legislation regarding matters that may have 
an effect on the interests of more than one of its member states, and provides general 
standards and frameworks by which all must observe, but leaves the implementation 
of any procedure to the member states themselves.  
 
The failure of the European Union community to agree on a constitution is 
evidence that there is institutional work still to be done, but a modern, increasingly 
interdependent global community must continue to find multilevel and effective 
                                                          
512 The debates surrounding global governance and justice are too numerous and far reaching to be given any justice 
in this short passage. For a good introduction however, see, amongst others: Archibugi, Daniele, Held, David, and 
Koehler, Martin (eds.), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1998. Held, David.  Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance, Stanford: Stanford University Press,1995. Zolo, Danilo.Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Politics, New York: Norton, 2003. 
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governance that is accountable as well as flexible. Therefore, as Thomas Heuglin 
suggests, ‘as long as the history of political thought is recognized as a heuristic tool of 
guidance, for the intellectual explorer as well as the political engineer, it remains 
important to advance awareness of historical crossroads and alternatives’.513 Fletcher 
is one such alternative. 
 
Our current need to engage and balance the powers of the state, international 
politics and civil society in readiness for the governance of global society is paralleled 
with the concept of the division and limitation of powers at the turn of the eighteenth-
century. Fletcher suggests a system of complementary and conflicting interests in a 
shared power base to increase transparency and accountability while diminishing the 
opportunity for domination. In both the eighteenth-century and the contemporary 
circumstances, the pluralism of powers suggested may result in increased cooperation 
and negotiation; advancing justice and welfare along the way. The presence of 
competing governance arenas implies that governance initiatives can advance even if 
they are blocked in one arena. The republic of republics model suggested by Fletcher 
for both the domestic and international arenas, separates the powers resulting in 
legislative, judicial and executive decisions being more balanced. This model can be 
used to address the issues of global governance as well as the domestic model 
suggested by Fletcher.  
 
Fletcher is self-consciously using both an historical and scientific method as a 
moral imperative, raising the value of the human community to fit a universal model 
and committing mankind to peace through his desire for wealth. He is not ignorant of 
raison d’état, but he understands commerce as providing the international system 
with a need for affinity that could free it from pure power politics; he believes 
international relations could be ordered through a balance of power mediated by 
international law and principles of justice. This interpretation of Fletcher suggests 
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similarities between his theories, moving through to Montesquieu and the figures of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, to contemporary liberal theories of economic 
interdependence which see the value of peace and cooperation the likelihood of war 
being minimised by increasing the value of trade over aggression. 
 
 Richard Rosecrance claims that states must choose between ‘trading states’ 
concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and ‘territorial states’ who seek 
military expansion. Modern conditions push states towards the trading mode - modern 
wars being too costly. Within the peaceful trading mode ‘the benefits that one nation 
gains from trade can also be realised by others,’ and the ‘incentive to wage war is 
absent’ within a highly interdependent system. ‘Trading states recognize that they can 
do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market 
for their goods and services that by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of 
land.514 Rosecrance (unknowingly) is neatly summarising Fletcher’s quite liberal view 
that interdependence and commerce fosters peace. Neo-realists of course deny that 
economic interdependence is a basis for peace, insisting that it increases the likelihood 
of war if one state must rely on another for vital goods – vulnerability increasing the 
incentive to go to war to assure supply.515 But for Fletcher, interdependence (not to be 
confused with dependence) increases cooperation, mutual assistance and is a 
precursor to peace.  
 
International order has value in itself – as the basis for justice and peace. By 
ordering international society with regards to individual and independent states with 
only their own interest in mind, wars are inevitable. By considering the progress of 
other states as beneficial to the progress of one’s own, and the interests of humanity 
before the interests of individual states, peace is achievable. By combining state 
                                                          
514 Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of the Trading states: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: 
Basic Books, 1986: 13-14; 24-25. See also Rosecrance. “A New Cooncert of Powers”. Foreign Affiars, vol 7: 1 
(Spring 1992): 64-82. 
515 See for example Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979. 
Mearsheimer, John J. "Disorder Restored" in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's 
Security. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992. And essays by Powell, Snidal and Keohane in David A. Baldwin, ed., 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
220 
 
interest with knowledge of commercial interests and markets, and a commitment to 
the common good of mankind, Fletcher is able to offer a model of international society 
that meets the obligations of peace, justice and security that we owe to humanity.  
 
Fletcher’s republic of republics is the best system for ensuring the cooperation 
required to overcome the contradiction of self-interest and a global political order 
ensuring justice and peace. As the trend for integration and globalisation increases, 
there is a need in contemporary politics for a commitment towards international 
society in general. Fletcher recognises this, as do Deudney and Boucoyannis.516 
Fletcher provides us with a model on which to base the best version of international 
order based on a cosmopolitan republican values. These themes clearly show that 
Fletcher’s political pamphlets are a useful starting position for any contemporary 
political theorist attempting to answer the questions posed by an increasingly 
interconnected world which is, quite rightly, concerned with justice, peace and human 
happiness. Fletcher believes that the well-being of the state begins with the well-being 
of the community, and it is with republican political theory that the community is 
looked to properly. More fundamentally, Fletcher’s republican values re-focus the 
debate from what form global governance should take, towards questions of what 
principles should govern the community of mankind. Fletcher questions what form the 
international system should take in order to guarantee justice and fairness.  
 
Scottish Politics in the 21st Century – Independence or Devolution Max! 
‘I ask every Scot to pause and reflect, not just on what kind of country we are, 
but on the kind of country we could be, the, kind of country we should be. I am 
committed to a new chapter in Scottish politics, one in which the story and the script is 
written by the people and not just by the politicians’.517 
                                                          
516 See Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village,ibid. 
Boucoyannis, Deborah. “The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea, or Why Liberals Can Learn to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Balance of Power”, ibid. 
517 Salmond, Alex. First Minister of Scotland. Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation. SNP White 
Paper. Nov. 2009.  
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Fletcher earned his moniker ‘the Patriot’ during his fierce battle against the 
incorporationist union of Scotland and England in the parliaments leading to the Treaty 
of Union in 1707. He is best known for his inexorable commitment to his native 
country. Despite being absent from Scotland for most of his life, Fletcher’s allegiance 
to his country and the welfare of his countrymen is evident throughout his political 
pamphlets and discourses. As previously mentioned, each of his political pamphlets, 
and political actions, are a product of a particular difficulty Scotland confronted. His 
fierce temper and reputation for aggression kept him from serious political office and 
he continued to petition parliament and people of influence to ameliorate his 
countrymen’s troubles. His activism against the Union was motivated by his belief that 
Scotland would be reduced to a slavish state if the incorporationist union went 
through without any limitations on the monarch and parliament based in Westminster. 
Fed up with the way Scotland is being treated by the English, Fletcher demands a 
restructuring of the proposed union and reassurances of Scotland’s autonomy. Fast 
forward almost three hundred years to the devolution process; the Scottish people fed 
up with the way Scotland has been treated by an (unwanted) Conservative 
Government in Westminster, and the demand for more Scottish autonomy over 
Scottish affairs.  
 
Consider Fletcher’s political activism against the Treaty of Union in 1707 
alongside the arguments for independence coming from Alex Salmond and his 
ministers in Holyrood. The Scottish National Party has proposed four broad options for 
Scotland’s future:  
 The Status Quo - retaining its current responsibilities with ‘gradual evolution in 
response to particular events or pressures’.518 
 Implementing the recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution 
including: devolved fiscal powers - part of the Budget of the Scottish Parliament 
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to be found from devolved taxation under its control rather than from grant 
from the UK Parliament. The main means of achieving this would be by the UK 
and Scottish Parliaments sharing the yield of income tax. Also, Stamp Duty Land 
Tax, Aggregates Levy, Landfill Tax and Air Passenger Duty would be devolved to 
the Scottish Parliament, again with a corresponding reduction in the block 
grant. The Scottish Parliament would also be given the power to legislate new 
taxes that apply in Scotland and Ministers given increased borrowing 
powers. 519  The boundary of settlement of the Scotland Act should be 
reconsidered to devolve the powers of legislation regarding constitution and 
institutions; culture, charities, sport and gaming; employment and skills; 
energy; environment and planning; health and bio-security; justice and home 
affairs; marine and fisheries; revenue and tax raising; science, research and 
higher education; social security; trade and commerce. 
 Full devolution, often called ‘Devolution Max’. Under full devolution the 
existing devolution framework would be retained, and Scotland would remain 
within the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government and institutions 
would continue to have responsibility for many matters; the currency and 
monetary policy, and decisions on peace and war. Full devolution would give 
Scotland more responsibility and powers for domestic matters, and would 
extend the range of measures the Scottish Government and the Scottish 
Parliament could take to encourage greater sustainable economic growth. 
Interaction with matters reserved to the United Kingdom, for example foreign 
affairs, defense, macroeconomic policy, some taxation and, possibly, social 
protection and pensions. Existing areas of disagreement would continue. 
Intergovernmental relations would improve, including enforceable principles of 
parity of esteem.520 
 Independence: Favoured by Alex Salmond and his ministers, full devolution 
with the additional responsibilities that could not be devolved within the 
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United Kingdom. Under independence Scotland would be responsible for all 
economic and fiscal decisions; education, infrastructure transport and housing;, 
the environment and energy; foreign affairs and defense; the constitution and 
all matters of legislation, courts and human rights.  
 
Since devolution and the Scotland Act 1997, services such as the NHS have 
already become devolved, as well as Education and some the courts system 
maintaining their own forms. Fletcher’s federal vision for Britain is clearly recognisable 
in the ‘devolution max’ proposal. Scotland would enjoy the full range of powers with 
regards to the economy and its constitutional responsibilities, while remaining within 
the free-market economy with England and sharing the responsibilities of national 
security, defense and foreign affairs; benefiting from the safeguards of being united 
with England and its political and military strength. According to the Scottish 
Government, Scotland’s lack of financial responsibility has detrimental consequences 
on its development and economy. The arguments put forth by the Scottish 
Government for more fiscal autonomy parallel those of Fletcher some three hundred 
years previous. A balanced and supportive macroeconomic policy framework is 
essential in fostering investment and development, innovation and job creation, and it 
is instrumental in creating the right incentives, conditions and opportunities for 
economic growth. The ‘one-size fits all’ policy within the United Kingdom with regards 
to economic policy cannot always meet the needs of both Scotland and England, and, 
as a consequence, Scotland is often the loser where United Kingdom-wide policies are 
implemented. Scotland cannot opt out of such policies and is currently limited in the 
actions it can take to improve or stabilise its economy.  
 
Alex Salmond, First Minister for Scotland and the staunchest advocate of 
independence for Scotland, when pledging to end over three hundred years of Scottish 
‘subordination’, quotes Fletcher directly, insisting that Fletcher’s fears that the ‘greater 
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must always swallow the lesser’ were realised with the Treaty of Union in 1707.521 
Fletcher’s influence on the Scottish Government and Alex Salmond is obvious, both in 
the proposal put forward and the motivations for the desire for independence or 
federal government. And although Salmond and his party wish for full independence, 
he has recently accepted the benefits of a federal system similar to that proposed by 
Fletcher in 1703 with ‘Devolution max’. The SNP, like Fletcher, are committed to 
addressing Scotland’s historic underperformance as well as encouraging sustainable 
economic growth, and both use the rhetoric of equality and justice. Fletcher sees this 
as achievable through a federal system like the Swiss Cantons, but accepts anything 
less than full autonomy with regards to fiscal decision making and representation 
within the United Kingdom with regards to joint matters – defense, war, liberty and 
the succession of the crown, is intolerable. Likewise, the SNP sees independence as the 
obvious and best solution to Scotland’s social and economic problems but accept that 
full devolution, taking Scotland to a place of federal union with England (as proposed 
by Fletcher), is another way of achieving the optimum level of development.  
 
Devolution Max should, in theory at least, provide Scotland with more efficient 
provision and production of public services; greater responsiveness to citizen 
preferences, transparent accountability in policymaking, better fits between public 
goods and their distribution, increased competition, experimentation, and innovation 
in the public sector, and better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for 
a diverse citizenry. This devolution, as opposed to decentralisation or delegation, 
would transfer many functions of Westminster permanently to the Scottish 
Government providing almost exactly what Fletcher was requesting with his limitations 
during the parliaments held between 1703 and the Treaty of Union in 1707. The 
constitutional magnitude of such a move does pose the question as to whether this is 
indeed possible to achieve within a federal system of dual sovereignty, or whether it is 
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necessary to avoid such dual sovereignty and aim for a soft federalism in which the 
restoration of some powers – fiscal, etc., is combined with the rebalancing of others – 
defense and foreign policy. And it remains to be seen, with a referendum proposed for 
2014, whether Devolution Max is enough to satisfy the desire for self-rule in Scotland. 
What is clear is that the rise in public opinion favouring independence and its soft 
federal counterpart is due to a discontent with the status quo.  
 
Devolution Max would provide many of the benefits of independence without 
the need for a complete separatist movement but is it enough to satisfy the Scottish 
Government (and the Scottish peoples) desire for self-rule? Devolution Max fails to 
restore full sovereignty to Scotland, sovereignty would remain with the crown in 
Westminster and the status-quo would remain.  Devolution itself implies that powers 
are surrendered to a lesser political entity, and the powers gained, although 
constitutionally difficult to revoke once achieved, would be on-loan, as it was when 
Devolution for Scotland was first negotiated. A written constitution for Scotland and a 
fundamental reform of the system of government in Westminster would be necessary 
in order to clarify and limit the nation’s powers. A re-negotiation of the Treaty of 
Union utilising the constitutional proposals of a non-incorporating union, making use 
of the twelve limitations and the pre-union status of the parliament of Scotland, as 
proposed by Fletcher, would go some way to solve the issue of sovereignty.  
 
There are of course other dangers – that of increased competition between 
Scotland and England, exacerbated by the possibility of protectionism. Scotland may 
be, in the short-term, unable to manage the increased powers and functions of its 
government and its social responsibilities. And what of immigration between to the 
two countries? If Scotland does become, as its current leader predicts, one of the more 
wealthy of the European countries which provides, as it does now, free prescriptions, a 
better national health service and free education, how long before English migrants 
flock to these wealthier shores (this is of course dependent on the Scottish 
government still having the funds to provide these generous services once the ‘block 
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grant’ is withdrawn). The antithesis may also be true. Scotland may not be able to 
increase its wealth and decrease its deficit as predicted, leaving an already poor nation 
in greater hardship. Would the English border agency accept the poor Scots fleeing to 
its southern, wealthier neighbour?  
The United Kingdom would, in Fletcher’s vision, consist of two States: Scotland 
and the Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, both being autonomous 
over domestic law, policy and finance. Each State would have its own citizenship, its 
own Crown, its own Parliament, its own responsible Government, and its own 
Constitution. The Union of Crowns would remain intact; the Queen of England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland would also be Queen of Scots. The person of the monarch would 
be united but the Crowns would be distinct and with their own constitutional roles; 
succession Acts would be negotiated and have to pass both Parliaments. There would 
be a committee of 31 members, chosen by the parliament and not the crown, to be 
elected every parliament to replace the Committee of Articles.522 In modern parlance 
this could consist of the First or Prime Minister of Scotland; The First or Prime Minister 
of England, Wales and Northern Ireland; Joint Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Defense 
and Finance, who shall be appointed upon the joint nomination of the two First 
Ministers and in charge of joint foreign policy, unified defense but not the 
administration of its own regiment, and common finances (i.e. the financial affairs of 
defense and foreign ministries) financed by each states fair contribution to a joint 
budget.523  Within this renegotiated, non-incorporating Union, the advantages of 
independence, including full autonomy in domestic affairs, law and policy may be 
achieved without the disadvantages of full independence: increased inter-state 
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competition, potential loss of confidence of foreign trading partners - and the 
constitutional difficulties presented by Devolution Max. 
The most effective way to restrict democracy is to transfer decision-making 
from the public arena to unaccountable institutions: kings and princes, priestly castes, 
military juntas, party dictatorships, or modern corporations.524 
Fletcher’s limitations are an early form of legal constitution – the writing down 
of legal requirements of governments is combined with his civic humanist 
republicanism which is more political than legal. The Scottish National Party base many 
of their claims for independence on their assumption that the British government are 
making discretionary decisions within the executive branch which have a profound 
effect on the Scottish nation but without consultation of the Scottish people. Salmond 
claims, for example, that Scotland would not have ‘participated as an independent 
country in the illegal war in Iraq’.525 He goes on to emphasise the importance of self-
government; ‘That stresses why you’ve got to have the ability and determination in 
order to chart your own way in the world so that you don’t get entangled into illegal 
and disastrous international conflicts’.526 
 
The suggestion that the executive are able to make discretionary decisions 
without scrutiny from the public or legislature, sits in tension with liberal constitutional 
values. Fletcher widely rejects the theories that support unaccountable decision 
making by the executive, even in times of crisis. Whereas Hobbes supports the theory 
that sovereign powers should not be held accountable to law by their subjects, this 
theory no longer has much credence in contemporary democratic and liberal politics. 
Unaccountability is in violation of the rule of law which connects the constitution with 
the common good. There is no room in Fletcher’s (or liberal) constitution for an 
executive power with unilateral and arbitrary powers. Within a federally constituted 
and devolved Britain. Salmond argues that the people of Scotland would have full say 
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in its political affairs, helping to shape the policies and government of Scotland, the 
voice of the Scottish people no longer a minority to be ignored by Westminster.  
 
As already noted, the Fletcherian constitutional checks and balances are 
designed to separate the legislative and executive powers in order to avoid absolutism 
or arbitrary power. Unreviewable and discretionary decisions breach the constitution 
which maintains that the executive is held accountable to the public, through the 
legislature, people and courts. There should be no act made against the public good; 
any act that is in breach of one is, by definition, in breach of the other, and 
unreviewable and discretionary decisions are against the public good. Conformity with 
the checks and balances on the divided powers, as rationally realised through the 
structural system of the mixed government, limit any need to further restrain the 
power of the executive. With Machiavelli heavily influencing Fletcher’s fundamental 
political ideas, he questions the nature and purpose of the state, placing its legitimacy 
at the centre of his political and social analysis. Like Machiavelli, Fletcher assumes the 
purpose of the state is to promote the virtue and well-being of its citizens, shifting his 
enquiry away from questions concerning the morality of the government’s goals 
towards questions concerning the acquisition and exercise of political power. Fletcher 
thus places accountability, legitimacy and obligation as fundamental elements of just 
rule and the pursuance of the common good.  
 
Fletcher’s conditions of government require consent for legitimacy; non-
consensual power is both arbitrary and unlawful and may be resisted if necessary. 
Fletcher proposes a theory of balance of obligations, appealing to his prevailing model 
of political obligations and reciprocity. Political obligation requires voluntary action; 
within a political setting this involves the voluntary acceptance of benefits in return for 
the obedience of laws. At the individual level, by accepting benefits and assistance 
from another I am accepting the obligation to reciprocate with the same assistance 
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and benefits when required. This is an ‘obligation of reciprocation’.527 Within the 
broader political setting, the acceptance of protection and other advantages the state 
can provide obliges the citizens to uphold laws. In order for the state to achieve its 
obligations, members of society must obey its rules. The members of society benefit 
from the state’s achievement of its aims and therefore are obliged in two ways: they 
have voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the state and by choosing 
to remain within that state consent to the rules of that society; the citizens will benefit 
from the state and, as a matter of self-interest, must obey that state in order for it to 
achieve its obligations to them, in return for their obligations to it. There is an 
argument in favour of independence that the current government in place in 
Westminster was not given consent by the Scottish people, the Conservative Party only 
gaining one seat in Scotland in the last general election. Under these conditions, 
Fletcher would maintain that the Scottish people have the right to resist and are under 
no obligation to consent to and obey the present government.   
 
The individual citizen benefits from the law-abidance of others, and is therefore 
obliged to abide by the law themselves so that others may benefit from their law-
abidance. The citizen body benefits from the state achievements of its aims and is 
therefore obliged to ensure the state is capable of achieving its aims. These obligations 
are reciprocal; the state benefits from the law abidance of its citizens and is therefore 
obliged to provide the conditions for the continued mutually beneficial status quo.528  
 
‘The laws are the only security we have for our lives and properties, which if our 
sovereign subverts, subjects cannot be blamed, for making use of the ordinary means 
to preserve them, and since this cannot be done without withdrawing obedience from 
such a magistrate as goes about to destroy them, such an act cannot properly be said 
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to punish him, (because we take nothing from him which he has a just claim), but do 
only shun the occasion of making ourselves miserable.529 
 
In his speeches Fletcher explicitly sets out the terms of a social contract 
between the state and the people, what he calls, ‘conditions of government’, the 
constitutional structure of Scotland and England’s governments. He sets out twelve 
conditions of government including the stipulation that the King must sanction all the 
laws offered by the estates, that he cannot, without the consent of the parliament, 
have the power to declare war or peace, and that if he breaks any of these conditions 
of government, he shall forfeit the crown. Fletcher justifies these limitations on 
monarchical power by means of theories of consent and contractual obligations. 
Legitimacy is a key concept, and all reciprocal political obligations rely on this principle. 
Fletcher’s social contract theory is subjectivist; it justifies political cooperation and 
arrangements by showing they would be agreed to as rational means of advancing 
subjective ends. Persons are motivated by the desires and interests they have at a 
given time, there is no independent standard of value other than what is required or 
desired in response to a particular concern.530 If the Scottish National Party were to 
pay more attention to Fletcher, they may find arguments such as these useful in 
legitimising their claims for independence; it was similar arguments that helped the 
Scottish devolution take place in 1998. 
 
As both Skinner and Pettit have claimed, a citizen is only free if he enjoys 
freedom from dependence within a state that is also free from domination by another 
state. The nature of contemporary political Britain gives us clear reason to adopt 
Fletcher’s political thought as an exemplar for modeling the United Kingdom. This 
federal republican model is also intended to fit the newly emerging international 
system of states. Fletcher’s interdependent Europe consisted of independent and 
autonomous states struggling to find harmony in the chaos left by war, empire building 
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and decline, and incipient commercial growth. Fletcher intended to balance the 
European system and create a perpetual peace based on the interdependence that 
was created by the developing commercial Europe. By expanding his domestic model 
of a federal republic to fit the European state system, he produces a model for a 
balance of power among the states and his version of perpetual peace.   
 
Conclusion:  
 
Deudney has suggested that a republican model of international politics is best 
equipped to deal with the security issues of the global political order and Fletcher 
provides a model that recognises the threats to security that come with both hierarchy 
and anarchy.531 His European system was dependent on a cosmopolitan recognition of 
communal interests, and it is here we can see Fletcher combining the structure of a 
republic of republics based on a community of mankind sharing an inclusive moral 
code and economic interest. This moral code is not based on universal shared values or 
norms, but on a commitment to the continuation of a shared social life; the purpose of 
protecting the rights of the citizens would oblige the state to respect the rights of all 
human beings and, as a consequence, nations. Justice would be a result of the 
obligations to the preservation of society – not as equal or distributive justice, but as 
the non-domination or suppression of the weak and the poor by the rich. Fletcher has 
a very valuable contribution to make to modern politics, offering standards for the 
best ordering of the international system and the proper conduct of states towards 
one another, all based on conceptions of the common good, interest, and most 
importantly, peace.  
 
It is clear that Fletcher is a political commentator and not a political 
philosopher. He does not have a grand theory of human nature, nor attempt the 
questions as to the meaning of society, or life. He accepts that man was corruptible - 
that luxury and power threatened social life; that human nature was sociable but 
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tempered by greed and avarice. He acknowledges that the system of states is plagued 
by self-interest and war, and that perpetual peace and universal harmony is not 
possible. Yet, Fletcher wishes to limit the suffering of his fellow men and limit the 
dependence man had on the state, and the state had on other states for their welfare 
and security. He provides a model of universal cooperation which he hopes will limit 
the wars of aggrandizement which cause so much misery, and advance prosperity and 
wellbeing throughout Europe. By studying the political works of Fletcher, we can see 
how important he is to modern republican theory. His introduction of commerce to 
the doctrine gave it relevance to the political structure of the coming modern age and 
the enlightenment figures who were able to develop his theories further and who are 
themselves, vital to our own understanding of politics, history and philosophy. It is 
John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard who tell us that one’s own discipline’s identity 
depends a great deal on its past and how we write and understand the history of the 
past.532 Fletcher recognises the importance of his predecessors on his own thought, 
and the republican theorists of today would be served well by revisiting Fletcher for an 
understanding of the republican political tradition as it now stands. Fletcher’s goals are 
not unlike our own, we seek to live freely and equally within a just society in which the 
common goods of man could flourish.  
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Conclusion - Bringing it Together 
 
It is fairly innocuous to suggest we do not live in a just world. It would be less 
innocuous, however, to suggest that we should not be attempting to create a just 
world, or that it would be impossible to do so. It is still unclear what form a just world 
could take, or exactly what scope justice could take on a world scale, or even as 
McIntyre asks – whose justice?533 But it is possible that justice is both impossible and 
unnecessary, and what is possible and necessary is balance and virtue in politics. It is to 
these two conceivable components of politics that we should be looking to provide not 
justice, but dignity and peace, as well as liberty and economic growth and 
development. With balance and virtue in global politics, the welfare of individuals 
within states can be better achieved. At least, this is what Fletcher assumes and this 
gives us the best reason to look to his theories of balance of power, liberty as non-
dependence, and peace built on commercial relations and cooperation, as a model for 
contemporary republican international order. What is more important than any issue 
of justice is the recognition that the situation is dire for a very large percentage of the 
world’s population and we have yet to find a way of correcting it.  
 
Some argue that humanitarian aid is detrimental, and it is better to help them 
help themselves. This is the very basis of Fletcher’s desire for Scottish independence 
and self-governance. Recognising that the only way the people of Scotland would get 
out of their miserable condition is to develop their economic and political 
infrastructures. Whereas his model of a European federal republic creates a jigsaw of 
obligations and responsibilities between states that is not universal in practice, it has a 
global reach. Although some may have an issue with this rather Hobbesian version of 
justice based on rational recognition of self-interest, preferring a conception of justice 
based on moral motivations, it can be argued that what matters is the expedience 
rather than the foundation. Nagel points to the economic facts of injustice; that 
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twenty-percent of the world’s population live on less than one dollar a day, with forty-
five percent on less than two dollars per day, meanwhile fifteen percent of the 
population living in high-income economies has on average seventy-five dollars per 
day. As he states, the situation is so grim that perhaps justice is a side issue.534 Once 
again, if the situation is as grim as Nagel suggests, and getting more dire by the day, 
then it does not matter whether improvement of the situation comes from ‘justice’, an 
Hobbesian self-interested contract, a Fletcherian balance based on commercial 
interests, or from an underlying morality of the human condition - what matters is 
something is done to address the dire circumstances of a large proportion of mankind.  
 
Is there morality in politics? Fletcher certainly thinks so. He does not have a 
conception of distributive justice or social equality, but does see that economic growth 
will benefit the whole community and will raise the poor condition in which his fellow 
Scots live. The moderate communitarian proposals of Etzioni are based on his 
recognition that the community is a strong foundation for peace and justice; it must be 
cultivated alongside individual needs to provide a sufficient foundation for rights and 
freedoms. Fletcher also recognises the mutual needs of the individual and society – 
identifying the reliance one has on the other for its/their security. The political 
assumptions of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century republicans with regard to the 
individual can be compared with modern political discourse. The commonwealth-man 
regarded the excessive individualism of the new commercial society as the root cause 
of corruption and insecurity, as each man gives up his virtue and pursuit of the 
common good for self-interested claims of wealth and luxury. The demands of an 
integrated international society rely on a solidarist principle which serves the 
interested of the community of mankind first, an understanding that the individual and 
the individual state is not ontologically prior to humanity, is required. 
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There is no reason to think that Fletcher would suggest a solidarist view of the 
global political order where states are not the main political actors, but rather an 
international society in which states, as the main actors, work collaboratively with a 
shared view and goal; placing the needs of mankind before the needs of the individual 
or the state. The pluralist argument that asserts states have a morality in and of 
themselves because of raison d’état, is a regular theme in Fletcher’s work and Fletcher 
envisions a European society in which the state is the predominant actor. Political 
activity is principally focused on the security and welfare of the European region as a 
whole which, in turn, secures the state and offers the opportunity for growth and 
economic development which, again, best secures the needs of the individual. By 
looking beyond the state towards the larger community, the individual is better 
served. But the question remains as to where the integrity and coherence of 
international society comes from when the shared norms of religion, ethnicity and 
even nationhood can no longer be assumed by proximity. 
 
David Miller objects to a European-wide republican model arguing that the 
institutional devices – federalism, constitutional checks and balances , and public spirit 
created by the neo-republicans such as Fletcher and Mathison – necessary to preserve 
liberty in the eighteenth-century cannot easily protect it today. 535  It is Miller’s 
contention that national identity provides the historical foundation for civic trust 
which is necessary for republican citizenship, and therefore it is unlikely that any 
European sense of patriotism would emerge – certainly not one strong enough to 
create the bonds of civic trust. Furthermore, factions at a European level promote self-
interest above any EU wide notion of the common good; the motivational pre-
conditions for European citizenship just aren’t present – the basis for cosmopolitan 
republican citizenship, or what motivates individuals to engage in transnational politics 
are not present. 
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What can be said in response however is that Fletcher’s vision of small 
republics coalescing to form a large, European republic, answers Miller’s motivational 
pre-condition concern. Fletcher does not need to consider the historical bond for 
creating civic trust, as the national politics combined with local politics within his 
federal republican model requires reciprocity – the mutual assistance of nearest 
neighbours forming a chain of cooperation and mutual aid if necessary and returning 
to the balance of power theories presented in a previous chapter. A rudimentary yet 
plausible form of global community thus presents itself across the international 
network of republics. Thus, global citizenship is a necessary consequence rather than a 
necessary pre-condition. But is this mutual assistance across federal republics enough 
to be considered a global community or a global republican citizenry? Of course, 
republican citizenship should require a concept of the common good; shared practices 
of social cooperation and at least, in theory, a notion of distributive justice, as well as 
the willingness and ability to defend the institutions of their civil liberty.  
 
There is no liberal rejection of patriotism in Fletcher’s work, quite the opposite, 
he assumes patriotism creates community and communities form the bond which is 
the basis for achieving the common good. This patriotism is extended to include a love 
of other communities whose development and welfare helps the first achieve its 
goals.536 Although he begins in his account by rejecting patriotism as a basis for justice 
and order, Fletcher does see a way in which a man can be a good citizen to both his 
country and to mankind, supposing patriotism as a virtue necessitates a love of 
mankind. His model for a federal Europe would be, in his words,’ the best to preserve 
mankind, as well from great and destructive wars, as from corruption of manners, and 
most proper to give to every part of the world that just share in the government of 
themselves which is due to them’.’537 
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The purpose of critiquing neo-republican theory was to draw attention to the 
similarities of the neo-republican theories of Pettit and Pocock, amongst others, and 
the early modern republican theories of Andrew Fletcher. By comparing the two 
models this thesis is able to emphasise the importance of Fletcher’s thought to 
contemporary political theory. For example, Pettit’s concept of non-domination is 
analogous to Fletcher’s non-dependence model; this non-dependence approach allows 
us to face the challenges that a global civil society based on inter-dependence and 
international interference on the internal affairs of a state presents, avoiding. 
Furthermore, this is evidence of his modern approach to the republican prototype; 
providing a more easily utilised version than the Harringtonian archetype.  
 
The neo-republican attempts to aid a contemporary global society, struggling to 
meet the challenges of global poverty and injustice. Dissatisfaction with liberalism’s 
failure to address these issues allowed for the republican paradigm to regain favour, 
but in attempts to demonstrate the differences between the two models, and 
establish one as superior to the other, the usefulness of both approaches has been 
fractured. The Fletcherian method of combining the best aspects of both; emphasising 
the necessity of working towards the common good in order to achieve the 
improvement of the individual good – has largely been ignored. Contemporary 
Republican theorists such as Sunstein and Etzioni offer a republican model which is 
entirely compatible with contemporary notions of liberty and justice, much closer to 
the model proposed by Fletcher at the turn of the eighteenth-century. But even 
Etzioni’s ‘third way’ is barely distinguishable from the early modern republican 
approach of Fletcher which can be seen to draw together the supposed polar 
opposites of liberalism and republicanism.  
 
As Onuf suggests, the modern republicans have absorbed the early modern 
themes of the ancient republican paradigm; accepting that the function of political 
society was for the common good - the provision of the conditions conducive to a 
shared experience judged as ‘good’. Republicanism refers to the organisation of a 
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political society, where political association takes precedence over individual 
autonomy. For the moderns, as society separated into a system of states, from Grotius 
through to Kant, the stress was on the interconnectedness over the independence of 
states.538 Of course, the early modern republican models are limited in their efficacy 
for these contemporary issues, not including any sense of inter-dependence or 
international commerce, both of which Fletcher is keenly aware. Yet the early modern 
republican emphasis on self-government and freedom of political action from arbitrary 
rule fit the needs of a fractured global political order; providing the fundamental 
blocks to survival for nations struggling to maintain self-rule while coming to terms 
with increasing international interference. Laborde at least recognises republicanism’s 
positive contribution to the debate surrounding global inequality and domination; 
republican refusal to reject all interference in internal affairs allows institutions such as 
the UN and the IMF access to developing communities, allowing them to influence the 
development of cooperative and stable political societies.539 What is apparent is that 
the neo-republican theories being rebranded as cosmopolitan republicanism or 
communitarianism are barely distinguishable from the early modern theories of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, but for the ‘modernising’ element of commerce 
which results in a very Fletcherian republican approach that has been, to date, largely 
ignored. 
  
The civic humanist ideal originated in the reassertion of the vita active – the 
ultimate goal of the citizen was to assert his virtue in (political) action (for the common 
good) of which the republic was the frame. Fletcher’s history of liberty (as is found in 
the discourses) highlights his for a civic morality that could not be found within 
political discourse at the turn of the eighteenth-century.540 Fletcher is using republican 
language and is in many respects purporting republican ideals, tempered by a liberal 
sense of justice. The common good is a republican ideal, committed to liberty under 
                                                          
538 Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. The Republican Legacy in International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998: 7. 
539 Laborde, Cecile, ibid. 
540 Pocock, J.G.A. The Machiavellian Moment: ibid:432. 
239 
 
law, with responsibility for the collective well-being of the community. It is this that 
distinguishes Fletchers’ republicanism and where his greatest intellectual contribution 
to republican debates remains, making him entirely relevant to contemporary politics. 
 
The civic tradition, of which Fletcher is a clear advocate, emphasises the 
concept of sovereignty, the unifying force of governance (the monarchy being 
exemplary because of its unitary form of government) and freedom from arbitrary 
rule. According to Robertson, this tradition sees liberty not as freedom to participate in 
government, nor the good of the community, but as a natural or historical right of the 
individual. Michael Sandel (1996) and Charles Taylor (1995) both favour a strong civic 
humanist, neo-Athenian republicanism, emphasising the political participation in self-
governing communities, an important aspect of Fletcher’s ideal republic, yet Fletcher 
cannot be considered a neo-Athenian republican proper; his ideal republic being rather 
a hybrid of Roman and Athenian republican values.541 The Roman tradition holds that 
people do not wish not to be ruled, but rather they do not wish to be ruled over 
arbitrarily. As a neo-Roman republican, Fletcher understands the republican model to 
be best served by a mixed government that upholds the res publica and not their own 
interests. And this is where Fletcher utilises the Athenian model; incorporating the 
necessity of political participation and civic duty – thus providing further necessary 
checks and balances on the government that prevent self-interested and arbitrary rule.  
 
The political dissonance inherent in Fletcher’s version of early modern 
republicanism may be a barrier to his political theories being accepted by 
contemporary republican theorists, yet it is this dissonance which allows Fletcher to 
modernise the early modern republican ideas of Harrington and Machiavelli, and 
provide a model for liberty and good governance based on non-dependence which fits 
well with our contemporary ideas of social justice and equality. Fletcher is 
                                                          
541 Sandel, Michael. Democracy’s Discontent, ibid. Taylor, Charles. “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism”. Boston 
Review (19) Oct/Nov, 1994. Reprinted in For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Joshua Cohen, 
(ed). Boston: Beacon Press, 1996: 119-21. 
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incomprehensible without republicanism, but is not clearly to be found within it. He 
backs the monarchy, although within its limits, engages in a Machiavellian pursuit of 
civic responsibility, yet believes in progress and development. He believes in virtue and 
the common good and blames luxury for the corruption of society, but is eager to 
promote free-trade and commerce. One could argue that Fletcher was either a poor 
republican, one who did not quite understand the language or the limits, or the 
limitations of republicanism were not acceptable to him. Fletcher’s civic-humanism is 
incorporated into his cosmopolitan and communitarian ideals and his desire for 
progress, as such it is clear that any differences between cosmopolitanism, 
communitarianism and republicanism, are not as irreconcilable as assumed. 
 
Of the themes that dominate Fletcher’s political writings the subjects of self-
interest, (whether individual or raison d’état), and the common good, liberty and 
justice are most prevalent. Whereas republican theorists in his own time were 
attempting to replace the republican paradigm of civic virtue with a more realist 
concept of self-interest, Fletcher is making attempts to combine the two divergent 
ideas to show how they both contributed to the common good and were, therefore, 
two parts of the same achievable goal. Commerce is a key contributor to the common 
good as well as to the degradation of civic morality – it is both the cause of the 
corruption of the civic moral way of life and brings an end to the ancient gothic 
constitution. The growth of a market economy was inevitable and necessary for the 
primary good – economic development would eliminate poverty and stabilise the 
nation. It is here that the most common theme in Fletcher’s political thought is most 
apparent – that self-interest prevents cooperation among states unless the state is 
able to recognise that virtue in commerce (albeit a paradox in terms) is a sound basis 
for economic growth. By accepting commerce as a force of good, Fletcher can be 
considered to be abandoning his republican principles, but it should be seen as 
Fletcher being an astute political observer who recognises the inevitability of 
commercial society and making plans for it to benefit the republic. Fletcher 
modernises republican theory by equating a commitment to the developing society 
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and the economy with virtue and a commitment to the community, the essential 
attribute to a civil way of life.  
 
It is therefore apparent that a contemporary republican model of politics based 
on early modern paradigms of the common good, civic virtue and egalitarianism can be 
the model for a global political order. This idea of a global political order should not be 
confused with global governance, but equated with the idea of global citizenry – an old 
idea which has enjoyed a renewed enthusiasm. As such, this thesis suggests a new 
normative approach to global politics based on a Fletcherian republican template 
which is attentive to the related theories and goals of cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism, but which does not lead to a soft concept of international society 
concerned purely with morality without considering the needs of commerce and 
power politics. Fletcher’s civic-humanist republicanism reaches far beyond the Treaty 
of Union in 1707, the Glorious Revolution or the Spanish Succession Crisis, and is a 
necessary model for contemporary politics and theories of political order. His 
contribution to political theory cannot be easily dismissed. He articulates a republican 
political theory of citizenship which, structured as it is around concepts of non-
dependence, liberty and equality, is capable of enhancing contemporary liberal and 
republican principles of non-interference and non-domination. Unlike Machiavelli and 
Harrington, there is no apparent tension between Andrew Fletcher and the 
contemporary Republican theorists; the concerns of Fletcher are the same concerns as 
his modern counter-parts, their approaches towards the solutions are the same.  
 
This evolution of republican political thought has taken some of the best parts 
of civic humanism (early modern republicanism); civic duty, political participation as 
the source of liberty and justice, and the emphasis on the common good, combined it 
with the republican notions of freedom as non-domination, and the liberal ideals of 
freedom as non-interference, and the pursuit of self-interest promoting the public 
good. Fletcher combines these republican and liberal ideals in his own version of early 
modern republicanism, modernising the model by bringing commerce into the 
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equation for the first time. His republican model incorporates key liberal ideals: 
collective security, interdependence, the rule of law and human rights. For Fletcher, 
socio-economic development alongside virtue, recognised here as political 
participation and self-governance, are required for liberty and justice. It is this that 
proves Fletcher’s model of civic humanism is relevant to modern political theory.  
 
This thesis shows Fletcher as a significant figure in the republican tradition. His 
intellectual, if not political, contribution is fundamental to a proper understanding of 
the republican paradigm. Using the early modern republican model of Andrew Fletcher 
to critique contemporary republican theories, this thesis proves Fletcher is a vital 
contributor to the contemporary debates concerned with global order and justice. 
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, writing at the turn of the eighteenth-century, is a relevant 
political theorist for contemporary politics; his vision for a federal Britain and Europe 
based on the early modern republican model incorporating civic virtue and the more 
modern factor of commerce is relevant to today’s political order. Within Fletcher’s 
model of a federal republic of Europe, similar to the models suggested by 
contemporary republican and liberal political theorists; his models of non-dependence, 
liberty and civic virtue, we can recognise the fundamental components of 
contemporary republican theory.  
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Appendix 1.  
 
Act for the security of the kingdom, brought in by the same member. 
 
The estates of parliament considering, that when it shall please God to afflict this 
nation with the death of our Sovereign Lady the Queen (whom God of his infinite 
mercy long preserve) if the same shall happen to be without heirs of her body, this 
kingdom may fall into great confusion and disorder before a successor can be declared. 
For preventing thereof, our Sovereign Lady, with advice and consent of the estates of 
parliament, statutes and ordains, that if at the foresaid time, any parliament or 
convention of estates shall be assembled, then the members of that parliament or 
convention of estates shall take the administration of the government upon them: 
excepting those barons and burghs, who at the foresaid time shall have any place or 
pension, mediately or immediately of the crown: whose commissions are hereby 
declared to be void; and that new members shall be chosen in their place: but if there 
be no parliament or convention of estates actually assembled, then the members of 
the current parliament shall assemble with all possible diligence: and if there be no 
current parliament, then the members of the last dissolved parliament, or convention 
of estates, shall assemble in like manner: and in those two last cases, so soon as there 
shall be one hundred members met, in which number the barons and burghs before-
mentioned are not to be reckoned, they shall take the administration of the 
government upon them: but neither they, nor the members of parliament, or 
convention of estates, if at the time foresaid assembled, shall proceed to the weighty 
affair of naming and declaring a successor, until twenty days after they have assumed 
the administration of the government: both that there may be time for all the other 
members to come to Edinburgh, which is hereby declared the place of their meeting, 
and for the elections of new barons and burghs in place above-mentioned. But so soon 
as the twenty days are elapsed then they shall proceed to the publishing by 
proclamation the conditions of government, on which they will receive the successor 
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to the imperial crown of this realm; which in the case only of our being under the same 
king with England, are as follows. 
 
 1.That elections shall be made at every Michaelmas head-court for a new 
parliament every year; to sit the first of November next following, and adjourn 
themselves from time to time, till next Michaelmas: that they choosetheir own 
president, and that everything shall be determined by balloting, in place of 
voting. 
 2.That so many lesser barons shall be added to the parliament, as there have 
been noblemen created since the last augmentation of the number of the 
barons; and that in all time coming, for every nobleman that shall be created, 
there shall be a baron added to the parliament. 
 3.That no man have vote in parliament, but a nobleman or elected member. 
 4.That the king shall give the sanction to all laws offered by the estates; and 
that the president of the parliament be empowered by his majesty to give the 
sanction in his absence, and have ten pounds sterling a day salary. 
 5.That a committee of one and thirty members, of which nine to be a quorum, 
chosen out of their number, by every parliament, shall, during the intervals of 
parliament, under the king, have the administration of the government, be his 
council, and accountable to the next parliament; with power in extraordinary 
occasions, to call the parliament together: and that in the said council, all things 
be determined by balloting in place of voting. 
 6.That the king without consent of parliament shall not have the power of 
making peace and war; or that of concluding any treaty with any other state or 
potentate. 
 7.That all places and offices, both civil and military, and all pensions formerly 
conferred by our kings, shall ever after be given by parliament. 
 8.That no regiment or company of horse, foot, or dragoons be kept on foot in 
peace or war, but by consent of parliament. 
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 9.That all the fencible men of the nation, betwixt sixty and fifteen, be with all 
diligence possible armed with bayonets, and firelocks all of a calibre, and 
continue always provided in such arms with ammunition suitable. 
 10.That no general indemnity, nor pardon for any transgression against the 
public, shall be valid without consent of parliament. 
 11.That the fifteen senators of the college of justice shall be incapable of being 
members of parliament, or of any other office, or any pension: but the salary 
that belongs to their place to be increased as the parliament shall think fit: that 
the office of president shall be in three of their number to be named by 
parliament, and that there be no extraordinary lords. And also, that the lords of 
the justice court shall be distinct from those of the session, and under the same 
restrictions. 
 12.That if any king break in upon any of these conditions of government, he 
shall by the estates be declared to have forfeited the crown.542 
 
 
 
                                                          
542 Fletcher. “Speeches made by a Member of Parliament Which Began at Edinburgh the 6th May, 1703”. In 
Robertson. Andrew Fletcher Political Works. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 138-139. 
